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Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph. D. degree 
by Donald J. Childs 
on 
The Religious Dimensions of T. S. Eliot's 
Early Life, Poetry, and Thought 
This thesis is a contribution to the arqument that T. S. 
Eliot's life, poetry, and thought form a continuous, consistent, 
and coherent whole. Toward this end, it explores the religious 
dimensions of Eliot's early readings in philosophy, anthropology, 
Christian mysticism, and Christian theology, 
The first chapter discusses Eliot's acquaintance with 
the work of T. E. Hulme, Irving Babbitt, and Charles Maurras-- 
showing sources in their political and literary conservatism 
for Eliot's religious conservatism. The following chapter, 
concentrating upon the impact of J. G. Frazer's Golden Bo F 
demonstrates the ways in which Eliot used his early anthropo- 
logical readings to articulate his spiritual concerns. The 
next chapter explores Henri Bergson's continuing influence upon 
Eliot--despite the latter's occasionally dismissive attitude 
toward the former--emphasizing the ways in which Bergsonism 
catered to Eliot's predisposition towards mysticism. Similarly, 
P 
chapter four emphasizes the pervasive conceptual influence of 
F. H. Bradley who, as the subject of Eliot's Harvard dissertation, 
not surprisingly appears in the language by which Eliot later 
articulates his religious and poetic beliefs. Chapter five 
discusses Eliot's readings in mysticism during his final years 
2 
at Harvard. Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism proves a particularly 
active and enduring influence. The final chapter explores the 
impact upon Eliot of his early reading of various Anglican 
divines--including, among otherst Lancelot Andrewes, John Donne, 
and Hugh Latimer. 
The conclusion reached is that a large part of the pattern 
in the carpet of Eliot's mature poetry and thought is woven from 
the religious elerents in his early reading. In short, Eliot's 
end is very much apparent in his beginning. 
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Introduction 
In a letter to Paul Elmer More in 1936, T. S. Eliot dis- 
cussed his early spiritual biography. He was responding to 
an article in which More had discussed aspects of his own 
spiritual biography: 
' 
What touches me most closely is the suggestion, 
here and there, of a spiritual biography which, 
if I may say so without presumption, is oddly, even 
grotesquely, more like my own, so far as I can see, 
than that of any human being I have known. And when 
you say, 
"I have often wondered what line my experience 
might have taken had I been brought up in a 
form of worship from which the office of the 
imagination and the aesthetic emotions had not 
been so ruthlessly evicted. 
I have made the same speculation. But I am inclined 
to think that I know how to value these things better, 
just for having (being me) to struggle for so long, 
and for so many years so blindly and errantly, towards 
them. 2 
Moreover, as J. D. Margolis notes, "Having reached the bottom 
of this page, Eliot appended to his typewritten letter, in ink, 
'May one say, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit? -"' 
3 
Eliot, 
then, shares More's conception of the close relationship between 
the anglo-catholic form of worship and the office of the imagina- 
tion and the aesthetic emotions. The long, blind, and often 
errant struggle which Eliot describes, therefore, refers just 
as much to his struggle for faith as it does to his struggle 
for a satisfying aesthetic. The note which he appended to the 
letter, t however, reveals his belief that the Holy Spirit was 
present in this strugqle and led him from the early loss of 
2 
his faith to the later acceptance of a more imaqinative faith 
and the discovery in his own poetry of his Christian vocation. 
In retrospect, then, Eliot is able to discern in his early 
experiences the influence of the Holv Spirit working to reveal 
to him a Christian faith and vocation. Presumably, this claim 
is at least partially verifiable; that is, there must be an 
objective--and so potentially verifiable--pattern of development 
such that Eliot is able to isolate a pattern of influence which 
he can attribute sincerely--however controversially--to the 
Holy Spirit. Even if the Holy Spirit does not exist, or if 
Eliot was not in fact graced by its guidance, the pattern of 
influence he observes exists nonetheless for havinq been mis- 
interpreted. The task of the literary researcher, therefore, 
is not to seek to settle any question as to the influence--or 
existence--of the Holy Spirit, but to seek to verify the exist- 
ence of a pattern of religious influence in Eliot's early ex- 
perience, 
Because Eliot does not actually document the religious 
influences he sees in his early experiences, one cannot hope 
to demonstrate the many subtle and perhaps inexpressible ex- 
periences which he later came to regard as religious influences. 
One must be content instead to explore the principal objects 
of his early intellectual concerns and demonstrate therein the 
religious dimensions. To demonstrate that his early reading is 
in many respects consistent with his later anglo-catholicism, 
for instance, is to show that a religious influence from this 
reading is at least possible. 
Such an influence is likely, moreover, given Eliot's ex- 
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planation of the nature of the reading experience. In reading, 
he argues, one is affected wholly, as a human being, whether 
or not one intends to be and whether or not one knows it: 
I suppose that everything we eat has some other 
effect upon us than merely the pleasure of taste 
and mastication; it affects us during the process 
of assimilation and digestion; and I believe that 
exactly the same is true of anything we read. 4 
Reading, therefore, is one of the experiences upon which a 
poet's mind goes to work: 
Wien a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its 
work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate ex- 
perience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, 
irregular, fraqmentarv. The latter falls in love, 
or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have 
nothing to do with each other, or with the noise 
of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the 
mind of the 5 poet 
these experiences are always forming 
new wholes. 
For Eliot, reading is not merely a matter of intellectual assent 
or dissent; it is an experience which answers a wide variety 
of intellectual, emotional, and spiritual needs. In general, 
then,, one is likelv to find in Eliot some sort of religious 
influence from his early reading. 
The likelihood of any particular religious influence, how- 
ever, depends upon several factors. Given that there is a 
religious dimension to the writing in question, of primary 
importance in determining its influence is the impact of the 
reading upon Eliot. The passion with which Eliot devoted him- 
self in turn to the writings of Henri Bergson and F. H. Bradley, 
for example, bears witness to the emotional impact which these 
writings achieved. Generally, the greater the impact, the more 
4 
pervasive any influence is likely to be. Relevant as well 
in determining religious influences in Eliot's early reading 
is the duration of the impact of the writers and writings in 
question. He encountered the writings of Irving Babbitt, 
Charles Maurras, and T. E. Hulme between 1906 and 1916, for 
instance, and they are still current in his conceptual voca- 
bulary twenty or more years later. Similarly,, he studied the 
writings of certain Anglican divines and certain saints and 
mystics both well before and well after his conversion. For 
these writers to continue to be important to Eliot, from his 
sceptical youth, through his conversion, to his mature faith, 
they must each have satisfied first, his aesthetic demands, 
and then,, his religious needs, for Eliot's conscious priority 
as a young poet was aesthetic, and not religious. Presumably, 
however, the religious dimensions of these writers and their 
works, cherished by Eliot the anglo-catholic, existed potentially 
for Eliotr the spiritually confused young poet, at the time of 
his first acquaintance with them. And so, although the influence 
of these writers is not exclusively religious, neither is it 
exclusively aesthetic. In the end, after all, Eliot's aesthetic 
is closely bound up with his religion; it is not surprising, 
thereforer that the influence of Bergson and Bradley, for instance 
should appear first in Eliot's aesthetic thought, and then his 
religious thought* 
In order to estimate the nature and extent of the influence 
of the religious element in this early reading, then, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate that what Eliot derives from this 
early reading is consistent with his later anglo-catholic faith 
5 
and that passions expressed in his early life, poetry, and 
thought not only derive logically and emotionally from this 
early reading, but also lead, by the same logic and emotion, 
to the conversion announced publiclv in the For Lancelot 
Andrewes declaration of 1928. 
Endnotes 
1 
See Paul Elmer More, "Marginalia, " American Review, 8 
(1936),, 25-6. 
2 
T. S. Eliot, Letter to Paul Elmer More, 1936, as quoted 
by John D. Margolis, T. S. Eliot's Intellectual Development 
1922-1939 (London: University of Chicago Press, 1972 145. 
3 
John D. Margolis, T. S. Eliot's Intellectual Development 
1922-1939 (London: University of Chicago Press, 19721-, P. 145. 
4 
T. S. Eliot,, "Religion and Literature,, " in Selected Essays, 
3rd enlarged ed. (1932; rpt. London: Faber and F-iber, 1951), 
p. 394. 
5 
T. S. Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets,, " in Homage to John 
Dryden: Three Essays on Poetrv of the Seventeenth Centurv 
London: Hoqarth Press, 1924), p. 30. 
Chapter One: Babbitt, Maurras, Hulme 
T. S. Eliot was born into a family with a strong tradition 
of Unitarianism. 
1 
Convincred that man was basically a noble 
creature, the Unitarian of Eliot's exprerience did not empha- 
size the damnation implicit in the concept of Original Sin; 
he ignored many of the general theological scruples responsible 
for distinctions between orthodoxy and hereasy. The Unitar- 
ianism of the St. Louis Eliots, then, provided a liberal dogma 
against which the maturing poet could react. Similarly, the 
Puritan aspect of the New England Eliot mind produced in the 
family's most celebrated poet a Puritan sensitivity, if not a 
Puritan sensibility. F. O. Matthiessen finds in Eliot the same 
Puritanical cast of mind that Henry James exhibits: passion 
ovenveighed by thought, high moral idealism restrained by 
practical prudence, absorption in the problem of belief, and 
dry, unexpected wit. 
2 That the Puritan influence upon Eliot's 
thought was a radical one is confirmed by Lyndall Gordon's 
explanation of Eliot's dislike of candy: 
I 
T. S. Eliot acknowledged that his early training in 
self-denial left him permanently scarred by an in- 
ability to enjoy even harmless pleasures. He learnt, 
for instance, that it was self-indulgent to buy candy, 
and it was not until he was forced to stop smoking 
for health reasons in his sixties that he could bring 
himself to eat it as a substitute. 3 
Though mereely accidents of tho environment into which he was 
born, the Unitarian and Puritan influences of Eliot's youth 
left a definite mark upon his consciousness. 
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From this perspective, the accidents of Eliot' s early 
lif e appear to have caused the concerns of his maturer years 
as poet and critic. But this is not the only perspective 
possible. One might argue instead that Eliot's later concern 
with personal salvation "caused" these accidents of early 
life--or at least caused his later interpretation of their 
influence. The appropriate explanation depends upon whether 
one adopts a mechanistic or energic perspective-terms which 
derive from an essay by C. G. Jung quoted by Eliot in "The 
Frontiers of Criticism": 
It is a generally recoqnised truth (says Jung) that 
physical events can be looked at in two ways, that is 
from the mechanistic and from the energic standpoint. 
The mechanistic view is purely causal: from this 
standpoint an event is conceived as 
- 
the result of a 
cause. ... The enerqic viewpoint on the other hand is in essence final; the event is traced from effect 
to cause on the assumption that energy forms the 
4 essential basis of changes in phenomena. ... 
Applyinq this double perspective not just to an isolated physical 
event, but to the entire life and work of a poet such as Eliot, 
reveals both how the past shapes the present and how the pre- 
sent shapes the past. The critic today inquiring into Eliot's 
early development knows so much more than the critics of fifty 
years ago precisely because he now knows the final shape of 
Eliot's life. One can see now that the "Lance-lot Andrewes de- 
claration" of 1928 merely confirmed for that and the following 
years a conservatism that had been awaiting articulation for 
almost forty years. Indeed, in introducing the subject of his 
classicism in literature, royalism in politics, and anglo- 
catholicism in religion, Eliot explains that he has "made bold 
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to unite these occasional essays merely as an indication of 
what may be expected, and to refute any accusation of playing 
1possum. ,5 But has Eliot not been playing 'possum all along? 
In this case, the Lancelot Andrewes declaration indicates not 
only what may be expected of Eliot in the future, but also what 
may be expected of him in the past. As Helen Gardner explains, 
any act such as Eliot's conversion, "which makes an apparent 
break with the past, is itself the result of the past, and when 
it occurs makes the past assume a pattern not visible before. ,6 
Moreover,, "what is found is what was looked for, and since to 
look for anything is to act on the hy 
_pothesis 
that it exists, 
faith precedes faith in a regressive series.,, 
7 
One ought not to be surprised, then, to find that much of 
Eliot's early reading now seems, from a perspective surveying 
his life and work as a whole, to be prerequisite. to his later 
faith. of those writers who influenced him at Harvard, Paris 
and London between 1906 and 1919, and who seem many years later 
to have influenced the Lancelot Andrewes declaration, three 
of the most important are Irving Babbitt, Charles Maurras, and 
T. E. Hulme. The classicism which Eliot proclaimed in matters 
of literature is evident in all three. Evident as well is an 
even more vigorous anti-romanticism. The royalism which Eliot 
advocated in politics derives largely from the writings of 
Maurras in support of L'Action Franvaise, although Babbitt 0- 
and Hulme both inclined towards authoritarian government. 
The anglo-catholicism, which was perhaps the most important 
aspect of the declaration, does not derive from any one of . J. 
these writers, however, for they were none of them believers. 
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Yet although none of them could believe, they each acknowledged 
the usefulness of belief and preferred religious conviction 
to the materialism rampant in a material age. In short, they 
combined in Eliot's developing Christian awareness to provide 
the literary, political, metaphysical, and moral framework in 
which he might realize his anglo-catholicism. Although, there- 
foro,, merely an accident of his early environment and educa- 
tion, these readings proved as essential to the development 
of T. S. Eliot, the anglo-catholic, as his early experience of 
Unitarianism and Puritanism. 
Eliot kncw Irving Babbitt from his time as an undergra- 
duate at Harvard. He studied French literature under him in a 
course entitled "Literary Criticism in France with Special 
Reference to the Nineteenth Century" during the two terms of the 
1909-1910 academic year. He knew Babbitt's Literature and the 
American College, 
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published in 1908, and, whether or not he 
read The New Laokoon, 
9 
published in 1910, or was in the course 
in which Babbitt seems to have presented the main conclusions 
of this book, it is likely that he heard something of The New 
Laokoon during his year with Babbitt as this was the year when 
Babbitt published it. In any event, there are striking renzem- 
blances betwecen Babbitt's work at this time and Eliot's early 
criticism several years latter. 
Babbitt introduced to Eliot the terms in which the debate 
about modern poetry would be waged: classicism and romanticism. 
Babbitt was not so much concerned to define the nature of art, 
however, as to define the relation between the artist's thought 
and society. He felt that an inquiry into the nature of the 
11 
arts "involves one's attitude not merely toward literature but 
life. " 10 When, therefore, he observed in literature the 
spread of impressionism and aestheticism, he feared that the 
loss of standards and discipline, virility and strength, would 
make poetry incapable of defending itself and society against 
scientific positivism. He called for a balanced society, 
such as that of ancient Greece, in which spontaneity and inspir- 
ation were possible within a tradition of discipline and measure. 
These apparently opposed concepts of spontaneity and dis- 
cipline represented for Babbitt the key elements in romanticism 
and classicism, respectively. The spontaneous romantic enjoys 
a vivid imagination. He constructs a world of illusion through 
which he attempts to break down the adult barriers to the 
emotional and instinctive unity of the child. His return to 
nature, Babbitt argues, replaces a religion concerned with 
what is above the reason with one concerned with what is below 
the reason--the primitive and irrational. The result is a 
great disproportion between the emotion evoked and the object 
or incident from which it ostensibly derives. In short, the 
romantic of Babbitt's experience leaves little room for the 
intellect. Babbitt argues, however, that "the man of letters 
should not be so modest as to leave all the analytical keenness 
and intellectual virility to the scientist. tell At the same 
timeo, one cannot produce good poetry by emphasizing the pro- 
saic and sensible at the expense of the imagination. Classicism 
rightly tends to be rational, but it can be too rational if its 
reasoned discipline allows no scope for creative illusion. 
Neither a radical romanticism nor a radical classicism, there- 
12 
fore,, is conducive to a healthy art. The Greek synthesis is 
required--a mediation between artistic standards and creative 
flexibility. The artist must produce a work of art "probable 
or convincing to both the imagination and the understanding. " 
12 
In tracing the effects of romanticism in art, Babbitt 
presents a fairly balanced and equanimical analysis. But 
when he extends his analysis to the effects of romanticism upon 
society as a whole, he becomes quite animated. The villain 
is Rousseau. With him began the rejection of the rational, 
the attack on the analytical understanding that multiplies dis- 
tinctions, which Babbitt finds in all romanticism. The dogma 
that man is capable of infinite progress--or perhaps even 
perfection--once he has rid himself of the chains imposed by 
social institutions is dangerous. Babbitt felt that Rousseau 
had led directly to the belief that to become perfect man had 
only "to continue indefinitely the programme of the nineteenth 
century, --that is, to engage in miscellaneous expansion and 
back it up if need be with noisy revolt against all the forms 
of the past. " 
13 Babbitt granted that man grows, but he would 
not grant that growth necessarily entails progress; man does 
not grow by moving in one direction only. but by moving in 
several directions simultaneously. The great failure of roman- 
ticism is the failure to recognize or maintain the distinction 
between a law for human nature and a law for physical nature; 
the prospects of material progress held out by science cannot 
be taken as evidence for prospects of human progress. 
Babbitt, thent is a classicist in his attitude toward 
literature and life. Man is a finite creature and as such 
13 
cannot hope to comprehend truth, beauty, or the absolute-- 
however one chooses to describe the infinite. He may achieve 
the occasional glimpse of the infinite and then attempt to 
formulate an awareness of it, but there is a danger that he 
will falsify it by the inadequate final form in which he pre- 
sents it. Yet man must categorize his knowledge; it is his 
nature to do so despite the fact that he knows the infinite 
will always overflow his categories. The solution, as Babbitt 
sees it, is for man to maintain fluid categories, flexible 
standards, such that he may have a faith in the infinite while 
preserving a vitality in that same f aith--a vitality responsive 
not to inadequacies in the infinite, but to inadequacies in 
man's apprehension of it: 
If the perception gains ground that man's knowledge 
of physical, like his knowledge of human nature, is 
destined always to remain a mere glimpse and infinites- 
imal fragment, there may be hope of reaction against 
what one may call scientific Titanism [the hope that 
science will discover all, even heaven ]. There might 
even be some recovery of that true humility--the inner 
obeisance of the spirit to something higher than it- 14 self--that has almost become one of the lost virtues. 
Babbitt felt that this sense of a vital authority distinct from 
either an outer authority such as God, or the inner authority 
of one's own temperament, was perhaps the real test of civili- 
zation. 
One can see how attractive many of these ideas would have 
been to a young man such as Eliot who was seeking an absolute. 
Talk of "the inner obeisance of the spirit to something higher 
than itself" is about as close as one can come to expressing a 
religious point of view without actually swallowing the religious 
14 
dogma. Eliot may well have preferred to adapt Babbitt's per- 
spective to a more explicitly Christian framework, but the latter 
made it clear that his was a humanism designed to avoid beliefs 
made untenable by science. Babbitt's humanism was dependent 
for its model, or authority, upon the exceptional men of anti- 
quity; his advice was to imitate them. But as Stephen Spender 
points out, "Eliot saw that to do this would be to abstract 
from the antique models the metaphysical faith which had made 
their almost superhuman achievements possible. to 
15 
Babbitt's 
talk of spiritual authority, therefore, and his suggestion 
that the Catholic Church might well be the only institution 
lef t in the West to preserve the past, seems to have served 
Eliot as at least a pragmatic and practical justification of 
Christianity, and may as well have illustrated, by the de- 
ficiencies of its presuppositions, that humanism was no re- 
placement for Christianity. 
There are other ways, however, in which Babbitt influenced 
Eliot. He interpreted Aristotle, for instance, in such a way 
as to emphasize the necessity of objectivity on the poet's 
part: "the poet is to turn away f rom himself and his own 
16 
emotions, and work like the painter, with his eye on the object. 11 
Eliot makes the same point in describing the writing of poetry as 
a sacrifice or surrender of the poet's personality to something 
greater; and so he incorporates into his poetic "the inner 
obeisance of the spirit to something higher than itself. " One 
can also find in Babbitt traces of a perspective later elaborated 
by Eliot as the theory of the dissociation of sensibility. Like 
Eliot, Babbitt traces the break between intellect and emotion 
15 
to the Renaissance when nthe drift toward a naturalistic con- 
ception of life" began. 17 But perhaps Babbitt's most important 
influence was in introducing to Eliot a theory of words which 
would stand him in good stead as he encountered later develop- 
ments in Imagism. Babbitt pointed out the futility of attempting 
to paint pictures with words: the plastic arts deal with space 
whereas words deal with time. A painter, therefore, can re- 
present but one moment; the poet, on the other hand, can portray 
an entire action. If he would paint with words, he must enumer- 
ate each of the different parts of his object until it becomes 
blurred and confused as a result of trying to portray what is 
coexistent--the object--by means of that which is successive-- 
language. Given, then, Babbitt's careful explanation of the 
interrelation of words, time, and action, Eliot was never 
likely to have practised the static image for which the Imagists 
were so thoroughly criticized by the Vorticists. 
Eliot's debt to Babbitt, therefore, is quite substantial 
and quite explicit. He first met in Babbitt's writing an ana- 
lysis of classicism and romanticism; but more importantlyr he 
learned from both Babbitt's insights and errors that a religious 
perspective was a necessary aspect of any classicism which might 
counter romanticism, not only in literature, but in society as 
a whole. Many years later, therefore, in "The Humanism of 
Irving Babbitt, " Eliot concluded that "the humanistic point 
of view is auxiliary to and dependent upon the religious point 
of view. " 
18 Babbitt, then, helped Eliot towards his anglo- 
catholicism but ultimately proved inadequate as a religious 
inspiration. 
16 
The quotation f rom "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt" con- 
tinues: 
For us,, religion is Christianity; and Christianity implies, I think, the conception of the Church. It 
would be not only interesting but invaluable if 
Professor Babbitt, with his learning, his great 
ability, his influence, and his interest in the most important questions of the time, could reach this 
point. His influence might thus join with that of 
another philosopher--Charles Maurras--and might, 
indeed, correct some of the extravagances of that 
writer. 19 
In 1927, then, Eliot recognized that the philosophy of Charles 
Maurras followed logically from that of Irving Babbitt- -according 
to the logic of T. S. Eliot, that is. It just so happens that 
this is the order in which Eliot read these two philosophers: 
Babbitt at Harvard by 1910, Maurras in Paris and at Harvard by 
1913. According to the double perspectives of mechanism and 
energism, then, Babbitt and Maurras led Eliot to discover the 
importance of the Church, and the importance of the Church 
to Eliot later led him to rediscover the importance of Babbitt 
and Maurras in his early spiritual development. In any event, 
Eliot's experience of Maurras marks the next step in this 
development. 
Maurras worshipped order. In fact, he saw order as heaven's 
first law. It was a law, therefore, in the arts as well as the 
state. Like Babbitt, then, Maurras chose Greece as his model 
of perfect order, for the ancient Greek found beauty in the 
concept of the limit or the measure. In respect of the state, 
however, Maurras, like Plato.. rejected all forms of democracy 
in favour of a strong monarchy. The hereditary king would not 
17 
only represent order through the stability of his succession, 
but would impose order through his ruling in the knowledge of 
what was best for the nation as a whole, as opposed to any one 
part of it. The king, however, is not inclined towards order 
as an individual, but as an institution designed to look after 
the nation's interests. The individual, Maurras argues, has no 
principle of unity or order within him--at least not naturally. 
Individualism, it seems, is a revolutionary principle, producing 
in religion, on the one hand, the Reformation, and in politics, 
on the other, the French Revolution. The remedy aqainst in- 
dividual disunity and disorder is reason, for reason is concerned 
with the general as opposed to the particular, and so serves 
the individual as the king serves the state. 
In this emphasis upon the individual as a principle of 
disunity and disorder, one can see Maurras' classicism showing 
through. Man's nature is constant; it is not necessarily 
progressing toward perfection however much it may in fact be 
developing. Man is simply an animal with reason: as an animal, 
a wolf; as an animal with reason, a god. To Maurras, then, 
the romantic emphasis upon the irrational and the individual 
represented a betrayal of all that was good in human nature, 
The traitor that Maurras accused was the same one that Babbitt 
accused--Rousseau. In breaking with reason, and in assuming 
that natural man was good, Rousseau denied both the one power 
responsible for civilization and the institutions through which 
it might civilize. Rousseau was simply a "Genevan vagabond, 
a homeless individual. . 
20 This break with civilization was 
really a break with Mediterranean culture; all that is not Latin 
18 
or Greek is barbarous. Maurras regarded France as the successor 
to Roman Civilization; the Reformation, the Revolution, and 
romanticism in general being a betrayal of classical France. 
The only remedy f or society as a whole was a return to the clas- 
sical tradition of discipline and order. The individuals of 
the intellectual elite must first set their own house in order 
by returning this discipline and order to their thought. Then 
they must secure the classical tradition by founding the in- 
stitutions of the state upon the concepts of discipline and 
order, for individuals perish while institutions endure. The 
"classical" institutions which Maurras would hope to see endure, 
of course, are the monarchy, the church, and the army. 
Of these, Maurras' support for the Catholic Church is the 
most surprising, for during most of his life he found belief 
in the Church's dogma impossible. The Church, however, had 
stood against the disunity and disorder of the Revolution. 
Questions of faith aside, therefore, Maurras found the Church 
quite useful as a social institution; it advocated all that he 
interpreted classicism to stand for: "orderr tradition, dis- 
cipline, hierarchy, authorityr continuity, unity, work, family, 
corporation, decentralizationt autonomyr working-class organ- 
ization. " 21 Furthermore, Maurras did not concern himself over 
questions about a faith which he felt was more a habit of 
tradition than real belief in any event. Maurras was careful, 
however, to distinguish between the Catholic Church of Rome and 
Christianity in general. He felt Christianity to be as dangerous 
to discipline and order as the Reformation, the Revolution, and 
romanticism. The Catholic Church, then, has performed a service 
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to mankind by controlling Christianity within its own particular 
order and discipline. Given the choice, therefore, of recog- 
nizing the value of the Catholic Church and so controlling 
Christianity, or of ignoring both and so leaving them both 
beyond his philosophical control, Maurras chose not only to 
recognize, but to recommend,, the traditional virtues of the 
Church: "the Church that I saluted as the oldest, the most 
venerable, or the most fecund of visible things and the noblest 
and most holy ideas of the Universe .*. the Church of Ordm '22 er. 
But despite the respect--or even reverence--in which he 
held the Church, Maurras was not a Catholic. Hip respect for 
the Church was a respect for the Church's achievement, not for 
its achieving power. Neither was he a complete anti-romantic. 
His approval of classicism was, like his approval of the Church, 
based upon approval of achievements as opposed to the power 
responsible for such achievements. Indeed, Basil de Se'lincourt 
argues that Maurras is merely an unusual type of romantic. 
De Se'lincourt argues that romanticism is distinguished f rom 
classicism by its attitude toward the infinite, the former 
haunted by the element of infinity, the latter accepting it and 
placing it within its cosmos without denying reason. Maurras 
does not "weep and rave" like the average romantic, but instead 
tries to exorcize a potentially infinite chaos by the imposi- 
tion of order and discipline within his cosmos. 
23 Although 
Maurras' philosophy seems to be based upon reason and its con- 
sequent order and discipline, it actually derives from a horror 
of the element of infinity or chaos. 
Maurras, then, is no more a classicist than a Catholic. 
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His classicism and Catholicism, however, such as they were, did 
exert an influence upon Eliot. The latter traced the literature 
of contemporary Europe back to the literature of the Europe of 
Homer,, and described the achievement of Roman literature as its 
sacrifice of its own life as a living literature so that it 
might provide for Europe the definitive classic; Eliot thus 
demonstrates in essays as far apart as "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" and What is a Classic? that he willingly 
follows Maurras in deriving modern culture from Mediterranean 
culture. But it is probably Maurras' emphasis upon tradition 
in general that proved most influential in shaping Eliot's 
classicism. Maurras constantly looked forward to the restora- 
tion of the monarchy in France and in so doing looked constantly 
backward toward the ancien regime. He idealized the traditions 
of the past to a degree perhaps incomprehensible even to one 
such as Eliot; one suspects that he wished not only to restore 
the monarchy but to restore the past entire. In short, Maurras 
was so disillusioned by the present that the past was all he 
had left to offer as an alternative, for the past endures and 
in so doing must always be greater and more important than the 
individual. Eliot makes much the same point in "Tradition and 
the Individual Talent" where he observes the literary monuments 
of the past in their ideal orderjand where he calls upon in- 
dividual writers to compose with their own and past generations 
in their creative bones* 
Maurras also seems to have influenced Eliot's religious 
consciousness. As Stephen Spender points out, this conscious- 
ness develops in three ways, 
24 First, Maurras confirmed in 
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Eliot's mind the distinction between classicism and romanticism, 
but then went on to distinguish between classicism, which ac- 
knowledges the Church, and humanism, which does not. Eliot 
could thus happily proclaim himself a classicist in more than 
literature. Secondly, Eliot learned from Maurras' philosophy 
and living example that it is possible to accept the values 
of religion even though one is unable to believe. This proved 
to be Eliot's position for the half of his life preceding the 
Lancelot Andrewes declaration. Maurras, however, was largely 
impotent in respect of the third stage, in which Eliot embraced 
dogma as more necessary than the tradition and ritual of the 
Church. Yet Maurras' influence upon Eliot's religious con- 
sciousness was not entirely constructive, but in at least one 
sense unfortunate, for Maurras seems to have contributed to 
Eliot's apparent anti-Semitism. Before the Second Chambre 
Correctionelle du Tribunal at Versailles, Maurras refused to 
answer a question put to him by M. Worms, the President of the 
court,, because the latter was Jewish: "I am French, you are of 
Jewish nationality. It is impossible for me to reply to a 
Jewish judge. 
25 Maurras' anti-Semitism, however, was not 
merely personal. He regarded the question of Jewish control 
of the French economy as a question of national defence; what 
point would there be in defending France, and what would it 
mean to be French, if the French were not masters in their 
own home? On a more philosophical levelt Maurras felt that 
cosmopolitanism, represented by, among others, the successful 
Jews of France and other nationst threatened to create disorder 
in the world. The confusion of nationalities would not lead 
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to understanding and harmony, but merely the dissolution of 
the hardly won values of each nation. Maurras, then, must 
have felt not only that he could not reply to a Jewish judge, 
for fear that the Jew would not understand the Frenchman, but 
also that he could not understand his question, for how could 
the Frenchman understand the Jew without the one or the other 
of them abandoning the hierarchical values of their respective 
nationalities? Perhaps such thoughts as these influenced--or 
simply confirmed--Eliot's portrayal of the Jew squatting on 
the window sill in "Gerontion, " the "Chicago Semite Viennese" 
in "Burbank with a Baedecker: Bleistein with a Cigar, " and the 
"murderous paws" of "Rachel nee Rabinovitch" in "Sweeney Among 
the Nightingales. " 
The unique classicism and Catholicism of Maurras, then, 
clearly influenced the development of Eliot's religious con- 
sciousness. If he did not quite bring Eliot to belief, he 
brought him as close to it as possible. Eliot, therefore, 
need not regret the unlikelihood of his wished-for consummation 
of the philosophies of Irving Babbitt and Charles Maurras, for, 
although the two never met as Eliot may have hoped they would, 
they met in the mind of Eliot himself, Their influence may 
not have been completely benign, but it was certainly 
decisive-- 
decisive in moving Eliot not only toward the commitment of the 
Lancelot Andrewes declaration, but toward a religious philo- 
sophy which could incorporate and stimulate a new poetic, a 
religious philosophy and poetic which 
Eliot was to find in the 
occasional writing and 
infrequent poetry of T. E. Hulme. 
But whereas it has long been known that Eliot was influenced 
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in his early years by both Babbitt and Maurras, the fact that 
he was aware of Hulme by 1916 has only relatively recently 
been recognized. F. O. Matthiessen, apparently having heard 
so from Eliot himself,, claims that "Eliot had not known Hulme 
personally, though he had heard much about him from Pound; 
and he had not read any of Hulme's essays before they were 
published, by which time Eliot's own theory of poetry had al- 
ready matured. " 
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Herbert Howarthp in an otherwise thorough 
account of early influences upon Eliot in Notes on Some Figures 
Behind T. S. Eliot, does not even mention Hulme. Eliot's later 
debt to Hulme, howeverf is quite evident. Quotations provided 
in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, "Baudelaire, 
I 
"Second Thoughts About Humanism, " and "The 'Pens6es' of Pascal" 
prove just how closely Eliot had studied Speculationsp published 
in 1924. Eliot's constant reference to Hulme in his articles 
and books in the years following this no doubt contributed toward 
Leavis' observation that Hulme's importance was the result of 
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an intellectual fashion. Eliot's appreciation of Hulme's 
importance, however, was deeply felt, for his philosophy and 
poetry were closely related to Hulme's. 
Ronald Schuchard, in "Eliot and Hulme in 1916,11 suggests 
that this fact is not surprising at all given Eliot's probable 
acquaintance with most of Hulme's philosophy and poetry by 
1916.28 That Eliot knew and admired the poetry of T. E. Hulme 
is clear from his observation in "The Function of Criticism" 
that "the poems of T. E. Hulme only needed to be read aloud to 
have immediate effect. " 
29 
What has only recently become clear 
is that the experience of reading Hulme's poetry aloud for the 
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sake of its immediate effects was provided as early as 1916 
by Eliot's opportunitv to lecture on "Modern English Literature" 
in Extension Courses for the University of London. In fact, he 
had probably been aware of Hulme's poetry since he had met Pound 
in 1914, for Pound, having in 1912 published in his Rinostes 
"The Complete Poetical Works of T. E. Hulme, " is likely to have 
recommended them to Eliot as examples of good modern poetry. 
But whether recommended by Pound or not, Eliot seems to have 
happened across them. His 1914 poem "The Death of Saint Nar- 
cissus, " later to find its place in The Waste Land, certainly 
owes something to Hulmels "Conversion. " Both Hulmels speaker 
and Saint Narcissus undergo a conversion experience which, 
despite the experience of beauty, ends with the one passing 
"to the final river / Ignominiously, in a sack, without sound, 1130 
and the other "Knowing at the end the taste of his own whiteness / 
The horror of his own smoothness. " 
31 Both Hulme's speaker and 
Eliot's Saint Narcissus are "stifled. " As Lyndall Gordon points 
out, "Neither is enlarged by his sensations. Both in the end 
overreach themselves and suffer a psychic blow, some kind of 
ignominious death of the spirit. " 
32 Perhaps, then, A. R. Jones 
reveals more than an interesting coincidence when he observes 
that Hulmels "theory of poetry finds its most coherent expression 
neither in the poems of the Imaqists, nor in his own poems, but 
in the early poetry of T. S. Eliot. "33 
Whatever articles by Hulme which Eliot may have read in 
periodicals such as The New Ager in which Hulme regularly pub- 
lishedt and with which Eliot was presumably familiar, it is 
likely that Eliot was familiar With Hulme's preface to Georqes 
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Sorel's Reflections on Violencer for the reading list for his 
1916 lectures recommends Hulme's translation as published in 
1916, which is one of the few editions to include the Trans- 
lator's Preface. One who has taken careful note of this 
preface thus knows a substantial part of Hulme's philosophy; 
his enthusiasm to publicize Sorel's rejection of the nalve 
hope for a peaceful transformation and intelligent readjustment 
of society in favour of violence gives Hulme an opportunity 
to publicize his own perspective according to which man must 
be seen as fundamentally evil and incapable of progress. In 
what Pound describes as Hulme's "fussing about Sorel, , 
34 there- 
fore,? one actually finds Hulme's essential thoughts concerning 
modern culture: he assesses the claims of romanticism and 
classicism in art and philosophy, explains the need for a 
critique of philosophical canons of satisfaction, and suggests 
the value of history in determining both the present and the 
past. Through Hulme's occasional writing on the one hand, then, 
and through his infrequent poetry on the other,, Eliot knew 
Hulme's philosophy and poetic as well as he knew the philosophies 
of Babbitt and Maurras, 
Hulme has often been dismissed as an unimportant figure 
in philosophy because his thoughts are not original. So great 
is his intellectual debt to Henri Bergson, for example, that one 
can find instances in Hulme's writings about Bergson where the 
former has lifted substantial passages from the work of the lat- 
ter and used them as his own. 
35 Consciously or unconsciously, 
Hulme simply seems to have found it easier to reproduce Berg- 
son's words as his own than to expand upon Bergson's thoughts in 
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his own terms. Hulme's motive, however, was not a selfish 
one; he freely acknowledges that he finds Bergson to be the 
theoretical sine qua non of modern aesthetic theory: 
the extraordinary importance of Bergson for any 
theory of art is that, starting with a different 
aim altogether, seeking merely to give an account 
of reality, he arrives at certain conclusions as 
being true, and these conclusions are the very 
things which we had to suppose in order to give an 
account of art. 36 
Both the fact that he can so easily assume Bergson's words 
as his own, and the fact that he has often chosen such words 
as are representative of Bergson's entire philosophyr illustrate 
the extent of Hulme's dependence upon Bergson as the conceptual 
foundation of his aesthetic. In part, then, Hulme is merely 
a propagandist and not a true philosopher; he chose to formul- 
ate in English a philosophical attitude which had already been 
formulated in French. His conservatism and classicism, how- 
ever, were relatively original in an English context still 
dominated by the liberalism and romanticism of the nineteenth 
century. If this much-needed originality in political, moral, 
and aesthetic theory could come only from France, much as the 
much-needed originality in poetry came f rom America, then so 
be it* 
of the many aspects of intellectual activity which Berg- 
son reveals to be non-vital, Hulme chooses to publicize the 
death-dealing tendency of language. Bergson describes the 
process by which reality is symbolized in language as a 
differ- 
entiation within, and separation from, the flux of pure duration. 
Hulmer therefore, does not expect language to be able to hand 
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over bodily the aspects of reality to which it refers. In 
fact, so far as this is the only indictment offered against 
language, language is no more disappointing in this respect 
than any other form of expression. Hulme has other reasons, 
however, for regarding language as the most effective known 
cause of the death of real experience. Beginning with Berg- 
son's observation, for instance, that language must be able 
to communicate with as many people as possible, Hulme argues 
that language must therefore restrict its reference to only 
that which is common in experience; language cannot refer to 
that which is particular in experience for this can be under- 
stood only by the individual who has the particular experience. 
Unfortunately, however, the effect of this fact about the nature 
of language is most pernicious, for if people may speak only 
of that which is common, surely they are doomed to think only 
of that which is common. So Hulme observes that the "average 
person ... does not even perceive the 
individuality of their 
own emotions. , 
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To illustrate this point, Hulme discusses the common feeling 
of "annoyance. " In each individual who experiences annoyance,, 
the feeling is personal and particular; it is coloured, in 
shortp by the whole personality of the person who is annoyed. 
Given, thereforep the incalculably great number of people who 
have experienced annoyance at one time or another, and given 
also distinctions between different feelings of annoyance 
experienced by even one individual, one can see that the range 
of personal, particular kinds and degrees of annoyance is in- 
expressible. Yet the same word is used to express each of these 
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different experiences. The word "annoyance, " then, can only 
refer to the objective, impersonal aspect of these personal 
experiences since, by definition, they can have in common only 
that which is non-particular. Hulme suggests that in a situa- 
tion such as this the word has come to be used as a "counter"; 
it serves language as an algebraic symbol serves an algebraic 
function. Functions in algebra hold true regardless of the 
particular values of x and X--as long as these symbols have 
been defined. Language works in a similar way. Assuming that 
the "function of the intellect is so to present things not 
that we may most thoroughly understand them, but that we may 
successfully act on them, , 
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Hulme suggests that words can 
work in intellectual equations designed to promote practical 
actions with just the disregard f or particularity which one 
sees in algebra. The average person thus need not concentrate 
his attention upon the particularity of his personal experience 
of annoyance, for, once he has classified his experience as one 
of annoyance, he can begin calculating a practical response. 
The average person, therefore, will inevitably develop the habit 
of not even perceiving the individuality of his own experiences 
since this will no longer be relevant to successful action and 
response. This, Hulme feltr was the result of the nineteenth 
century's tendency to solve important moral problems with 
simple verbal formulae--the tendency to prove "God's in his 
heaven / All's right with the world" by simply saying so. 
Reacting against linguistic oppression in particular, 
Hulme determined to recover reality. The best way to do this, 
he argued, is through the medium of art: "the function of the 
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artist is to pierce through here and there, accidentally as 
it were, the veil placed between us and reality by the limit- 
ations of our perception engendered by action. " 
39 Perception, 
he feels, has not always been so limited by the ultimate goal .A 
of action. Originally, language was composed of "living" 
metaphors which evoked vivid mental images--images in which 
strong impressions were yoked together. But the metaphors 
which are already in the language are dead or dying; they have 
become intellectual "counters. " One need only turn to prose 
to f ind "the museum where the dead metaphors of the poets 
are preserved. 
40 The poet,, then,, must restore life to language 
by introducing new metaphors. Because of his ability to pierce 
through the action-oriented veil of perception, the poet re- 
cognizes the inadequacy of his languaqe's fixed representation 
of reality. In the face of the reality he perceives, the 
poet must invent a new means of linguistic expression--a new 
metaphor--in order to capture just that aspect of his intui- 
tion which language has hitherto been unable to reprpsent. The 
ultimate goal of art, Hulme suggests, is to reproduce in the 
reader the artist's intuition: 
the big artist, the creative artist, the innovator, 
leaves the level where things are crystallised out 
into ... definite shapes, and, diving down into the inner flux, comes back with a new shape which 
he endeavours to fix. -*e It is as if the surface 
of our mind was a sea in a continual state of motion, 
that there were so many waves on it, their existence 
was so transient, and they interfered so much with 
each other, that one was unable to perceive them. 
The artist by making a fixed model of one of these 
transient waves enables you to isolate it out and 
to perceive it in yourself. 41 
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In short, the poet strives to express an experience just as 
he has experienced it; he attempts to communicate that which 
ordinary language lets slip through its descriptive net. 
Hulme realized, however, that poetry cannot produce in 
the reader the same experience which comprises the poet's 
intuition; poetry is merely "a compromise for a language of 
intuition which would hand over sensations bodily. , 
42 Since,, 
then,, the poet cannot directly communicate his experience of a 
reality beyond the veil of common language, he must at least 
communicate his conviction in the possibility of perceiving 
it. The poet, thereforef presents images which create the 
feeling in the reader that the poet has had an actual contact 
with reality; Hulme suggests that "by the use of image the 
'creative' man can always convey over the feeling that he has 
'been there. 1 g143 In consequence, then, such a poet's reader 
ought to be in a receptive state in respect of the possibility 
of intuiting reality. Properly presented images, therefore, 
may serve to suggest and evoke in the reader a state very near 
that which the poet feels. For Hulme, then, as A. R. Jones 
points out, the reading of poetry is "an act of co-operation 
between poet and reader in which the reader, by virtue of 
poetic imagery shaped under the immediate pressure of reality, 
is able to seize the poet's original intuition. , 
44 Here, once 
again, one sees Hulme's debt to Bergson, 
for Hulme has merely 
taken up the latter's suggestion that "many diverse images, 
borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the 
convergence of their action, 
direct consciousness to the precise 
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point where there is a certain 
intuition to be seized, 
31 
But despite his conviction that poets commune with reality, 
Hulme was anxious to deny that poetry is in any way a type of 
religion. He will not allow that poetry is a means by which the 
soul soars to a divine communion with a higher reality; it is 
nothing of the sort: "It is a means of expression just as prose 
is, and if you can't justify it from that point of view it's 
not worth preserving. " 
46 
This tendency to confuse poetry with 
religion is the basis of Hulme's quarrel with romanticism--a 
movement which, in the nineteenth century, reduced poetry to 
,, 47 no more than "spilt religion. 
Hulme felt that the nineteenth century's most serious 
error was a metaphysical one; it assumed the universal applic- 
ability of the principle of continuity. Following Bergson's 
distinction between the unextended and the extended, his dis- 
Unction between life as movement and materiality as "the 
inverse movement, , 
48 Hulme regarded the discontinuity between 
life and matter as having been sufficiently established. He 
still felt it necessary, however, to refine the distinctions 
concerning the discontinuities of reality even further. He 
suggested, then, that there are three absolute divisions in 
reality: 11 (1) The inorganic world, of mathematical and 
physical science, (2) the organic world, dealt with by biology, 
psychology and history, and (3) the world of ethical and religious 
values. " 
49 The romantic perspective of the nineteenth century 
errs in confusing the human and the divine: "it blurs the 
clear outlines of human relations--whether in political thought 
or in the literary treatment of sex--by introducing in them 
the Perfection that properly belongs to the non-human. ', 
50 But 
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although such a perspective may have appeared most forcefully 
in the nineteenth century, Hulme felt that its origin might 
be traced back much further--ultimately to the beginning of the 
Renaissance. 
In order to comprehend Hulme's historical perspective, 
however,, one must come to terms with his peculiar conception 
of the function of philosophy. Philosophy is not a science, 
he claims., but an art. One will never discover in it the 
secret of the cosmos; "one merely f inds elaborate and complete 
ways of expressing one's personal attitude towards it.,, 
51 In 
Hulme's eyes, thenp Bergson was simply an exceptional artist 
who found a coherent system of thought which perfectly expressed 
his attitude toward reality. Hulme argues that the philosopher's 
final attitude toward the world must be satisfying in some way. 
After all, if a philosopher has taken great pains to prove 
that the world is other than it seems, the final picture of 
reality which he presents must be personally satisfying--satis- 
fying,, that is, in respect of either his equally subjective 
wishes for this or that kind of world or his perhaps equally 
subjective need to obey the logical arguments. he has contrived, 
whether or not these lead to the kind of world he wishes. 
Philosophy, thent seems to have a distinctly personal element 
in addition to its scientific interest. Surprisinglyr therefore, 
philosophers seem to disagree in respect of scientific matters 
of fact--where they might have been presumed to agree--and agree 
in respect of a satisfying world picture--where they might have 
been presumed to disagree. This agreement concerning a satis- 
fying destiny for man, Hulme suggests, derives from an uncritical 
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acceptance of the humanist perspective manifested in the 
Renaissance. And it is this uncritical acceptance of Renais- 
sance "canons of satisfaction 1152_ -pseudo-categorin-s which are 
not apprehended but throuqh which apprehension occurs--which 
ultimately leads to the excess and sloppiness of romanticism's 
11 spi lt religion. " 
The romantic, Hulme observes, believes that man is bas- 
,, 53 ically good--"an infinite reservoir of possibilities . He 
is perverted, however, by society and its institutions such 
that his inclination to do good is thwarted. On this view, 
then, in order to allow the infinite progress which will in- 
evitably follow from man's infinite possibilities, one need only 
rearrange society so as to remove the oppressive order of its 
institutions. In short, any type of order has a negative in- 
fluence upon man. There is, then, no absolute ethical order 
beyond man's natural order; as man is by nature good, one need 
only observe the life of man fulfilling his infinite pos- 
sibilities in order to determine what is good. Romanticism, 
therefore, in placing man at the centre of the cosmos, "de- 
velops logically into the belief that life is the source and 
measure of all values, and that man is fundamentally good. 1,54 
These radical assumptions, however, have not gone un- 
challenged. The religious attitude, or classical attitude, 
stands on assumptions directly contrary to romanticism., The 
first postulate of the religious attitude is the impossibility 
of "expressing the absolute values of religion and ethics in 
terms of the essentially relative categories of life. " 
55 In 
other words, "the organic world, 
dealt with by biology, psycho- 
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logy,, and history,. " is discontinuous from "the world of ethical 
and religious values. " Given the fact of absolute and ethical 
values, then, one must declare man, in so far as he falls 
short of these values, to be essentially limited and imperfect. 
When Hulmer therefore, asserts that man is "endowed with Origin- 
al Sin, 1156 he is pointing out that man is born to a life of 
imnerfection. From this perspective, then, man's nature is 
absolutely fixed by certain limits; he has infinite possibilities 
of going wrong, not right. Left to a life which was not ordered 
by social institutions, man would produce nothing but chaos: 
"It is only by tradition and organisation that anything decent 
can be got out of him. 11 
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According to the religious attitude, 
then, order is creative and liberating, for it works to release 
man from the basic limitations of his nature. 
For Hulme, however, the opposition between the romantic 
and religious or classical attitudes is no more confined to 
philosophy than it was for Babbitt and maurras; it leads to a 
fundamental distinction in art as well. Art, Hulme suggests, 
parallels a person's--and a people's--general philosophy or 
general world outlook; that is, it represents a satisfying 
attitude toward man and the world: 
It is necessary to realise that all art is created 
to satisfy a particular desire--that when this desire 
is satisfied, you call the work beautiful; but that 
if the work is intended to satisfy a desire and mental 
need different from your own, it will necessarily 
appear to you to be grotesque and meaningless. 
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Thus Hulme accounted for the current neglect of Byzantine art; 
it simply satisfied different desires, for the Byzantine artist 
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was no rom, antic. Ronantic art f lourishes when man, in his 
general conception of the order of the universe, places himself 
at its centre. In such an age and such a culture, man, in the 
words of A. R. Jones again, "will feel more or less confident in 
the face of the world and optimistic and happy in its contempla- 
tion, and his art will be vital and naturalistic celebrating 
,, 59 the life and power of man and of nature. ... Man will 
be conscious of no limitations upon his desires and so will 
picture the universe as that which satisfies his desire; in 
short, the human and divine will become identified. The Byzan- 
tine artist, however, t-ypifies the religious or classical 
attitude toward man and the world. In a classical age, man 
is far less confident than his romantic counterpart. Nature 
is not one with man but opposed to him; the world seems a 
hostile and arbitrary place, for man pictures the universe as 
that which frustrates his desire. Man is aware that he is a 
severely limited creature that may never expect to attain the 
absolute values of religion and ethics. His art, therefore, 
expresses the desire to transcend human limitations. This 
entails a geometric, non-human, formal and non-naturalistic 
art,, such as a Byzantine mosaic, for, by using abstract, in- 
organic forms to portray the living and organic, the religious 
artist can suggest the permanence and eternity of absolute 
values. 
Because individuals here and there were beginning to 
appreciate Byzantine art once more, Hulme concluded that 
sensibility was returning from romantic to classical. This 
would be the return to the religious attitude toward life which 
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Hulme greatlv deesired, yet desired not simply because it would 
confirm the symmetry of his historical analysis of romanticism 
and classicism, but because he actually held "the religious 
conception of ultimate, values to be right, the humanist wrong. , 
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He set about accumulating evidence, therefore, that such a change 
in sensibility was occurring, and set about convincing his 
readers that such a change was due. The new geometrical tend- 
encies he discovered in painting and sculpture proved that a 
classical movement was underway; the similarity between the new 
art and the art of past classical periods, in respect of their 
use of geometrical forms, demonstrated, to Hulme's satisfaction, 
that modern artists were seeking a new means to express a new, 
modern attitude toward life. Hulme claims that this aesthetic 
glance toward the past is a necessary step in determining both 
a new means and a new matter for expression. In a certain 
artistic movement of the past,, the modern artist finds the 
intensity of expression which he f inds lacking in the art of 
the movement against which he is reacting. The modern artist 
thus attempts to reproduce this intensity in order to convey 
his equally intense conviction that he has perceived that 
which has not been perceived before. In the now permanent or 
classic formulae of this previous form of art, the modern 
artist finds his first means of expressing his own intense 
perception. Initially, however, because clothed in an ancient 
form, the modern perception seems more like the old one. But 
the change of sensibility activating the modern artist eventually 
discovers its own f ormula which, in respect of the movement 
against which he is reacting, provides a "purer and more accurate 
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medium of expression. " 61 This change of sensibility, further- 
more, directs the modern artist to fix his gaze upon an artistic 
movement of the past which demonstrates a sensibility similar 
to his own. A new romantic movement, therefore, looks back to 
a previous romantic age just as a new classical movement looks 
back to its classical predecessors. The modern artist of which 
Hulme speaks,, then,, will find that he shares the classical or 
religious attitude of the Byzantine artist. Hulme expects 
that such a discovery will no doubt help the modern artist 
to articulate the particular attitude he wants to express in 
modern art. Again, however, although this new attitude may 
initially seem to be indistinguishable from the Byzantine 
attitude, the modern attitude will reveal its distinguishing 
features as the modern mind comes to comprehend the change of 
sensibility activating it, 
Hulmels attitude to the past, then, must have attracted 
Eliot's attention, for Hulme's awareness of the past as part 
of the present foreshadows Eliot's conviction that a healthy 
culture requires the collective personality of its past to 
interact with the originality of its living generation. In 
short,, Eliot must have found in writings by Hulme, and hearsay 
about him, the same concern for tradition that he found in 
Babbitt and Maurras; but in Hulme, for the first time, he found 
tradition linked creatively to the individual talent. He also 
found--in the Translator's Preface to Sorel's Reflections 
on Violence, for example--the first 
hint that the present may 
influence the past as much as the past influences the present. 
Hulme points out that critics now regard European art as a 
38 
coherent body of work deriving from certain clear presupposi- 
tions-but presuppositions which have only become clear as they 
have been denied by modern art. Similarly, philosophy since 
the Renaissance has been of one family although philosophers 
have only now recognized the romantic lineage because a new 
philosophical family has appeared, a family with a tradition 
of subordinating man to absolute religious and ethical values. 
Pointing to these observations on the relation between present 
awareness and the actual past, Hulme might well have claimed 
Eliot" s observations in "Tradition and the individual Talent" 
as his own: "the difference between the present and the past 
is that the conscious present is an awareness of the past in 
a way and to an extent which the past's awareness of itself 
cannot show. " 
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one can see as well that Hulme helped to make current 
the notion of a point in European history at which sensibility 
changed from classical to romantic. In metaphysical terms, 
at any rate, romanticism began with the Renaissance: "it 
seems as if no sooner had Copernicus shown that man was not 
the centre of the universe, than the philosophers commenced 
for the first time to prove that he was. " 
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Eliot preferred 
to explain this development in terms of literature. He argued 
that Milton and Dryden were responsible for turning poets 
inward to contemplate their own feelings, for these two refined 
the magnificence of their language to such a point that 
feeling 
got left out altogether 
in favour of the ratiocinative and 
descriptive; as a consequence, the romantic reaction against 
reason began and, as 
Hulme has shown, man became the centre of 
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the universe. But whether or not Hulme influenced Eliot on 
this matter, they both agreed that man ought to be no more 
the centre of the universe than the poet ought to be the 
emotional centre of his poem. As Eliot argues, "poetry is 
not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; 
it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from 
personality. " 
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Hulme suggests similar reasons for avoiding 
a poetic indulgence in the simple expression of personality: 
the poet's mood is vague and indefinable; it passes away too 
quickly to be captured in any event. In writing a poem, then, 
the poet "selects, builds up, and makes even his own mood more 
definite to him. " 65 Expression does not reveal personality, 
but builds it up; the poet aims to produce artificial, deliber- 
ate poises in himself so as to create his own emotional chess- 
board out of his poetry. Not only, then, would Eliot have 
found support in Hulme's writing, poetry, and conversation 
for his own theories of sensibilitv and impersonality, but he 
would also have found the very prescription for the artificial, 
but deliberate, poises which his own early poetry filled, 
The need to escape from personality derives logically 
from Hulme's position in the debate between classicism and 
romanticism. Although he could trace the development of 
romanticism back to the beqinning of the Renaissance, he felt 
that the worst aspects of romanticism were represented by the 
poets of the nineteenth century. Victorian opinion and rhetor- 
ic-. to the effect that all was right with the world--was, 
according to Hulme, the worst symptom of the romantic disease. 
This lack of any real thought stemmed from an indulgence of 
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feeling and emotion; in short, it stemmed from an indulgence 
of personality. In a certain sense, then, the escape from 
personality represents for Hulme an escape from Victorian 
rational i zation--an escape in which Eliot was only too willing 
to participate. Hulme saw the Victorian poets as creators 
of a sound signifying nothing; Eliot sees this tendency in 
Swinburne: "When you take to pieces any verse of Swinburne, 
you find always that the object was not there--only the word. " 
66 
But Swinburne is not a typical Victorian poet, for his poetry 
pretends to be no more than sonorous words; it does not depend 
upon the assumption that God is in his heaven and all is right 
with the world: 
The world of Swinburne does not depend upon some 
other world which it simulates; it has the necessary 
completeness and self-sufficiency for justification 
and permanence. It is impersonal, and no one else 
could have made it, The deductions are true to the 
postulates. It is indestructible. 67 
Eliot, then, would have found in any talk of an escape from 
personality a valuable suggestion as to how a modern artist 
might not only avoid the cynical use of words, but actually 
encourage their accurate use. 
The thought of an escape from personality is also con- 
sistent with the religious attitude in so far as it demands 
order and discipline. It is not an abandonment of self-dis- 
cipline, but rather an escape from that which 
is personally ex- 
pressive and satisfying. The escape 
from personality is a 
discipline in at least a negative sense, then, because it avoids 
a lack of discipline. The poet,, 
however,? has a further purpose,, 
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for,, in denying his personality during the creative process, 
he is submitting to the discipline of inspiration. He must, 
in the words of C. K. Stead,, negate "the conscious rational 
individual man in favour of the 'shaping spirit of imagina- 
tion' " in order for inspiration to be possible. 
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Such is 
the discipline required in respect of this part of the creative 
processr moreover, that, as Eliot points out, no half-measures 
will suffice: "the poet cannot reach this impersonality without 
surrendering himself wholly to the work to be done. " 
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concept of impersonality, then, in the context here of poetic 
theory,, is a discipline in the positive sense in which order 
and discipline are recommended in the classicism of Babbitt, 
Maurras, Hulme, and Eliot. But it is Hulme's classicism which 
suggests its poetic context in terms of personality, and Eliot' s 
classicism which develops it in this respect. 
Yet perhaps Hulme's most important influence upon Eliot 
was in the area of language. His description of the poet's use 
of metaphor to pierce the common veil of language, to dive 
down into the inner flux of experience and come back with a new 
aspect of reality to be fixed in the language, suggests Eliot's 
perspective when discussing Swinburne in The Sacred Wood: "the 
language which is more important to us is that which is strug- 
gling to digest and express new objects, new groups of objects, 
new feelings, new aspects, as, for instance, the prose of Mr. 
James Joyce or the earlier Conrad. , 
70 Hulme, then, made it the 
poet's responsibility to create a language in which insight 
would be possible, a responsibility--as Eliot acknowledged it 
later in "What Dante Means to Me"--"to pass on to posterity one's 
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own lanquage, more hiqhly developed, more refined, and more 
precise than it was before one wrote it ... 1 
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and a re- 
sponsibility which Eliot had accepted by the time he had written 
the essays collected in The Sacred Wood. 
But Eliot's acceptance of this responsibility created a 
tension within both his personality and his poetic, for Eliot's 
conception of the relation between poetry and the absolute 
was different from Hulme's. One of Hulme's reasons for defining 
the poet's responsibility toward language was to limit the 
Victorian romantic's subject matter. Hulme would not allow the 
poet to range through scientific and philosophic arguments in 
his own attempt to prove or disprove the absolute. In short, 
Hulme denied the poet any right to deal with the absolute. The 
absolute is unknowable; the poet, therefore, ought only to strive 
to produce an exact image of objects of ordinary perception. 
By surrendering the poet's claims to be able to compete with the 
scientist and philosopher, and by concentrating solely upon 
language itself, Hulme felt that poets could begin to produce 
the accuracy and exactness which a scientific age demanded. Al- 
though, then, Hulme seems actually to have believed in an ab- 
solute reality, he refused, as S. K. Coffman, Jr. observes in 
Imagism: A Chapter for the History of Modern Poetry, "to permit 
introduction of this reality into his verse, and in fact estab- 
lished the refusal as a major premise of his poetics. " 
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But 
for the young Eliot, who occasionally attained, and always wished 
for, visionary qlimpses of the absolute, such a restriction 
was bound to cause tensions. Hulme had effectively arqued for 
the separation of religion and poetry--a separation to which Eliot 
43 
could only agree reluctantly, given that his early poems were 
really as much a nalve form of religion as poetry. In these 
n early poems, Lyndall Gordon suggests, Eliot moved too fast, 
riding on intuitions and truncated visions without any real 
experience beyond his own self-absorbed fantasies. 1173 They 
really could not satisfy him, thereforer in respect of either 
their religion or their poetry. The period of poetic sterility 
which began in 1914, then, may have had two causes--two causes 
which reinforced each other: first, the recognition that this 
early poetry was inadequate both as religion and as poetry; 
and secondly, the influence of Hulme's poetic in arguing for 
a separation between religion and poetry. In the following 
years,, then, Eliot would have had to decide whether poetry 
ought to declare its relation to the absolute values beyond 
it or whether it ought simply to interpret poetic values. 
Tensions thus appear in The Sacred Wood where, in an essay 
on Blake, Eliot at once affirms and denies the importance of 
religion, or the absolute, to poetry. Blake, Eliot observes, 
lacks the framework of mythology, theology, and philosophy which 
supports Dante's poetry. Such a framework of belief "would 
have prevented him from indulging in a philosophy of his own, 
and concentrated his attention upon the problems of the poet. 11 
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Dante is a classic, therefore, and Blake merely a genius, because 
the f ormer was provided with the proper conceptual framework 
whereas the latter had to make do with one of his own construc- 
tion. One must conclude, then, that the best poetry depends 
upon the best conceptual framework,? although this framework 
is not actually one of "the problems of the poet. 1, In short,, 
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Eliot has simultaneously connected and separated poetry and 
religion. The Waste Land, similarly, demonstrates a largely 
Christian conceptual framework, although this framework is 
apparently not one of the problems of the poet, 
From Hulme's distinction and separation of poetry from 
religion, r thenr Eliot went on to connect them once more--al- 
though he maintained the distinction and separation even in 
doing so. This theme, of course, became of enduring concern 
to Eliot; even after his conversion he was concerned to define 
poetry's proper relation to religion. In Four Quartetst there- 
fore,, Stephen Spender observes that there is still a tension 
between "the mystical-religious view, which uses language in 
such a way that it tends to disappear into the state of ecstatic 
belief communicated, and the view that poetry is about poetry. " 
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Hulme, then, even in leading Eliot to banish the absolute from 
the creative control of the artist, in order that the artist 
might concentrate upon his art alone, played a decisive role 
in shaping Eliot's religious consciousness; for Eliot understood 
through Hulme that salvation could not come from culture, intel- 
ligence, or any other product of man's mind, because man-- 
including a genius such as Blake--is a limited and imperfect 
being. His salvation, therefore, is dependent entirely upon 
grace. Similarly, his literary salvation, in the form of a 
proper conceptual framework, is dependent upon some form of 
grace--a literary or historical grace. Hulme's 
denial of the 
poet's right to deal with the absolute, therefore, proved 
instru- 
mental in the development of Eliot's suggestion that a proper 
conceptual framework 
is essential to the best poetry even though 
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it is beyond the control of the poet. 
Hulme's impact upon Eliot's religious development during 
his first years in London, then, was just as important as the 
impact of Babbitt at Harvard and Maurras in Paris. Each con- 
firmed in Eliot the conservative tendency in his nature. Indeed, 
the convictions expressed in the Lancelot Andrewes declaration 
derive in some measure from all three of these thinkers. But 
emphasis upon the three major aspects of Eliot's conservative 
creed varied from one to the other: Babbitt emphasized the 
concepts of classicism and romanticism; Maurras was for order 
and tradition; Hulme was--or at least wanted to be--a philosopher 
of morals and aesthetics. One can see, then, that there was 
some significance in the chronological order in which Eliot 
encountered them. Babbitt, as a humanist classicist, was not 
a believer; Maurras was a cerebral or pragmatic "believer" in 
the Church; and Hulme seemed on the verge of conversion-con- 
vinced, perhaps, by his own arguments in favour of the dogma 
of Original Sin, or perhaps overwhelmed by the infinite flatness 
of the Canadian prairies. This progress from unbelief towards 
belief,, in other words, precisely reflects Eliot's own develop- 
ment during his early years. Whether, therefore, Eliot encoun- 
tered these philosophers merely as an accident of his education 
and environment, or somehow intended the course of reading 
which he actually carried out, the influence of Babbitt, Maurras, 
and Hulme upon the early development of Eliot's religious con- 
sciousness is as undeniable as it is decisive. 
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Chapter Two: Frazer and Anthropology 
Ezra Pound, the poetic father-figure of the early twentieth 
century, demonstrated that mythology was a proper concern for 
the thoroughly modern poet. In 1918, for instance, he described 
the origins of mythology with an anthropological prescience not 
to be fully articulated until the publication of Ernst Cassirer's 
Lanquage and Myth six years later. Pound wrote: 
The first myths arose when a man walked sheer into 
'nonsense', that is to say, when some very vivid 
and undeniable adventure befell him, and he told 
someone else who called him a liar. Thereupon, 
after bitter experience, perceiving that no-one 
could understand what he meant when he said that 
he 'turned into a tree' he made a myth--a work of 
art that is--an impersonal or objective story woven 
out of his own emotion, as the nearest equation 
that he was capable of putting into words. 1 
Not surprisingly, then, Pound was greatly impressed by The 
Golden Bou of Sir James George Frazer. He felt Frazer to 
have provided as essential a light to the twentieth century as 
Voltaire to the eighteenth--essential, that is,, "in the mental 
furnishings of any contemporary mind qualified to write of 
ethics or philosophy or that mixed molasses religion. .2 One 
s complete work in order to benefit need not even rezad Frazer$ 
from the experience of his intellectual light; but one must 
be aware of him, Pound argued, or risk invalidating one's own 
work through "simple ignorance. .3 Indeed, the extent to which 
The Golden came to dominate the inter-war intellectual 
milieu is indicated by Pound's 
ironic analysis of contemporary 
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European social conflict: 
By 1934 Frazer is sufficiently digested for us to know that opposing systems of European morality go back to the opposed temperaments of those who thought 
copulation was good for the crops, and the opposed f action who thought it was bad for the crops. .. 4, That ought to simplify a good deal of argument. 4 
Furthermore, Pound tacitly acknowledges The Golden Bough's 
poetic relevance by at least two allusions in his Cantos. In 
Canto LXXIV, for example, the poet suggests the ritual observ- 
ance of the priests of the goddess Diana--priests who, in the 
phrases of this Canto, "at Nemi waited on the slope above the 
lake sunken in the pocket / of hills. '. 
5 In Canto LXXVII,, more- 
over,, the poet recalls not only the geographical location of the 
opening scenes of The Golden , but also the nature of the 
vigil maintained there by Diana's murderer-priest: "With 
drawn sword as at Nemi / day comes after day. .6 The Golden 
Bough, therefore, was clearly required reading for the self- 
respecting modernist. 
That Eliot should have become interested in The Golden 
Bough thus would seem to follow as a matter of course from the 
disposition of his one-time poetic mentor and the European 
intellectual milieu of his aqe. Moreover, the relation between 
poetry and mythology has long been acknowledged. As Professor 
R. L. Brett observes in Fancy and Imagination, the tradition 
can be traced back to Homer: 
Earlier writers such as Homer had associated art 
with mythology; the poet was inspired by the muse, 
who was, significantly, the daughter of memory. 
This enshrined the belief not only that the imagina- 
tion was nourished by the images stored in a poet's 
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memory, but also that the poet embodied the tribal 
memory, that he kept alive in the hearts and minds of his contemporaries the feats of valour, the achieve- ments and tribulations of the past, and transmittand these to future generations. 7 
That Eliotr then, a poet supremelv conscious of poetic tradition, 
should have come to consider the traditional relation between 
poetry and mythology is thus even less surprising. As early 
as 1918 he declares his belief in a special relationship between 
the artist and man's primitive past: "The artist, I believe, 
is more primitive, as well as more civilized, than his contemp- 
oraries, his experience is deeper than civilization, and he 
only uses the phenomena of civilization in expressing it.,, 
8 But 
neither Pound's influence, the influence of the age, nor the 
influence of a long poetic tradition serves to explain Eliot's 
interest in The Golden , for this interest is essentially 
religious. 
Frazer regards myths and religious rituals not simply as 
evidence of primitive ways of thinking about the world, but 
as evidence of actual past ways of life practised by primitive 
man as part of his struggle to create and sustain life in the 
uncertain world in which he finds himself precariously placed. 
The entire structure of The Golden , therefore, is os- 
tensibly arranged as an inquiry into the basis in fact for the 
myths surrounding the ancient priesthood of Nemi--those of the 
lake and grove of Aricia dedicated in antiquity to the service 
of the goddess Diana of the Wood. This servant was actually 
both priest and murderer, for he attained his priesthood by 
virtue of having murdered the priest who served before him. 
53 
Although the problem as to the origin of such an apparently 
irrational practice seems a difficult one to solve, Frazer's 
strategy for tackling it is quite simple: 
recent researches into the early history of man 
have revealed the essential similarity with which, 
under many superficial differences, the human mind 
has elaborated its first crude philosophy of life. 
Accordingly, if we can show that a barbarous custom, 
like that of the priesthood of Nemi, has existed 
elsewhere; if we can detect the motives which led 
to its institution; if we can prove that these motives 
have operated widely, perhaps universally, in human 
society, producing in variea circumstances a variety 
of institutions specifically different but generally 
alike; if we can show, lastly, that these very motives, 
with some of their derivative institutions, were 
actually at work in classical antiquity; then we may 
fairly infer that at a remoter age the same motives 
gave birth to the priesthood of Nemi. 9 
One may be certain, however, that Frazer's concern does not 
begin and end with the practices of the priesthood of Nemi. 
Rather, he simply uses this anthropological instance to convey 
to the reader the shape of the inquiry to follow. The narrative 
from Diana of the grove of Aricia to the Norse god Balder is 
continuous, but the murderer-priest often seems far from Frazer's 
mind. Beginning The Golden B with an investigation of 
the 
ritual of the priesthood of Nemi is simply a literary 
licence 
designed to provide Frazer with the anthropological licence for 
a wide-ranging discussion of the history of religion. 
Frazer set out in The Golden Bo to establish three main 
points. First, he wished to demonstrate that 
the history of 
religion was a matter of evolution. Revealing something 
of a 
bias against the mystical sensibility, he claims that 
"the 
movement of higher thought, so 
far as we can trace it, has on 
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the whole been from magic through religion to science. " 
10 
Secondlyr Frazer desired to convince his colleaques that 
primitive rituals derived from vegetative celebrations as 
opposed to solar celebrations. The yearly observances of the 
death and resurrection of Osiris at the annual floodinq of 
the Nile in October and November, for instance, could not be 
explained as a celebration of the sun's rise and fall, nor as 
a celebration of the sun's rebirth in December, for the latter 
occurs at the wrong time of the year and the former occurs 
much too often to be marked by an annual observance. The 
view, therefore, that the essence of the rites of Osiris, and 
the rites of similar deities such as Attis and Adonis, "was the 
mimic death and revival of vegetation, explains them separately 
and collectively in an easy and natural way, and harmonizes 
with the general testimony born by the ancients to their sub- 
stantial similarity. 1,11 Thirdly, he wished to undercut 
Christianity's claim to be other than a vegetative ritual. 
Toward this end, he assembled his most impressive array of 
anthropological artillery. 
Early in the first volume of Adonis, ttis, Osiris, 
Frazer's patronizing--if not actually contemptuous--attitude 
toward primitive man's belief in magic combines with his 
scepticism about the Bible's literal truth to reveal the Old 
Testament prophet's responsibility for rain-making: 
when the Israelites demanded of Samuel that he should 
give them a king, the indignant prophet, loth to be 
superseded by the upstart Saul, called on the Lord 
to send thunder and rain, and the Lord did so at once, 
though the season was early summer and the reapers 
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were at work in the wheat-fields, a time when in 
common years no rain falls from the cloudless Syrian 
sky. The pious historian who records the miracle 
seems to have regarded it as a mere token of the 
wrath of the deity, whose voice was heard in the roll 
of thunder; but we may surmise that in giving this impressive proof of his control of the weather Sam- 
uel meant to hint gently at the naughtiness of asking for a king to do for the fertility of the land what 
could be done guite as well and far more cheaply 
by a prophet. 1 
Furthermore, Frazer feels that it is once again primitive ignor- 
ance which has produced the widely instanced, but nonetheless 
erroneous, belief in the possibility of a virgin birth. The 
lapse of time between the act of conception and the first mani- 
fest symptoms of pregnancy is sufficient, he suggests, to dis- 
guise,, from what he calls the "savage, " the causal connection. 
As a result, stories alleging the birth of a god from a virgin 
mother might enjoy a high degree of plausibility amid such 
ignorance. Today, however, one must regard such myths "as relics 
of superstition surviving like fossils to tell .*. of a bygone 
age of childlike ignorance and credulity. , 
13 Clearly, then, for 
Frazer, the Virgin Mary is in some sense a fossil from a pre- 
rational, pre-scientific age. 
Although Frazer can understand credulity such as this, or 
at least understand it as consistent with human nature, he cannot 
tolerate Christianity's anthropological chauvinism. Note, for 
instance,? the tone of his review of the Church Is eclecticism in 
respect of church festivals: 
When we remember that the festival of St. George 
in April has replaced the ancient pagan festival 
of the Parilia; that the festival of St. John the 
Baptist in June has succeeded to a heathen Midsummer 
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festival of water; that the festival of the Assump- 
tion of the Virgin in August has ousted the festival 
of Diana; that the feast of All Souls in November is 
a continuation of an old heathen feast of the dead; 
and that the Nativity of Christ himself was assigned 
to the winter solstice in December because that day 
was deemed the Nativity of the Sun; we can hardly ýe 
thought rash or unreasonable in conjecturing that the 
other cardinal festival of the Christian Church--the 
solemnization of Easter--may have been in like mannerr 
and from like motives of edification, adapted to a 
similar celebration of the Phrygian god Attis at the 
vernal equinox. 14 
Frazer cannot hide his disdain that the Church should have 
appropriated these dates and these festivals as its own without 
the slightest acknowledgement of their pagan origin. In re- 
viewing a fourth-century debate on this very point, therefore, 
his ironical support for the Christian position undoes it 
completely. 
Christians and pagans alike, it seems, were struck by the 
remarkable similarities between the worship of Christ and the 
worship of Attis. Essentially, the debate was concerned to 
determine which god was the first to experience death and 
resurrection. The supporters of Attis claimed that the Christ- 
ian version was merely an imitation of the resurrection of 
Attis, who was a much older deity. Christians, however, put it 
about that Attis was no more than a diabolical counterfeit of 
Christ. At this point, by siding with the fourth-century 
Christians, Frazer awards the decision to the pagans: 
In these unseemly bickerings the heathen took what 
to a superficial observer might seem strong ground 
by arguing that their god was the older and there- 
fore presumably the original, not the counterfeit, 
since as a general rule an original is older than 
its copy. This feeble argument the Christians easily 
rebutted. They admitted, indeed, that in point of 
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time Christ was the junior deity, but they triumph- antly demonstrated his real seniority by falling back on the subtlety of Satan, who on so important an occasion had surpassed himself by inverting the usual order of nature. 15 
In the evolution of reliqions, this particular battle for 
survival had been won by Christianity--presumably the stronger 
of the two combatants. 
But Frazer resented this and similar victories by the 
Christian religion. He seems to have regarded this religion 
as posing a theoretical, if not practical, threat to the life 
which he felt it was the purpose of religion to further and 
preserve. Lest, for instance, his Christian readers should 
too comfortably condemn or deride the Western Asian custom of 
holy prostitutioh, Frazer subtly suggests that they look first to 
see that their own house is in order. He points out that the 
holy prostitute's vocation, 
far from being deemed infamous, was probably long 
regarded by the laity as an exercise of more than 
common virtue, and rewarded with a tribute of mixed 
wonder, reverence, and pity, not unlike that which 
in some parts of the world is still paid to women 
who seek to honour their Creator in a different way 
by renouncing the natural functions of their sex and 
the tenderest relations of humanity. It is thus that 
the folly of mankind finds vent in opposite extremes 
alike harmful and deplorable. 16 
Given the choice between the fertility of the one or the steril- 
ity of the other,, Frazer would opt for fertility. He regards it 
as a triumph of common sense that early Christians and Buddhists 
were not able to maintain the purity of the doctrine of their 
religions' founders in respect of poverty and celibacy. These 
ideals strike at the root of human existence, he suggests. 
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Whether, therefore, due to intellectual and moral weakness, 
or intellectual and moral strength, the inability to subscribe 
to these doctrines proved fortunate. Frazer seems unaware, 
however,, that by admitting that original Christian doctrine 
proclaimed the ideals of poverty and celibacy, that is, an 
anti-material, anti-life philosophy, he undercuts his argument 
that Christianity, in its origin, is nothing more than a 
vegetative ritual designed to guarantee or celebrate the return 
of the material needs for life. His bias against Christianity, 
therefore, is not always supported by the evidence he cites, 
nor by the interpretation which he qives to such evidence. 
This is not to say, however, that there is no substance 
to the claim that. there are many and significant structural 
parallels between the ritual worships of Christ, Adonis, Attis, 
and Osiris. Frazer traces in each, for instance, the figure of 
the man-god, that is, the incarnate deity. He suggests that 
in primitive societies the connection between ordinary men and 
their gods was established and maintained by a man-god. This 
individual enjoyed the distinction of being both a man and a 
god,, hence the society's dependence upon him in order to com- 
mune with its gods, In so far as he was a god, the man-god 
was accorded the respect due to one in touch with the power of 
life. As a mant however, he was obliged to use his divine and 
magical powers to provide fertility for his people and their 
land. But this responsibility also laid him open to punishment 
should crops fail or disease strike. The human representative 
of life,? therefore, miqht well be put to 
death should his powers 
appear to fail. Even this 
drastic action, however, was designed,, 
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according to Frazer, to ensure the continuity of life: 
the motive for slaying a man-god is a fear lest 
with the enfeeblement of his body in sickness or old age his sacred spirit should suffer a cor- 
responding decay, which might imperil the general 
course of nature and with it the existence of his 
worshippers, who believe the cosmic energies to be mysteriously knit up with those of their human divinity. 17 
In other words, in this case those Of J. B. Vickery in The 
I 
Literary Impact of The Golden Bouqh, what is established by 
the death of the divine fiqure "is not his mortality but his 
divinity. That is to say, incarnation conquers death and there- 
by introduces the resurrection which, in turn, promulqates 
regeneration. "18 Moreover, the divine figure having thus be- 
come incarnate once more in another form, the nation or society 
itself is restored and regenerated through the resumption of 
its link with the gods. 
Here,, then, in the dozens of various examples of incarna- 
tional rituals which he describes, is Frazer's most conclusive 
evidence that Christianity ultimately derives from primitive 
vegetative rituals. But lest he should have inadvertently 
flattered Christianity by implying that it is the culmination 
of incarnational religious development, Frazer is careful to 
disparage the concept of incarnation itself; it belongs essen- 
tially "to that earlier period of religious history in which 
gods and men are still viewed as beinqs of much the same order, 
and before they are divided by the impassable gulf which, to 
later thought, opens out between them. nig 
In the end, then, Frazer largely succeeds in proving that 
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which he set out to prove. The religious processes he has 
documented do suggest an evolutionary development of some sort. 
Whether similarities across cultures are due to direct and/or 
indirect influences, or universal absolute laws of human mental 
development, is unclear. Similarly, that the worship of Adonis, 
Attis, and Osiris did not derive from solar rituals, but from 
vegetative ritualst seems a point well proven. If, therefore, one 
were to regard The Golden BouSjh as a romantic quest, with 
Frazer representing objective, scientific truth in a series 
of battles against primitive superstition, then one would have 
to admit that Frazer had won the first two battles quite handily, 
He does not fare quite so well, however, in his confrontation 
with the Christian religion. Try as he might, Frazer could 
not kill this dragon. He demonstrates that Christianity has 
strong and suggestive connections to a long tradition of pagan 
incarnational ritual, but the same chauvinistic faith which 
bedevilled fourth-century pagan critics rises again to bedevil 
Frazer. In this final battler Frazer may well have gained the 
upper hand, but the contradiction in claiming that Christianity 
derives originally from primitive vegetative fertility rituals, 
while admitting simultaneously that its original, founding 
ideals recommend poverty and celibacy, leaves him in a no-win 
situation. 
As with any masterpiece of any kind, however, The Golden 
Bough transcends its author's conscious intentions. For many 
readers, for instance, Frazer's encyclopaedic cultural survey 
served to make them aware of the primitive roots of their own 
society; the more perceptive, in fact, recognized the yet 
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primitive nature of contemporary Society. His rather detached 
chronicling of the various sexual elements in primitive rituals 
thus reinforced the public's preoccupation with the sexual 
instinct; Freud, Jung, and Frazer suggested that the sexual 
savage was very near the surface of civilized society. The 
carnage of World War I, in fact, showed that the savage had 
actually broken through. Moreover, the economic consequences 
of the war, the material emphasis of Marxism and communism, and 
the world depression, all argued that Frazer was right to reduce 
primitive and civilized man to the same level: 
To live and to cause to live, to eat food and to 
beget children, these were the primary wants of men in the past, and they will be the primary wants of 
men in the future so long as the world lasts. Other 
thingsmay be added to enrich and beautify human 
life, but unless these wants are first satisfied, 
humanity itself must cease to exist. 20 
Thus, in capturing the spirit of its age, in articulating the 
concerns of the early twentieth century, and in looking for an 
explanation of the present in the past, The Golden Bough trans- 
cended its conscious anthropological intentions. Still possessed 
of the nineteenth century's confidence in science and progress., 
but somewhat confounded by Christianity's refusal to submit 
before it, Frazer's work helped to convey a sense of the con- 
tinuity between the spiritual dilemmas of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
intellectuals of the early twentieth centuryr overwhelmed by the 
sheer amount of knowledge amassed by the sciences, should seek 
some comfort in beginninqf with Frazer, in the beginning, for, 
according to Eliot, this is the end. 
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Eliot certainly appreciated The Golden Bough: "It is a 
work of no less importance for our time than the complimentary 
[sic] 
work of Freud--throwing its 
the soul from a different angle. 
light on the obscurities of 
000 Similarly, the 
famous Dial review of Ulvsses, and the references to The Golden 
Bough, in The Waste Land and its Notes, suggest Eliot's respect 
for Frazer's work. Ten years earlier, however, Eliot led 
several graduate seminars at Harvard in which he read papers 
critical of Frazer and the prevailing anthropological methods 
of research. Eliot's criticisms, in fact, are so devastating 
that, in the end, one must look for something other than the 
anthropology alone in order to explain his continuing interest 
in The Golden Bough. 
Eliot's major anthropological concern, as expressed in his 
seminar paper "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual, " has to 
do with interpretation, or explanation and description. Inter- 
pretation, he feels, is an illegitimate anthropological activity. 
Influenced by Josiah Royce, who regarded interpretation of the 
past as a statement of the meaning of the present, Eliot argued 
that an anthropologist's interpretation of the primitive past 
can never got beyond that anthropologist's present cultural 
perspective. The anthropologist, in short, is methodologically 
trapped by the fact that he can never attain a vantage point 
from which to survey his subject; that is, the subject matter 
of his research is a historical point of view, while whatever 
perspective he might attempt is equally a historical point of 
vlew. Eliot explains the problem of perspectiven, in "The Int--C-! kr- 
pretation of Primitive Ritual, " in terms of natural versus 
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social or religious evolutionary studies: on the one hand, in 
the former "we are able practically to neglect all values that 
are internal to the process, and consider the process from the 
point of view of our value, wh[ich I is for our purposes conceived 
of as outside the process .a. "; on the other hand, however, 
"to some extent in a social progress, and to a very great extent 
in religious progress, the internal values are part of the ex- 
ternal description. 1122 In other words, the anthropologist in- 
evitably encounters himself as an object in his own study. 
Although equally false as interpretation, explanation and 
description differ, not in content, but in the nature of their 
activity. Explanation is relatively primitive. The anthropo- 
logical explanation attempts to confine itself to one point of 
view but inevitably fails to do so. Because the anthropologist 
is himself a term in the relations he observes, his point of 
view will necessarily vary according to the relations in which 
he finds himself involved. Frazer understands the celebration 
of the burial of Osiris, for instance, not simply as a man 
with a blank mind, but as a man who knows of the worship of 
Adonis and Attis, as a man raised in a Christian culture, and 
as a man disdainful of superstition, In short, an anthropo- 
logical explanation will attempt to incorporate its object into 
as comprehensive a category as possible; thus Eliot's reported 
conclusion that "explanation is an act which tries with in- 
different success to bring the particular under the univers- 
"23 al. 40 The goal of 
description, however, is to preserve 
the particular in its full autonomy. The re-sult of description 
ought to be an absolutely objective catalogue of behaviour or 
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activity. Unfortunately, however, the responsibility for the 
act of description once again f alls upon the anthronologist who, 
as a human being, cannot help but interpret the observed object. 
The very language in which the description is made will neces- 
sarily reflect that lanquage's historical conceptual relativity. 
Concerning anthropologists, then, anthropology cannot live with 
them and cannot live without them. 
But anthropology is still possible, Eliot feels, so long 
as the anthropologist refrains from interpreting the purpose 
of the changes he observes in religious development; he must 
confine himself to interpreting the Process of change itself: 
"We can come to conclusions as to what men did at one period 
and another, and can to some extent see the development of one 
form out of another. .. 
24 The most the anthropologist can 
hope to do is to establish a definite historical order, a process 
interpreted as a continuous function: 
So far as there is an external order in ritual and 
creed and in artistic and literary expression, this 
order can be reconstructed and cannot be impugned. 
But the "facts" which can be thus arranged are de- 
cidedly limitedo, and consist historically in a certain 
order--we never know anv too exactlv of what the order 
is. 25 
Eliot felt, however, that the two main schools of anthroDology-- 
the English and the French--had both succumbed to the inter- 
pretative fallacy. The English were flagrant interpreters, but 
even the more scientific description by the French failed to 
eradicate cultural subjectivism. Eliot demanded a mind prepared 
to abstain from speculation; and, with but a few qualifications, 
he felt that he had found this in Frazer. 
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Frazer certainly indulged in the occasional interpreta- 
tion. He suggests, for instance, that the similarities he 
has observed in a great cross-section of religions are probably 
due to "the similar and independent workings of the mind of man 
in his sincere, if crude, attempts to fathom the secret of the 
universe, and to adjust his little life to its awful mysteries. " 
26 
Anthropologically speaking, this ought not to be any of Frazer's 
concern, for the anthropologist can "never know any too exactly 
of what the order is. " He should have been content to have 
noted these similarities; as Eliot remarks in "The Interpreta- 
tion of Primitive Ritual,, " "No one has done more to make manifenst 
the similarities and identities underlying the customs of races 
very remote in every way from each other. , 
27 With a proper 
humility,, thereforer he admonishes Frazer for this anthropo- 
logical vice: 
I have not the smallest competence to criticise 
Dr. Frazer's erudition, and his ability to manipu- 
late this erudition one can only admire. But I 
cannot subscribe for instance to the interpretation 
with which he ends his volume on the Dying God. 2b 
The essence of Frazer's methodr Eliot felt, was sound; that is, 
interpretation aside, Frazer's comparisons between religions 
certainly work to establish the evolutionary order of the reli- 
gious process. Moreover, as Eliot was to argue ten years later, 
Frazer himself seems to recoqnize this virtue of his historical 
comparative methodp for with "every fresh volume of his stu- 
pendous compendium of human superstition and 
folly? Frazer has 
withdrawn in more and more cautious abstention 
from the attempt 
to explain. " 
29 Frazer, therefore, having reformed somewhat, is 
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elevated by Eliot to the position of culture hero; his Golden 
Bouqh, transcends the partisan theoretical speculations of 
anthropological politics: 
Yet it is not a mere collection of data, and it is 
not a theory. The absence of speculation is a con- 
scious and deliberate scrupulousness, a positive 
point of view. And it is lust that: a point of 
view, a vision, put forward through a fine prose 
style, that gives the work of Frazer a position 
above that of other scholars of equal erudition and 
perhaps greater ingenuity, and which gives him an 
inevitable and growing influence over the conteMpor- 
ary mind. He has extended the consciousness of the 
human mind into as dark a backward and abysm of 
time as has yet been explored. 30 
For Eliot, then, Frazer's rehabilitation seems to depend upon 
a selective reading--a reading which selects against the inter- 
pretation of primitive ritual. 
But whether Frazer actually quantitatively reduced the 
instances of interpretation in his work as he progressed from 
edition to edition, or whether he merely added a greater quantity 
of facts so as to reduce the ratio of interpretation to fact, 
is uncertain. What is certain, however, is Frazer's constant 
conviction that it is important for the development of the 
modern mind that the anthropologist attempt to penetrate the 
primitive religious consciousness. He thus concludes his study 
of Adonis, Attis, and Osiris--the study to which Eliot refers 
in his notes to The Waste Land--with an affirmation of the inter- 
pretative method: 
If we would understand the early history of institu- 
tions, we must learn to detach ourselves from the 
prepossessions of our own time and country, and to 
place ourselves as far as possible at the standpoint 
of men in distant lands and distant ages. 
31 
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The spirit of this statement is correct, according to Eliot's 
criticisms of cultural relativity, but Frazer inevitably fails-- 
as every man must fail--to detach himself from the prepossessions 
of his own time. Years later, moreover, in the 1922 abridged 
edition of The Golden B. Frazer, having recognized the 
validity of objections such as Eliot's, nonetheless hoped that 
the anthropologist might eventually produce a probable picture 
of primitive religious consciousness: 
the savage is above being hidebound by the trammels 
of a pedantic logic. In attempting to track his 
devious thought through the jungle of crass iqnor- 
ance and blind fear, we must always remember that we 
are treading enchanted ground, and must beware of 
taking for solid realities the cloudy shapes that 
cross our path or hover and gibber at us through 
the gloom. We can never completely replace ourselves 
at the'standpoint of primitive man, see things with his 
eyes, and feel our hearts beat with the same emotions 
that stirred his. All our theories concerning him 
and his ways must therefore fall far short of cer- 
tainty; the utmost we can aspire to in such matters 
is a reasonable degree of probability. 32 
Frazer, then, at no point in the history of The Golden Bough 
overcomes what Eliot regards as the interpretative fallacy. 
Eliot's observation, therefore, of Frazer's movement away from 
interpretation is not accurate. Rather, Eliot seems to have 
indulged in a rationalization which would give The Golden B 
both an integrity as anthropology and a leqitimacy as an "in- 
fluence over the contemporary mind. " That is, just as Eliot 
later felt that the Bible, in order to maintain its literary 
influence, need be regarded as the word of God, so he felt that 
The Golden Bough, in order to maintain its cultural influence, 
need bom regarded as 
legitimate and valuable anthropology. 
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In any event, Eliot maintained throughout his career the 
view that interpretation is misleading because historically 
and culturally relative. In his dissertation, for instance, 
he judcres the point at which behaviour changes into mental 
life to be essentially indefinite because its explanation is 
a question of interpretation. 33 Similarly, in After Strange 
Gods , he remembers the dif f iculty he had at Harvard in under- 
standing the Indian philosophers--a difficulty he analyzes in 
terms of the interpretative fallacy: 
A good half of the ef f ort of understanding what 
the Indian philosophers were after--and their subtle- 
ties make most of the great European philosophers 
look like schoolbovs--lav in trying to erase from my 
mind all the categories and kinds of distinction 
common to Euronean philosophy from the time of the 
Grenks. My previous and concomitant study of European 
philosophy was hardly better than an obstacle. And 
I came to the conclusion ... that my only hope of 
really penetrating to the heart of that mvstery would 
lie in forgetting how to think and feel as an American 
or a European: Which, for practical as well as senti- 
mental reasons, I did not wish to do. 34 
Inde^. d,, as late as Notes towards the. Definition of Culture in 
1948, Eliot resorts to the interpretative fallacy--in this 
case, in order to demonstrate the difficulties of understanding 
another culture: 
The anthropologist may study the social system, the 
economics, the arts, and the religion of a particular 
tribe, he may even study their psychological peculiar- 
ities: but it is not merely by observing in aetail 
all of these manifestations, and graspinq them to- 
gether, that he will approach to an understanding of 
culture. For to understand the culture is to under- 
stand the people, and this means an imaginative under- 
standing. Such understanding can never be complete: 
either it is abstract--and the essence escapes--or 
else it is lived; and in so far as it is lived, the 
student will -tend to identify himself so -com-p-Tetely 
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with the people whom he studies, that he will lose the point of view from which it was worth while and possible to studv it. Understanding involves an area more extensive than that of which one can be 
conscious; one cannot be outside and inside at the 
same time. What we ordinarily mean by understanding 
of another people, of course, is an approximation towards understanding which stops short at the point 
at which the student would begin to lose some essen- tial of his own culture. The man who, in order to 
understand the inner world of a cannibal tribe, 
has partaken of the practice of cannibalism, has 
probably gone too far: he can never quite be one of his own folk again. 35 
Here, then, Eliot returns the concept of the interpretative 
fallacy to the anthropoloqical context from which it sDrang, 
Indeed, there may be something of Frazer in the straw anthro- 
pologist which Eliot knocks down in this passage. 
But although Eliot never forgets his original criticisms 
of Frazer and his interpretative anthropology, Frazer neverthe- 
less becomes a potent influence upon Eliot's critical prose. 
The title of Eliot's most famous collection of essays, The Sacred 
Wood, derives from the opening scenes of The Golden Bo which 
describe the sacred grove of Aricia where Diana's murderer- 
priest maintained his daily vigil. According to J. B. Vickery, 
it seems clear that Eliot's allusion makes poetry the sacred 
goddess, and criticism her warrior priest "who defends her honor 
and sanctity, and whose function is to prevent inferior poetry 
and criticism alike from usurping unworthily the role of deity 
or of priest and attendant. 136 This interpretation is no doubt 
true of Eliot's general critical practices; he does wield the 
critical sword so as to guard against inferior poetry and criti- 
Cism. But surely Eliot was also announcing his intention to 
enter the sacred critical wood in a quest to become the new 
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murderer-priest of modern literature. If not his intention, 
however, this was certainly the result; and Frazer provided not 
just this title, but also the outline of many of Eliot's new 
critical concepts. 
In the first place, The Golden Bough suggested to Eliot 
the possibility of organizing and controlling the vast array 
of knowledge being amassed by modern research. Frazer's 
assumption of universal laws of human development implied that 
modern science was continuous, as a theory of thought, with 
the earlier theories of thouqht embodied in magic and religion. 
In short, the modern poet might suppose a primitive categorical 
perspective on human behaviour just as valid--though perhaps 
less obviously articulate--as a more scientific categorical 
perspective. Frazer implied, therefore, although perhaps un- 
wittingly, that poets such as Eliot might legitimately analvze 
the modern world in terms of The Golden Bough's primitive 
religious categories. Thus the Dial review of Ulysses: 
In using the myth [of the Odyssey], in manipulating 
a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and 
antiquity, Mr Joyce is pursuing a method which others 
must pursue after him. They will not be imitators,, 
any more than the scientist who Uses the discoveries 
of an Einstein in pursuing his own, independent, 
further investigations. It is simply a way of con- 
trolling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a signi- 
ficance to the immense panorama of futility and 
anarchy which is contemporary history. ... Instead 
of narrative method, we may use the mythical method. 
It is, I seriously believe, a step toward making 
the modern world possible for art. ,, 0 11 
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In any event, The Golden Bough, in so 
far as it contributed 
towards Eliot's awareness of the possibilities of the mythical 
methodf certainly 
helped to make the modern world possible for 
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Eliot. 
Similarly, The Golden B seems to have suggested to 
Eliot the primitive origins of poetry; it thus appears behind 
his observation in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: 
nPoetry begins, I dare say, with a savage beating a drum in a 
1138 1 ung le. .0 'D There is also something of The Golden s 
magical and religious consciousness in Eliot's concept of the 
auditory imagination- the feeling for syllable and rhythm, 
"penetrating f ar below the conscious lemels of thought and 
feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive 
and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something 
back,, seeking the beginning and the end. " It "fuses the old 
and obliterated and the trite, the current,, and the new and 
. 39 surprising, the most ancient and the most civilised mentality. 
Indeed,, The Golden B itself is something of a fusion of the 
most ancient and the most civilized mentality. As such, more- 
over, it represents the vital connection necessary between past 
and present--a connection maintained through ritual, and a 
connection exemplified in art. Eliot thus asserts, 
in another 
early Dial review, that "all art emulates the condition of 
ritual. That is what it comes from and to that 
it must always 
return for nourishment, , 
40 
The necessary and vital connection between past and present 
in arto, however, appears as a distinct emphasis 
in Eliot's 
critical prose--an emphasis 
inspired in several ways by Frazer's 
work. The latter's 
influence can be discerned, for instance, 
in "Tradition and the Individual Talent"; 
the great procession 
of death and rebirth which 
he details in The Golden Bough tends 
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to create a sense of timelessness at the same time as it em- 
phasizes the temporal vastness of man's cultural history. That 
is, Frazer's cross-cultural, cross-temporal anthropological 
eclecticism creates the impression of an infinite present in 
respect of the universal human mind; the very survey itself, 
howeverr reinforces the pastts separation from the present 
because of the strange and eccentric aspect the past assumes 
before the present. Moreover, Frazer's great anthropological 
knowledge leads to a perspective from which he can at once 
read the present in the past and the past in the present. In 
short, Frazer has what Eliot calls the "historical sense": 
the historical sense involves a Derception, not only 
of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; 
the historical sense compels a man to write not merely 
with his own generation in his bones, but with a 
feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe 
from Homer and within it the whole of the literature 
of his own countrv has a simultaneous existence and 
composes a simultaneous order. This historical 
sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as 
of the temporal and of the timeless and of the 
temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. 
And it is at the same time what makes a writer most 
acutely conscious of his place in time, of his con- 
temporaneity. 41 
Substitute "culture" for "literature" here and one has the 
essence of Frazer's comparative method. The same spirit pre- 
vails in Eliot's conception of the critic's role; his business 
is to see literature steadily and to see it whole--"and this is 
eminently to see it not as consecrated by time, but to see it 
beyond time; to see the best work of our time and the best 
work of twenty-f ive hundred years ago with the same eyes ." 
42 
just as Frazer contains cultural history within one perspective, 
73 
so Eliot's critic must contain literature within one perspec- 
tive. It may be, then, that Eliot found the precedent for his 
abrupt transitions in time, place, and culture throughout his 
poetry, and the inspiration for his critical conception of the 
relation between past and present,, in The Golden Bough's wan- 
derings from nineteenth-century Scotland to sixteenth-century 
Mexico, classical Greece and Rome, and the Egypt of the pharaohs. 
Similarly, The Golden B influenced Eliot's development 
of the concept of the impersonality of good art. Frazer's 
scholarly objectivity and detachment, in fact, serve as a model 
of anthropological impersonality. But whether or not the idea 
itself derives from Frazer, the terms in which Eliot expresses 
it certainly do. For instance, he uses the imaqe of "surrender": 
"The emotion of art is impersonal. And the poet cannot reach 
this impersonality without surrendering himself wholly to the 
work to be done. " 
43 The poet finds, moreover,, that "what happens 
is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to 
something which is more valuable. " "Sacrifice" is another 
image: "The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, 
a continual extinction of nersonality. " 
44 These images of 
surrender and sacrifice suqgest that Eliot has in mind Frazer's 
dying man-god. The poet's personality assumes the role of 
Adonisy Attist Osirisr and Christ; the poet must surrender or 
sacrifice his personality to the poetic power he represents 
in 
order that that power may again be made manifest 
in the world. 
As Eliot himself puts it in "The Function of Criticism, " "theren 
is ... something 
outside of the artist to which he owes al- 
legiancer a devotion to which he must surrender and sacrifice 
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himself in order to earn and to obtain his unique position, n45 
But, as Eliot is quick to point out, "only those who have 
personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape 
from these thinqs. , 46 This serves as a reminder that the poet 
returns to his personality and emotions once the act of poetic 
creation is complete. In terms of Frazerian metaphor and 
imagery, then, Eliot's theory of impersonality thus comprises 
the death and rebirth of the poet as man-god, 
Just as potent as this influence upon Eliot's critical 
theory, however, is Frazer's influence upon Eliot's poetry, 
T. C. Rumble, for instance, in "Some Grail Motifs in Eliot's 
'Pruf rock, I" notes in Eliot a predisposition towards the myth- 
ical method as early as "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock. 1147 
He suggests that "Prufrock" is structured around the central 
motifs of the Grail story; Prufrock's quest culminates in the. 
Grail story's life-restoring question--in this case, "an over- 
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whelming question" (13) which Prufrock knows will, if asked, 
disturb his sterile universe. When, therefore, Eliot later 
encountered The 'Golden Bo . and later still Jessie L. Weston's 
From Ritual to Romance, he was already prepared to exploit 
such material in the search. for an objective correlative adequate 
to his experiences of the early twentieth century. 
Examples of Eliot's poetic recourse to Frazer are thus 
quite easy to find, In respect of "Mro Apollinaxt" Eliot seems 
to owe to Frazer the inspiration for combining the classical 
and anthropological worlds--worlds combined in the opening 
pages of The Golden . The 
figure of Priapus represents 
fertilitYl for, as J. B. Vickery notesp Priapus was "a minor 
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Roman god of vegetation and wine. " 
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He thus resembles the 
even more fertile Greek god, Dionysus, and so justifies the 
suggestion that Mr. Apollinax laughs "like an irresponsible 
foetus" (31). The Golden Bough, therefore,, suggests the anthro- 
pological and classical context in which Eliot can explore con- 
temporary social and sexual sterility. Similarly, in "La Figlia 
Che Piange, " the fugitive woman in the garden, who--"Her hair 
over her arms and her arms full of flowers" (34)--must leave 
with the autumn, recalls one of Frazer's female fertility 
spirits such as Persephone or Eurydice. And Sweeney, whether 
"Erectn (42) and "straddled in the sun" (43)p or "Apeneck" (56) 
among the nightingales7-with "zebra stripes along his jaw" (56) -- 
represents Frazer's savage. Knees spread and arms hung down to 
laugh, it is difficult to trace Sweeney's devious thought through 
"the jungle of crass ignorance and blind fear" described by 
Frazer, 
It is The Waste Land, however.. which is rightly celebrated 
as demonstrating Frazer's most sustained influence upon an Eliot 
poem. The consciousness which the poem itself represents seems 
to function as one of Frazer's man-gods. As a witness of the 
experiences portrayed in the poem, this consciousness is in- 
dividual; it is separate from, and independent of, the experiences 
of the individuals portrayed in the poem. Yet, in so far as the 
individual experiences portrayed in the poem are universal, the 
consciousness behind the poem is also universal. The poem's 
consciousness, thereforep or its protagonist, if one prefers, is 
like a man-god, for it represents all men and yet lives an in- 
dividual life: as a god, it witnesses the various scenes in the 
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poem, but, -as a man, it also participates in each of them, 
Specific imagery bears Frazer's impression as well. That 
"April is the cruellest month" (61) is consistent withý Eliot's 
habit of regarding spring as the ambiguous season of both life 
and death. Significantly, this observation is also consistent 
with Frazer's documentation of sacrificial ceremonies concerning 
the man-god, for these were performed each spring. The death 
of the man-god, however, is not an occasion for simple sadness, 
for by his sacrifice the fertility of the coming growing season 
is ensured. Spring might therefore be described as a cruel 
season because of the tension as to whether or not the annual 
sacrifice had indeed ensured fertility. April is the cruellest 
of these spring months, of course, because it represents the 
tension to do with Christ's death and resurrection, 
Similarly, Eliot may have derived the particular waste land 
imagery of his poem--"the dry stone" giving "no sound of water" 
(6l)--from Frazer's description of actual waste lands such as 
an infertile Egypt during the dry season: 
Egypt, scorched by the sun, blasted by the wind that 
has blown from the Sahara for many days, seems a mere 
continuation of the desert, .*. The plain appears 
to pant in the pitiless sunshine, bare, dusty, ash- 
coloured, cracked and seamed as far as the eye can see 
with a network of fissures. 
50 
The very image of a waste land would itself 
become more pointed 
for a native of England upon reading Frazer's 
description of the 
differences between northern and southern summers: 
in countries bordering on the Mediterranean the 
drought is almost unbroken through the long months 
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of summer. Vegetation then withers: the face of 
nature is scorched and brown: most of the rivers dry up; and only their white stony beds , hot to the foot and dazzling to the eye, remain to tell where they flowed. It is at such seasons that a green hollow, a shady rock, a murmuring stream, are wel- 
comed by the wanderer in the South with a joy and 
wonder which the untravelled Northerner can hardly imagine. Never do the broad slow rivers of England, 
with their winding reaches, their grassy banks, 
their grey willows mirrored with the soft English 
sky in the placid stream, appear so beautiful as 
when the traveller views them for the first time 
after leaving behind him the aridity, the heat, 
the blinding glare of the white southern landscape, 
set in seas and skies of caerulean blue. 51 
Eliot,, though a relatively untravelled Northerner, and perhaps 
aided by this very passage, seems remarkably able to imagine 
the intense aridity of this Southern waste land summer; thus, 
at the first sign of a shadow in The Waste Land, the exhorta- 
tion: "Come in under the shadow of this red rock" (61). 
The theme of the conversation with Stetson, moreover, 
derives from The Golden Bouq 's volume concerning the burial 
of Osiris. "That corpse you planted last year in your garden" 
(63) is the Egyptian god Osiris in whose effigy grain was 
annually planted such that each spring his worshippers might 
ask: "Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year? / Or 
has the sudden frost disturbed its bed? " (63). As Vickery 
points outt the poem is brought, through the reference to Fra- 
zer's dying god, "to articulate the worry implicit in 'April is 
the cruellest month'--whether time and the god are being reborn, , 
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Frazer's influence likewise appears in other figures in "The 
Burial of the Dead": The hyacinth girl--"Your arms full, and 
your hair Wet" (62)--is 
the fertility spirit seen in "La Figlia 
Che Piange"; Madame Sosostris recalls the primitive magical con- 
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ception of nature; and the Hanqed Man of the Tarot suggests 
the hanged god of ancient sacrificial rituals. Even the 
"Dog 
.. that's friend to men" (63) derives from The Golden 
for Frazer relates that Sirius, the Dogstar, "the bright- 
est of all the f ixed. stars, appeared at dawn in the east just 
before sunrise about the time of the summer solstice, when 
the Nile begins to rise. " 
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The connection between the n Dog" 
and the burial of Osiris, therefore, is a natural one. The 
connection between these two images and the rest of the poem? 
moreover, is once again discovered in The Golden , for 
note that Frazer's observation that, for the Egyptians, "the 
brilliant luminary in the morning sky 
I Sirius) seemed the goddess 
of life and love I Isis] come to mourn her departed lover or 
spouse 
I 
Osiris] and to wake him f rom the dead "54 is parodied 
by lines in "The Fire Sermon": "She turns and looks a moment 
in the glass, / Hardly aware of her departed lover" (69). 
And similarly, Frazer's description of certain other pri- 
mitive cultures serves to contrast the inverted social ideals 
of "A Game of Chess. " Lil and her companions, for instance, 
have profaned the ritual of indiscriminate sexuality. Frazer's 
evidence is that things were once otherwise: 
In Cyprus it appears that before marriage all women 
were formerly obliged by custom to prostitute them- 
selves to strangers at the sanctuary of the goddess, 
whether she went by the name of Aphrodite,, Astarte,, 
or what not. Similar customs prevailed in many 
parts of Western Asia. Whatever its motive, the 
practice was clearly regarded, not as an orgy of lust, 
but as a solemn religious duty performed in the ser- 
vice of that great Mother Goddess of Western Asia 
whose name varied, while her type remained constant, 
from place to place. 55 
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The typist of "The Fire Sermon" thus performs the proper ritual 
but subverts its value because unaware of its meaning. As 
Vickery suggests, these characters "fail to see a sacred connec- 
tion between themselves and other living kinds. " 56 Both "The 
Fire Sermon" and "Death by Waterrn furthermore, show the in- 
fluence of Frazer's work as well, for they illustrate the chief 
forms of purgation and purification documented extensively 
throughout The Golden Bou . Frazer also plays a part in the 
final section, "What the Thunder said. " Here,, Frazer helps 
to establish the connection between the death and revival of 
Christ and the death and revival of ancient deities. The key 
phrase concerns the "reverberation / of thunder of spring over 
distant mountains" (72), for Christ's death was accompanied 
by such a storm and yet, according to Frazer, "the first peal 
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of thunder in spring announces the reviving energies of nature. " 
The Waste Land, then, begins and ends with the same Frazerian 
tension concerning death and rebirth. 
Though apparently representing the culmination of Frazer's 
influence upon Eliot's poetry, The Waste Land by no means marks 
the end of this influence. The figures in "The Hollow Men, " 
for instance, recall the straw effigies which Frazer explained 
as a counterfeit of the actual man-god. 
"Journey of the Magi" 
reveals a Frazerian awareness of the connection 
between pagan 
and Christian religion. The 
birth witnessed by the magi is but 
a beginning; an endless cycle of 
death and rebirth follows-- 
endless so lonq as the Eucharist 
is celebrated. But the birth 
of Christ also apPears 
here as the end of the life-cycle of 
Dionysus who is represented 
by the "vine-leaves over the lintel" 
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(103) and "the empty wine skins" (103) which the feet about 
the tavern are kicking. "Animula" refers to Floret's death-- 
"by the boarhound slain between the yew trees" (108)--and so 
refers to the similar mythical deaths of Adonis and Attis, 
Frazer's dying and reviving precursors of Christ. Burnt 
Norton includes the same anthropoloqical and mythological 
reference: 
We move about the moving tree 
In light upon the figured leaf 
And hear upon the sodden floor 
Below, the boarhound and the boar 
Pursue their pattern as before 
But reconciled among the stars. (172) 
Similarly, in East Coker, Eliot's Frazerian sensibility in 
respect of primitive ritual leads him to reflect on the fertil- 
ity customs of his own ancestors: 
In that open field 
if you do not come too closer if you do not come too 
close, 
on a summer midnight, you can hear the music 
Of the weak pipe and the little drum 
And see them dancing around the bonfire 
The association of man and woman 
In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie-- 
A dignified and commodius sacrament. 
Two and two, necessarye coniunction, 
Holding eche other by the hand or the arm 
Whiche betokeneth concorde. Round and round the fire 
Leaping through the flames, or joined in circles, 
Rustically solemn or in rustic laughter 
Lifting heavy feet in clumsy shoes, 
Earth feet, loam feet, lifted in country mirth 
Mirth of those long since under earth 
Nourishing the corn. Keeping time, 
Keeping the rhythm in their dancing 
As in their -living in the living seasons 
The time of the seasons and the constellations 
The time of milking and the time of harvest 
The time of the coupling of man and woman 
And that of beasts. Feet rising and falling. 
Eating and drinking. Dung and death, (177-8) 
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Likewiser The Family Reunion shows Frazer's influence; Agatha's 
incantations recall the magical perspective of Frazer's savage: 
Round and Round the circle 
Completing the charm 
So the knot be unknotted 
The cross be uncrossed 
The crooked be made straight 58 And the curse be ended, .0* 
Even The Elder Statesman's surface preoccupation with names 
suggests Frazer's analysis of primitive taboos to do with the 
names of sacred ancestors or gods. 
On the one hand, then, there is a great amount of evidence 
to show that Frazer's work proved a formative and lastinq in- 
fluence in respect of both Eliot's criticism and poetry. But 
on the other hand, there remains Eliot's original objection 
to contemporary anthropology. Neither Frazer, on behalf of 
English anthropology, nor Durkheim, on behalf of French anthropo- 
logy, was able to transcend the interpretative fallacy. Because 
of the increasing cultural impact of The Golden Bouqh, however, 
Eliot managed to convince himself that Frazer was at least 
moving away from interpretation; that is, in order to regard 
this general cultural influence as legitimate, he needed to re- 
gard the anthropology as legitimate. But why should Eliot have 
gone to such lengths to rehabilitate Frazer's anthropology? 
Why not admit the validity of his own criticism and so dismiss 
the influence of The Golden B? Clearly Eliot was struggling 
to acknowledge the fact of Frazer's 
deep personal impact- 
despite his own logic arguing against allowing this 
influence, 
and despite, 
later still, religious convictions contrary to 
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Frazer's scepticism about Christianity. How, then, does The 
Golden Bough transcend these objections so as to serve Eliot 
as an objective correlative of his religious consciousness? 
Thouqh part of the intent of The Golden Bou is to de- 
tract from Christianity, this is not necessarily the result. 
The seemingly endless, and largely pre-Christian, cycle of 
death and rebirth which Frazer's narrative unfolds would appear 
to undercut the uniqueness of Christ's incarnation. So argues 
the sceptic. To the Christian, however, the case appears quite 
different. Twentieth-century Christians, appealing to a logic 
familiar to their fourth-century ancestors, might well argue that 
there is a gain for Christianity in being associated with Adonis, 
Attis,, Osiris, and the like, for this demonstratels that Christ- 
ianity has a history as old as man himself. That is, assuming 
the unique Christian Incarnation, and so arguing from, not 
toward, this position, the Christian rightly regards pagan in- 
carnational ritual as either a conceptual counterfeit or a 
glorious anticipation of the one Incarnation. In short, Christ- 
ianity is, in a certain sense, Incarnation; in the same sense, 
moreover, all incarnation is Christian. 
In fact, the consistency of Eliot's reference to The Golden 
Bough after his conversion to anglo-catholicism depends on this 
very argument. He regards Dionysus in "Journey of the Magi,, 
" 
the Floret-Adonis figure in "Animula, " and the boar--the slayer 
of Adonis-, -in Four Quartets as complementary to 
Christianity 
because these images refer to incarnation. And incarnation it- 
self,, moreoverr refers to Incarnation. 
In this respect, Eliot's 
Christian poetic shares the fourth-century Christian perspective 
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which Frazer mocked. Ironically enough, then, from this per- 
spectiveo, ' The Golden Bough proves a positively beniqn influence 
on Christianity. After his conversion, therefore, Eliot's 
allusions to Frazer's work are perfectly consistent with his 
Christian convictions, for these very convictions render harm- 
less Frazer's hostile anthropological speculations as anticipa- 
tions of Incarnation, 
Similarly, Eliot's unease at the fallacy which underlay 
Frazer's anthropology was settledo, somewhat,, by F. H. Bradley. 
The anthropologist's epistemological difficulty proved to be 
the same as that of Bradley's philosopher. Just as the anthro- 
pologist might never gain an objective perspective from which 
to study the history of human perspectives, so the philosopher's 
perspective on the inaccessible Absolute was bound to be rela- 
tive. Not surprisingly, then, Eliot fashioned the one activity 
which could save anthropology out of the one activity which 
Bradley felt could save philosophy. The goal of the philosopher, 
Bradley argued, given that the Absolute was inaccessible by 
definition, must be the utmost comprehensiveness and coherence 
possible. That which is the most comprehensive and the most 
coherent is that which is most true. Eliot, largely having ac- 
cepted this perspectiver thus chose Frazer's historical com- 
parative method as the model for anthropology. Its vast his- 
torical perspective certainlv ensured comprehensiveness. Its 
tendency to be interpretative might be forgiven, moreover, be- 
cause this at least made for a greater 
degree of coherence. 
Eliot was thus able to transcend--or at least to neutralize-- 
first his logical qualms, and then any potential religious qualms, 
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in respect of The Golden Bough's influence upon him. The 
resolution of any such difficulties was really inevitable, 
however, qiven the number of ways in which Frazer's work was 
furtherinq the development of Eliot's Christian religious 
consciousness. 
In the first place, The Golden Bough's description of 
a seemingly endless cycle of death and rebirth created a sense 
of timelessness in regard to man's preoccupation with this 
concern. Similarly, the juxtaposition of remote cultures and 
time periods contributed to this sense of timelessness. Indeed, 
the very act of describing or explaining the past in the present 
makes for timelessness. But the essence of timelessness is 
ree-wealed in pattern--the pattern of incarnation, death, and 
rebirth which informs human history. The Golden Bough, theree- 
fore, in revealinq the timelemss pattern in the history of reli- 
gions and cultures, reveals to Eliot the timeless pattern in 
time. It reveals, as well, through the same history, the in- 
evitable association between this timeless pattern and the 
divine; in short, The Golden B portrays the history of reli- 
gions and cultures--that isr time itself--as the incarnation 
of a timeless pattern. Eliot thus received from Frazer's work 
the categories by which he might conceive the timeless Christian 
Incarnation and through which he might later articulate it in 
his poetry. There is somethinq of The Golden Bough's temporal 
presuppositions, for instance, 
in The Rock's description of 
Incarnation: 
Then came, at a predetermined moment, a moment in time 
and of time, 
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A moment not out of time, but in time, in what we call history: transecting, bisecting the world of time, 
a moment in time but one like a moment of time, A moment in time but time was made through that moment: for without the meaning there is no time, and that 
moment of time gave the meaning. (160) 
As Kristian Smidt remarks in Poetrv and Belief in the Work of 
T. S. Eliot,, "More and more in Eliot's later work the idea of 
timelessness is connected with the Christian revelation, , 
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Similarly, The Golden Bough reinforced Eliot's belief in 
the virtue of order. The result of Frazer's comprehensiveness 
and coherence is a perspective from which the history of re- 
ligions and cultures forms a definite order. In fact, Eliot 
believed that the anthropoloqist could never attain more than 
the conception of some such chronological order: 
So far as there is an external order in ritual and 
creed and in artistic and literary expression, this 
order can be reconstructed and cannot be impugned. 
But the "facts" which can be thus arrancred are de- 
cidedly 11-m-ited, and consist historically in a certain 
order--we never know any too exactly of what the order 
is. 
In short, "what we can ever have, at best, is a continuous 
change of ritual in one direction. We can have .*. at least 
a function of continuous chanqe. "60 In the context of the 
early twentieth century, moreover, and particularly in the 
context of Eliot's criticism and poetry, order ultimately 
implies 
religion. In any event, as Eliot observes 
in Poetrv and Drama, 
such is the case in art: 
it is ultimately the function of art, in imposing 
a credible order upon ordinary reality, and thereby 
eliciting some perception of an order in reality, 
to bring us to a condition of serenityl stillness 
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and reconciliation; and then leave us, as Virgil left Dante, to proceed toward a region where that 
guide can avail us no farther. 61 
Such is the effect of The Golden Bouah upon Eliot; its per- 
ception of an incarnational, resurrectional order in huTnan 
history leads him to that state of "serenity,, stillness and 
reconciliation" in which he recognizes, as early as The Waste 
Land, that a simple anthropological scepticism must be trans- 
cended by real belief. Frazer's emphasis upon order, therefore, 
a by-product of The Golden Bough, proved a decisive influence 
in enabling Eliot to discover "the still point of the turninq 
world" (173). 
Frazer also had an important geographical impact upon 
Eliot. The Waste Land demonstrates that people are a ref lec- 
tion of the land; "Gerontion" demonstrates that the old man is 
a reflection of his house. Similarly, location is a central 
theme in Four Quartets: Burnt Norton, the old house in Glou- 
cestershire, provokes the religious ruminations which follow; 
East Coker depicts an imaginary reunion with the poet's seven- 
teenth-century Somerset ancestors; The Drv Salvages returns him 
to the harsh New England coast of his youth; and the f inal poem 
of Four Quartets refers, through its title, to the sevente.. 5-enth- 
century religious community in Huntingdonshire which was aban- 
doned after the English Civil War. The inspiration for these 
geographical poetic devices derives from The Golden Bough; 
Frazer states his belief in the relation between environment 
and religion in the pref ace to the first edition of Adonis, 
Attis,. Osiris: 
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In studying afresh these three Oriental worships. 
akin to each other in character, I have paid more attention than formerly to the natural features of the countries in which thev arose, because I am more than ever persuaded that religion, like all other institutions, has been profoundlv influenced by 
physical environment, and cannot be understood with- out some appreciation of those aspects of external 
nature which stamp themselves indeliblv on the 
62 thoughts, the habits, the whole life of a people. 
But even so, Frazer nevertheless warns, toward the conclusion 
of volume one, that "the whole subject of the influence which 
physical environment has exercised on the history of religion 
deserves to be studied with more attention than it has yet re. - 
ceived. , 
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In reading these volumes, then, Eliot became aware 
of the relation between religion and environment; that is, he 
realized, in the words of John B. Barry in "Eliot's 'Burial of 
the Dead': A Note on the Morphology of Culture,, " that 'Isacral 
practices may be carried f ar and wide but their power remains 
latent in their 'place of origin. , 
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The Golden Bo Is most important influence, however, was 
in suggesting to Eliot how he might revive what he perceived 
as a dead or dying European culture. The image of Frazer's 
0 description of healthy primitive cultures lies behind Eliot's 
prescription for his own: it is "the struggle of our time to 
concentrater not to dissipate; to renew our association with 
traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connexion between 
the individual and the race. 00. n65 However savage Frazer's 
primitive cultures might appear, they were nonetheless vital, 
Eliot, thent was faced with the problem of restoring that vital- 
ity to his own culture. The Golden made it clear that 
primitive ritual was still echoed or parodied in the contemporary 
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world; but whereas at one time this ritual had meaning, it no 
longer did. The typist's indiscriminate sexuality--submitting 
without thought to the young man carbuncular--and the boudoir- 
lady's threat to prostitute herself promiscuously--" I shall 
rush out as I am, and walk the street / With my hair down, so" 
(65)--betray society's ignorance of the religious dimensions of 
sexuality. The behaviour of many of modern Europe's women was 
consistent with the ritual of the holy prostitutes of Western 
Asia, yet in the activity of the former there was none of the 
meaning which one finds in the activity of the latter. According 
to Eliot, then, the poet's duty is to recover the meaning of 
the rituals and symbols of the past: 
as it is certain that some study of primitive man 
furthers our understanding of civilized man, so it 
is certain that primitive art and poetry help our 
understanding of civilized art and poetry. Primitive 
art and poetry can even, through the studies and 
experiments of the artist or poet, revivify the con- 
temporary activities. The maxim, Return to the 
Sources, is a good one. More intelligibly put, 
it is that the poet should know everything that 
has been accomplished in poetry, (accomplished, not 
merely produced) since its beginnings--in order to 
know what he is doing himself. He should be aware 
of all the metamorphoses of poetry that illustrate 
the stratifications of history that cover savagery. 
For the artist is, in an impersonal senser the 
most conscious of men; he is therefore the most 
and the least civilized and civilizeable; he is 
the most competent to understand both civilized and 
primitive. 66 
In the end, however, the object is not just to revivify art, but 
to reviVifY the whole society. Frazer's influence here in a 
review of 1919 has clearly developed to the maturer awareness 
in After Strange Gods of 1934 that society itself must concen- 
trate, f not 
dissipate; it must renew its association with tradi- 
89 
tional wisdom and re-establish a vital connection between the 
individual and the race. It was Frazer, then, who enabled Eliot 
to see the meaninglessness of modern ritual; thus Frazer's 
relevance to The Waste Land, and thus Eliot's acknowledgement 
of his influence. But it was also Frazer who woke Eliot to 
the possibility of restoring the meaning to modern ritual, for 
The Golden Bough led nowhere if it did not lead Eliot to reli- 
gion. The need to recover the primitive's living consciousness 
of the religious dimension of life--a need made obvious by 
The Golden Bough--could not be satisfied through anthropology, 
for,, in Frazer's words, "We can never completely replace our- 
selves at the standpoint of primitive man, see things with his 
eves, and feel our hearts beat with the same emotions that 
stirred his. 
67 
Eliot, then, was left with no alternative but 
religion-- specifically the Christian religion--for it parti- 
cularly emphasized the living understanding of all ritual, that 
is, Incarnation, with a capital "I": 
For most of us, there is only the unattended 
Moment, the moment in and out of time, 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but vou are the music 
While the music lasts. These are only hints and quesses, 
Hints followed by guesses; and the rest 
Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action. 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, 
is Incarnation. (190) 
From his experience of The Golden Bough, then, Eliot 
fashioned poetry and criticism which further developed his 
Christian sensibility. In qeneral, however, he was unaware of 
the extent of Frazer's influence upon him. In criticizing 
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Yeats's attempt to take heaven by magic, for instance, Eliot 
points to the former's poetry where "golden aDples, archers, 
black Pigs and such paraphenalia abounded. 11 ('8 Yet these very 
tý 
things aD-n-ear so f rrequently in his own Frazer-inf luenced poetry. 
Mythology itself is not necessarily incapable of taking heaven; 
it is only a lower mythology, such as Yeats's, which never can 
do so: 
Mr. Yeats's 'supernatural world I was the wrong super- 
natural world. It was not a world of spiritual sig- 
nificance, not a world of real Good and Evil, of holiness or sin, but a highly sophisticated lower 
mythology summoned, like a physician, to supply the 
fading pulse of poetry with some transient stimu- 
lant S? q 
that the dying patient may utter his last 
words. 
The conclusion--implied but not state-d--is that Eliot's own 
supernatural world is the proper one, a world derived from a 
higher mythology. Here, at least, Eliot acknowledges the im- 
portance of his own mythologyr although he does not appear to 
recognize Frazer's formative and enduring influence upon it. 
But having concluded as early as 1913--in respect of anthropo- 
logical works such as Frazer's--that "to understand my point 
of view, you have to believe it first, "70 Eliot owed to The 
Golden B, and the reflections it provoked, the very under- 
pinning of his later faith--that is, the conviction that belief 
must precede understanding. In Eliot's anthropological be- 
ginning, therefore, is his Christian end. 
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Chapter Three: Bergson and Berqsonism 
Bergson's place in the history of modern literature has 
not properly been explained; indeed, according to some, it 
has not even been secured. Kathleen Nott, for instance, dis- 
cusses Bergson's theories only in relation to T. E. Hulme, for 
"it is only in this connection that they bear on the current 
situation in poetry and art. Apart from that their place seems 
to be in the history of philosophy. " 
1 
Even here, however, 
their prospect is poor. A. R. Jones, in The Life and Opinions 
of T. E. Hulmer admits that "Bergson is not a great philosopher 
and wrote little or nothing that has been widely recognized 
as a valid contribution to the permanent and universal science 
of philosophy. " Jones feels that Bergson's significance con- 
sists in his aesthetic sensitivity, for he possessed "an acute, 
almost artistic sensitivity to that age of which he was a most 
typical product: a sensitivity which enabled him not onlv to 
formulate its problems but also to make a distinct and excellent 
attempt to answer them. " 
2 
Irving Babbitt, however, is less 
charitable; he dismisses "the anti-intellectual trend of this 
philosophy and its tendency to present as a spiritual illumina- 
tion what is at bottom only the latest refinement of Rousseauistic 
revery. " 
3 Eliot himself suggests--in the studied arrogance of 
his early prose--that Bergson's theories amount to nonsense: 
"the follies and stupidities of the French, no matter how base, 
express themselves in the form of ideas --Bergsonism itself is 
"4 
an intellectual construction. PerhaDs the most severe 
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criticism, however, comes from I. A. Richards who describes 
Bergsonism as an "insidious dry-rot-like invasion of contemp- 
orary intellectualism. "5 But this may also be the most ironic- 
ally accurate criticism of Berqson, for Richards' hostility 
manifests itself amid a personal Berqsonian "invasion. " His 
complaint, for example,, that "we continually talk as though 
things possess qualities, when what we ought to say is that 
they cause ef f ects in us of one kind or another. " 
6 
actual lv 
seems a paraphrasal of the followinq passage in Bergson's 
Time and Free Will: "We ... associate the idea of a certain 
quantity of cause with a certain quality of effect; and final- 
ly ... we transfer the idea into the sensation, the quantity 
of the cause into the quality of the effect. " 
7 Similarly, 
Eliot seems blind to Bergson's impact; yet despite his seemingly 
ungrateful attempts to cover his tracks, Eliot actually dis- 
plays Bergson's influence widely in his prose, poetry and reli- 
gious belief s. 
This fact is by no means obvious, however, given the 
variety of opinion on this matter. C. A. Patrides, in f act, 
suggests that "Bergson's influencer which on the modern novel 
was extensive even if not exclusive, was on Eliot entirely 
negative. " 
8 Indeed, if Eliot is right in dismissing Bergsonism 
as a confusion of art and philosophy--a typically intellectual 
French follyp according to Eliot--then Bergson's influence may 
well have been negative. 
9 But even a potentially negative 
influence may nonetheless provoke a positive reaction. Herbert 
Howarth thus salvages something positive from Bergsonism: 
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By demolishing a clutter of assumptions and claims, 
especially the claims for scientific law as allowed by the nineteenth century, Bergson cleared a space in which work and play could begin afresh; and if he liberated the human mind, as some observers feared, for experiments in anarchy, he also cr, _!! _ýated 
the con- ditions in which the new conservatism might grow by 
reaction and make its own use of the leveled snaCe. 10 
In short, Berqson at least served Eliot as a philosophical 
example against which to react. Yet Eliot had once been a 
convert to Rergsonism. So strong was his interest in Bergson's 
lectures at the College de France in early 1911 that he arrived 
early at each lecture--a strong interest shown more by Kristian 
Smidt's picture of "Eliot arrivinq an hour and a quarter before 
the lecture started, as he says one had to do, "" than by 
Robert Sencourt's report that "Tom found that if he wanted a 
seat, he had to arrive there a quarter of an hour beforehand. IJ2 
There was a period, then, when Bergson's influence is likely 
to have been substantial. And if, as Piers Gray suggests in 
T. S. Eliot's Intellectual 'and Po-etic Develonment 1909, -19-221, 
Eliot's lack of poetic activity between 1911 and 1913 stems 
from a dissatisfaction with Bergsonism, 
13 the resulting Doetic 
incapacity at least serves to show how deeply the former had 
been impressed by the latter. At no point,, however,, does Eliot's 
conversion to Berqsonism seem to have been completely uncritical, 
for he wrote an essav in 1911 criticizing Berqson's duree reelle 
it , 
14 
as simply not final. Thus not only the duree re- elle itself, 
but Eliot's attitude towards it, is simply not final. This 
ambiguity or ambivalence--whatever the combination of Eliot, s 
conversion and criticism yields--is explained by Philip Le Brun 
in terms of Eliot's distinct attitudes tov7ards Bergson, on the 
98 
one hand, and Bergsonians, on the other. Bergsonians were 
responsible for Bergsonism--a confusion of philosophy and art, 
and a folly in its own right, according to Eliot; it was Berg- 
sonis disciples, Le Brun argues,, "who had perhaps always been 
the real object of Eliot's antagonism. J5 As far as Bergson 
himself is concerned, "there appears to be an actual failure 
on Eliot's part to recognize what he gained from Bergson, 
and perhaps some process of repression is involved. " 
16 
More 
likely, however, is Smidt's suggestion that, in moment's of 
doubt, old ways of thinking come to the fore: 
The whole past history of a man composes an ideal 
order, and the sense of this order compels a man to 
write with his whole past in his bones. One's al- 
legiance can change, as Eliot's changed in respect 
of Babbitt or Bradley, but one's views and attitudes 
can hardly change so completely that the old ideas 
lose all their appeal and do not present themselves 
in moments of doubt as the only tenable ones. 17 
Here,, then, after adding Bergson's name to this passage, is a 
psychological explanation of Bergson's presence in much of 
Eliot's later prose, poetry, and religious thought. But much 
more interesting is an explanation of the conceptual consistency 
which further justifies Bergson's continuing influence upon 
Eliot at all points in his critical, poetic, and religious 
development. 
As Howarth hints above, and as Frank Kermode states plainly, 
"Bergson .e. is the almost 
inevitable result of the nineteenth- 
century effort to find room for art amid the encroachments of 
science. ee* 
18 Toward this end, Bergson began his assault 
against nineteenth-century materialism 
by asking whether thought 
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can properly be assimilated to things. He concedes, of course, 
that for the practical purposes of day to day living, and for 
scientific purposes, there have to be just as sharp and precise 
distinctions between ideas as there are between the material 
objects which they are supposed to represent. It would be 
impossible otherwise to observe any regularity between inten- 
tions and actions, or causes and ef fects--a regularity necessary 
for the 'practice of livinq and the practice of science. But 
this is merely the common perception of the matter; and it is, 
after all, within this common perception that certain philo- 
sophical problems arise. Ouqht thouqht, thereforer to be 
necessarily assimilated to its objects? As Bergson suggests: 
it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficul- 
ties presented by certain philosophical problems do 
not arise from our placing side by side in space 
phenomena which do not occupy space, and whether, 
by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round 
which we are fighting, we might not bring the fight 
to an end. 19 
He therefore proposes to inquire as to the relation, if any, 
between the properly spatial--the extended--and the properly 
non-spatial-the unextended or mental. 
Bergson observes that it is quite common--if not a rule-- 
to speak of mental states in terms of magnitude. That is, 
one describes a certain thought, feeling, emotion, or sensation 
as greater or lesser than another. This description, then, is 
actually a comparison in respect of magnitude. But magnitude 
being properly a concept applied to things which are extended, 
what is one to make of the unextended magnitude implied by the 
ranking of mental states as greater or 
lesser than others? As 
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Bergson and Richards suggest, this curious aspect of common 
ways of thinking is the result of subtly importing cause into 
effect. Take, for example, the pricking of a finger of the 
left hand by a pin held in the right hand. The pin is nricked 
deeper and deeper into this finger as the effort of the riaht 
hand increases. Bergson denies, however, that the sensation 
in the finger increases, for this would once again quantify 
sensation. The intensity of a sensation is but "a ceertain 
shade or quality"; the mistake arises as one localizes in "the 
sensation of the left hand, which is pricked, the progressive 
effort of the riqht hand, which pricks. , 
20 
And so a quality 
becomes ro.: -apresentative of the magnitude or quantity of 
its 
cause; one thus speaks of it as though it were extended itself. 
Bergson is at pains to emphasize, however, that there is no 
point of contact between the extended and the unextended, 
between quantity and quality: "We can interpret the one by 
the other, set up the one as the equivalent of the other; but 
sooner or later, at the beginning or at the end, we shall have 
to recognize the conventional character of this assimilation. , 
21 
Having determinedr therefore, that a mental state neither in- 
creases nor decreasesf Bergson proceeds to ask whether the very 
distinction between one mental state and another might not also 
be a conventional illusion--another aspect of the conventional 
assimilation of thought to material objects. 
Material objects, of course, must be distinct; that is, 
they observe the law in respect of the impenetrability of matter: 
"Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. " 
Bergson sugqestsf howeverf that this is not actually a physical 
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law,, but merely a logical necessity. If something is to be 
counted, for instance, it must be distinct in space. In other 
words, objects simply could not be distinguished--that is, 
counted--if they were interpenetrated in physical or mental 
space. The law concerning the impenetrability of matter, 
therefore, reflects not a property of matter, but a property 
of number. There ought, then, to be no conceptual difficulty 
in picturing mental activity as an infinite interpenetration 
of mental states, for the multiplicity of these mental states 
is numerical only in the sense that the symbols which represent 
them--verbally or otherwise--are distinct and many in number. 
The fact remains, however, that people commonly conceive of 
mental states in the material terms of distinction and number. 
There must, then, be a convincinq illusion responsible for the 
unnecessary, but nonetheless f irmly established, convention of 
assimilating mental states to material objects. 
Bergson accounts for this convention by tracing it to a 
confusion between time and spacgm-. One's reflective conscious- 
ness,, he observes, tends to conceive of time through its dis- 
tinction between a present and past state of consciousness. As 
a result, time appears to be "a medium in which our conscious 
states form a discrete series so as to admit of being coun- 
ted. .*o 
, 22 But counting can only occur in space; in order 
a able to distinguish to apply the concept of number,, one must be 
objects in physical or mental space. Time, then, 
in so far as 
it is regarded as a medium in which distinction and counting 
occur, r seems 
to be space. This concept of time, therefore, is 
impure; Bergson describes it as an alloy "surreptitiously bringing 
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in the idea of space. 1123 Pure time, Bergson argues, knows 
no distinction between present states and past states; it is 
a living duration. Of these two concepts of time, however, 
the impure notion of time as a medium of extension is the far 
more pervasive. And it is this conceptual impuritv which is 
responsible for the conventional assimilation between mental 
states and material objects. 
In pure time--living time, concrete time, or the time 
of pure duration--thoughts, feelings, emotions, and sensations 
are in a constant flux; they are confused and ever-changing. 
In impuren, extended time, however, these mental states are 
distinquished and named so that they come under the domain of 
a symbolic language. The act of distinguishing such states, 
so that thev become clear and precise, actually reduces them to 
the lowest denominator common with the experience of others 
in order that what the name or symbol denotes miqht be coTmnunic- 
ated to as many as possible. This impersonalization, however 
unfortunate, proves necessary not only in the interest of science, 
but also in the interest of practical day to day living, for 
communication is impossible without it. In the end--the unex- 
tended consciousness having been extended and impersonalized by 
linguistic symbol s-extended time produces an extended conscious- 
ness: 
little bv little ... our conscious] states are 
made into objects or thýngs; thev break off not only 
from one another, but from ourselves. Henceforth 
we no lonqer perceive them except in the homoqeneous 
medium in which we have set their image, and throuýh 2 the word which lends them its commonplace colour. 
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And so, Bergson claims, as mental states are assimilated to 
material objects, they not only separate from each other, but 
from the living, concrete consciousness as well. Eventually 
the real, "lived" thought, feeling,, emotion,, or sensation comes 
to be known only through the common, impersonal word or image 
which represents it--that is, fixes or extends it--in the ex- 
tended consciousness. From the confusion between time and 
space, there fore, "a second self is formed which obscures the 
first,, a self whose existence is made. up of distinct moments, 
whose states are senarated from one another and easily expressed 
in words. , 
25 
But although this process begins with the con- 
fusion between time and space, it is perpetuated by the problems 
of communication: words, words, words. 
To illustrate the impossibility of communicating a state 
of consciousness directly, Bergson describes the relationship 
between an author, the character he creates, and the reader. 
Describe as particularly as he will the character in his novel, 
the author can never convey his character's actual conscious 
state, for any "lived" thought, feeling, emotion, or sensation 
comprises an indefinite multiplicity of conscious states. The 
author, therefore, in order to represent such a complex state, 
must distinguish from this flux that which can be represented 
in words. The words he chooses, of course, are not themselves 
actual states of consciousness; thus the author can indicate 
the most personal "lived" sensation- individual consciousness- 
only by the least personal state of consciousness--the word. 
And soj, even in his expert rendering of the character's states 
of consciousness through the speeches and actions he depicts, 
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the author can nenver produce for the reader "the simple and 
indivisible feelinq" one should experience if one were able 
even for a moment to identify oneself with the charactsr. 
26 
As Bergson testi4L: ies: 
Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a snrj- 4nar 
all the words, gestures and actions of the man would 
appear to me to f low naturallv. Thev would no longer 
be accidents which, added to the idea I had alreadv 
formed of the charactor, continually enriched that 
idea, without ever completing it. 27- 
In short, actions looked at from the inside appear different 
from actions looked at from the outside. According to Bergson, 
one might rise from one's desk, for example, with the intention 
of opening a window. Should somethinq disrunt one's train of 
thouqht, however, such that the intention of opening the window 
is temporarily obscured, one miqht well feel that one is standing 
for a particular reason-a reason that may be recovered with 
due concentration--althouqh the observation of another, or of 
lanquage itself, both of which are outside one's state of con- 
sciousness, is the same whether one has stood to open a window, 
or simply to stand. Bergson's point, then, is that no repre- 
sentation by language, or any other means, is adequate to the 
thing represented. 
Moreover, as a representation must always be imperfect in 
comparison with the object it represents, it therefore seem-s 
that the only perfect expression of an object is that object 
itself. To know an object, then, one must know more than its 
representation; one must know the object itself. And to know 
the object itself can mean nothinq less than to become the 
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object; that is, one must know it from the inside as onnosed to 
the outside. This distinction hetween vilews -from the inside 
and outside, respectively, is fundamentall, 7 the distinct -icn 
between intuition and intellect. The intellect, according 
to Bergson, infinitely divides its object, ext-e-nds it in space, 
and expresses it in words. Intuition, on the other hand, is 
a "kind of intellectual sympath77 by which one places oneself 
within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in 
it and consequently inexpressible. , 
28 
It is not possible, 
therefore, for intellectual analysis actually to hand ovxmr the 
reality with which it is dealing; it merely lays conc,. ---5pts side. 
by side in an artificial reconstruction of the object. It is 
occasionally possible, however, for the intellect to suagest 
an intuition through the skilful manipulation of images. Berg- 
son explains that such images cannot replace the intuition 
of pure duration, "but many diverse images , borrowed f rom vehry 
different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their 
action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there 
is a certain intuition to be seized. , 
29 Intuition itself, 
however, is a rare occurrence-, for human understandinq, accordinq 
to Bergson's metaphor, is like a railway station: "it notes 
departures and arrivals. . 4, * It 
is more than human to grasp 
what is happening in the interval. g, 
30 
The question as to why it should be more than human "to 
grasp what is happening in the interval" prompts Berqson to 
answer in the terms of his own version of the 
history of life 
on earth. To begin with, he accepts the principle of evolution 
as a conceptual framework within which 
to discuss the development 
106 
of life. Given existencer Bergson commences his historv at 
the point of the distinction between animal and plant life; 
he assumes that animal and plant cells derive from a common 
stock: "the first livina organisms oscillated between the 
,, 31 veqetable and animal form, participatinq in both at once . 
This common cellular stock consisted of "vegetable torpor, 
instinct, and intelligence"; an increasing distinction occurred 
within this "vital compulsion, " however, due to its mixed 
nature. 
32 
In time, plants simply fell asleep, thus leaving 
the pursuit and development of instinctual and intelligent 
consciousness to animals. According to Bergson's analysis, 
one path olf evolutionary developMent leads to ins tinct- -evident 
primarily in insects --whereas the other path leads to intel- 
ligence-evident primarily in human beings. At the root of 
instinct, of course, is intuition; and at the root of intel- 
licrencee, is intellect. The passing of time, then, has made the 
power of intellect human and the power of intuition "more than 
human. " 
But although Bergson speaks of life in terms of evolution, 
one ought not to conclude that he has quietly, though nonethe- 
less contradictorily, accepted the scientific materialism of 
the nineteenth century. He will not, for instance, accent that 
life may be explained as a combination of physico-chemical 
elements. Life is certainly dependent upon such things as cells, 
but to explain life in physico-chemical terms inevitably denies 
the very essence of that which it attempts to explain. In order 
to illustrate this point,, Bergson discusses the mathematical 
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relationship of a curve to a straight line, by which he means 
to represent the relationship of liffe to physics and chemistr,. r. 
A curve, in so far as it is concrete or "living,, " is actually 
a movement--the movement of its own generation. Life, of 
course, is just such a movement. The straight line in question 
may be taken to represent chemical and physical forces. From 
the analytical perspective of mathematics and science--that is, 
from the perspective of intellect--both a curve and a straight 
line are reducible to the limit of a point. A curve, then, 
in the aspect of a point, will be indistinguishable from a 
straight line in the same aspect. One might claim, therefore, 
that the curve is actuallv comT)osed of straight lines. Such 
a point of view, however, confuses time with space, for it 
assumes that the living duration which is the curve can be 
reconstructed from the infinite extension in space of the 
moments which, undivided and undistinguished, generated the 
curve originally. Similarly, life is tangent at every point 
with physical and chemical forces, but no postmortem arrange- 
ment of these concepts can ever reproduce the vitality which 
exists in unextended, undifferentiated time. 
Clearly, thenr Bergson was willing to discuss the history 
of life within an evolutionary framework despite the association 
of evolution with scientific materialism. In fact, the concept 
of evolution seems to have enabled him to explain life as pure 
duration, for, accordinq to the theory of evolution, there is 
a real persistence of the past in the life of the present. In 
short, life, like the individual consciousness, is an aspect of 
that undi-Al.: ferentiated flux which is the highest mode of exist- 
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ence conceivable. As Bergson observes,, "continuit, 7 of change, 
preservation of the past in the present, real duration- -the, 
livinq being seems ... to share these attributes with con- 
h 133 sciousness. Not surnrisingl, ý,,,,, then, Bergson's analvsis of 
the realationshin of life to matter mirrors his analvsis of the 
re la-lk--- ions h in of consciousness to material objects. Indeed, 
life is actually "a broad curreant of consciousness. " 
3A 
Bergson 
thus 'Presents this broad current of consciousness as penetratina 
matter just as the ind_ividual consciousness Penetrates material 
objects. That is, just as thoughts, feelings, emotions, and 
sensations in the individual consciousness differenntiate and 
separate from the flux which is the "living" consciousness, in 
order to engage co-operativell., with material objects in the 
practical activity designed to sustain this consciousness, so 
life--that broad current of consciousness--externalizes itself 
in a commerce with matter designed to overcome matter's resist- 
ance to life. As Bergson puts it: 
In reality, lifee is a movement, materiality is the 
inverse movement I and each of these two movements 
is simple, the matter which forms a world beinýT an 
undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs 
through it, cutting out in it living beings all along 
its track. Of these two currents the second [material- 
ity] runs counter to the first [life), but the first 
obtains, all the same, something from the second. 
35 
What it obtains, of course, is its own furtherance--the further- 
ance of life. Life, therefore, in the same manner as the 
in- 
dividual consciousness creates a second nmaterial" consciousness 
to deal with the practical affairs of the material world, creates 
life in the form of living beings in order to wend its wav through 
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matter. 
Life manifests itself in the three modes cataloaued ahove: 
vegetable tornor, instinct, and intelligence. Plants, however, 
havincT fallen asleep, are not the important agents in life's 
engagement with matter. Rather, instinct and intelligence ner- 
form this function. Whereas man represents the ultimate achieve- 
ment of life in respect of intellect or intelligence, the insect, 
according to Bergson, renresents the ultimate achievement of life 
in respect of intuition or instinct. Intuition, however, has 
not gone as far in the develonment of living beings as has in- 
tellect. Berqson suggests that intuition, by relnýstrictina its 
attention as much as possible to the minimum contact with matter 
necessary to sustain life, eventually shrinks into instinct- 
a r,. astricted intuitive consciousness. With the Derfection of 
intelligence in man's intellect, however, Bergson suggests that 
consciousness may then "turn inwards on itself, and awaken the 
potentialities of intuition which still slumber within it. . 
36 
Through reawakened intuition, individual consciousness might 
return to the broad current of consciousness from which it had 
originally descended into matter. In short, individual conscious- 
ness will become life itself. It will look at life through 
life--from the inside out--insteead of trying to recomnose life 
from the fragmentary analysis of a fragmented consciousness, as 
is necessarilv the case when looking at life from the outside in. 
Toward this apocalyptic end, thent Bergson's exhortations in 
Creative Evolution wax enthusiastic: 
Let us try to see, no longer with the eves of the 
intellect aloner which grasps onlv the already made 
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and which looks from the outside, but with the snirit, I mean with that faculty of seeinq which is irmanent in the faculty of acting and which snrings un, some- how, býý- 
'i-P 
;, the twisting of the will on itse when 
action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to 
say, into light. To movement, then, evervthina will 
be restored, and into movement evervthing will he 
resolved. Where-, the understanding, workina on the 
image[,, ] sunnosed to be fixed[, ] of the. progressincT 
action, shows us partts infin-it'nl',. 7 manifold and an 
order infin-ite-1v well contrived, we catch a alimnse 
of a simple process F an action which is makin('T itself 
across an action of the same kind which is unmaking 
itself, like the fierlr path torn by the last rocket 
of a fireworks displalr through the black cinders of 
the spent rockets that are falling dead. 37 
Intuition and intellect, in other words, need not be mutuallv 
exclusive approaches to life. In understanding an imaae, for 
instance, one glimpses the nrocess b-, - which thn- intellect con- 
structs its fixed moment out of the duration which is continually 
unmaking itself through its constant f lux. In short, one is 
prepared for the intuition of pure duration by the image-making 
activitv of the intellect. 
Essentiallv, this is the function which Bergson attributes 
to the artist. Whereas the intention of life--the flow of move- 
mermt, the harmonl-;, of flux--escapes those who look at life through 
the eve of the intellect, the artist, Bergson feels, is abls to 
regain this intention by "Placing himself back within the object 
b, k, r a kind of sinnpathv, in breaking down, by an effort of intui- 
tion, the barrier that space puts un between him and his model. " 
38 
The work of art, therefore, ought to communicate the thing itsel-f-7- 
the very flux which is its object. To seek for the meaning of a 
poem in the. letters of which it is comosed is thus a vain effort, 
for "the letters ... are not parts of 
the thing, but elements 
of the svnbol. " 
39 The thing itself, however, is not the artist's 
ill 
exclusive object, for he must necessarily portray something 
of himself as he placns himself within this object. In effect, 
the simultan, -elous portrayal of the object and the artist within 
the object proves to be the very portrayal of the s7rmnathetic 
process which is the aritist's intuition. The artistic "thincr 
itself, " therofore, is actuall-v the artist's intuition of him- 
self as the thing contemnlated. The work of aric, then, incorpor- 
ates the duration of the sympathetic process of intuition within 
itself,, and so becomes as much as possible like the living ex- 
perience which is its creation. As Bergson outs it: 
to the artist who creates a picture by drawing it 
from the depths of his soul, time is no lon7er an 
accessorv; it is not an interval that ma'ý, r be le-mnqth- 
ened or shortened without the content being altered. 
The duration of his work is part and Darcel of his 
work. To contract or to dilate it would be to modify 
both the nsvchical evolution that fills it and the 
invention wýich is its goal. The time taken up by 
the invention is one with the invention itself. 40-' 
The artist, therefore, te-stifics through his work that intuition 
is possible, and strives, furthermore, to make his intuition 
possible for others. He cannot communicate it, however, and so 
must leave these "others" to fars towards intuition as best 
they can. 
In the end, one is left in a similar situation in respect 
of Bergson's philosophy as a whole. One now knows that conscious- 
ness, like time, ought properly to be undifferentiated. Morsover, 
one has become wary of the insinuating practicalitv of the 
intellect. Yet the possibility having been admitted that con- 
sciousness might become one with becoming itself. one seems no 
nearer to intuition than 
before this Bergsonian enliahtenment. 
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Perhaps the fact that intuition has been discovered--or redis- 
covered- -through intellectual analysis explains the diff ýicultv- 
or even the imDossibilitv--or' loqicallv proceedinq to an alogical, 
unanalytical intuition by means of it. One can seemingly expect 
no more than that intellectual analysis may "direct consciousness 
to the precise point where there is a cert-ain intuition to be 
seized. " In many respects, such seelms to have been Eliot's 
experience of Bergson's philosophy. 
Althouqh scampt-ical of Berqsonism in qeneral, Eliot never- 
theless seems to reflect in his own c,. -itical preoccupation with 
time the same concern which ruled Bergson's intellectual life. 
In "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " for instancem, one 
finds that "the historical sense involves a perception, not only 
of the pastness of the past, but of its presence .*9 1141 -- a 
sense similar to Bergson's historical or evolutionary sense of 
the "preservation of the past in the present. " 
42 
For Bergson, 
moreover, one's personal past exists as pure memory, that is, 
as a psychical entity in which past mental states exist as 
independently as the material world. Eliot and Bergson thus 
agree that the artist must have his finger on the pulse of the 
living duration--the flux which is at once past, future, and 
present--for, as Eliot warns,, "he is not likely to know what is 
to be done unless he lives in what is not merea1v the present, 
but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not 
.C 1143 of what is deadf but of what is already living. Similarly, 
in his earlier essavr "Reflections on Vers Libre, " Eliot explains 
"the very life of verse" in the Bergsonian terms of a "contrast 
between f-4, xitv and flux, , 
44 In addition, then, to sharing with 
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Bergson the idea of a renalitv hravond time, an idea with an 
almost universal currcncy in eastern and wesltenrn religion and 
philosophy, Eliot seems unconsciouslv to accont many aspects 
of Bergson's particular version of this real-i t-7 
So pervasive, in fact, is Eliot's sSnse of Bergsonian 
duration that, in tho light of it, even his insistonce upon 
impersonalit, v can ben intcrT)retnd as an attem)t to deny the 
snatializeld "second self" of Bergson's matr-ýrial world. In this 
world, the ''surrender'' or ''extinction'' of nersonality returns 
one ironically to the more personal self which is, esse entially, 
duration itself. 45 Not sur? risingly, then, Eliot later admits, 
in 1940, that heen actually had in mind a very personal kind of 
immersonality-the impersonalit-,,., - "of the poet who, out of in- 
tense and personal experience, is able to express a general 
truth; retaining all the particularity of his experience, to 
make of it a general symbol, , 
46 According to Bergson, in fact, 
it is this verv particularity which is the general truth. Berq- 
sonts impact, then, is not confined to Eliot's early years; it 
turns up, for instance, in What is a Classic? (1945): 
In our aqe, when men seem more than ever prone to 
5dae confuse wisdom with knowlsdae, and knowle with 
information, and to try to solve problems of life, 
in terms of engineerinq, there is coming into exist- 
ence a new kind of nrovincialism which perhaps deserves 
a new name. It is a provincialism, not of snace, but 
of time; one for which historv is merelv the chronicle 
of human device-ts which have served their turn and been 
scrapned, one for which the world is the property 
solel-yr of the living, a property in which the dead 
hold no shares. 47 
Here,, the concern at the corrupt influence of materiality upon 
questions of liffle and tine is Bergsonian. Far f rom beina merelv 
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negative or inconseauential, then, Bergson's inf luence upon 
Eliot seems important- indeed essontial-to an inquir, y into 
the process hV which Eliot's progressive rccognition and 
articulation of his deepest concerns culminate finally in 
a Christian T)ersnective. 
Among the earliest Drose instancems of Bergson's impact 
upon Eliot are the "Eeldrop and Annlenlex" chapters in The 
Little Review of 1917. These characters, prsferring evil 
neighbourhoods of silence to evil neiqhbourhcods of noise, be- 
cause the former are more evil, wish "to apprs-hond the human 
soul in its concrete individualit-y. ,4 '9 This goal--the goal o-ý 
Bergsonian intuition-is partially realized in their anprscia- 
tion of an unnleasant, hut nonetheless unique, Spaniard: they 
are "able to detach him from his classification and recTard him 
for a moment as an uniaue being, a soul, however insignificant, 
with a historýv of its own, once for all. tlA9 The Bergsonian 
analysis continues as Appleplex centrels the problem of modern 
consciousness in language: "The majority of mankind live on 
paper currenc'y: they use torms which are merelv crood for so 
much retalitv, thev never see actual coinage. "50 And, for qood 
measure, Eeldron adds that the "majority not only havn no 
language to express anvthinq save generalized man; thev are 
for the most part unaware of themselves as anything but gencral- 
ized men. 1151 Here, then, is them Bergsonian emnhasis unon the 
disparity betweemn the individuality of immediate experience and 
the impersonal, common nature of language. Similarly, in the 
second chanter, one finds Eeldrop discussing art in Bergson's 
terms; he identifies the artist with his work, for instance, just 
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as Bergson identifies the duration of the creative T3rocess 
with the duration which is the work of art: "what holds the 
artist together is the work which he does; senarate him from 
his work and he either disintegrates or solidifies. There is 
no interest in the artist apart from his work. , 
52 The artist, 
then, is in some sense a nart of the work of art; Eeldron thus 
adds that "the people who can be material for art must have 
in them something unconscious, something which they do not 
fully realise or understand. , 
53 In short, they must have the 
potential for intuition or inst. 4nct. Paradoxically enouch, 
however, r the true extent of BercTson's impact on1v appears when 
Eeldrop dismisses the Bergsonism which has been recommended to 
Appleplex: 
Our philosophy is quite. irrelevant. The essential 
is, that our philosophy should spring from our point 
of view and not return upon itself to explain our 
point of view. A philosophy about intuition is 
somewhat less likely to be intuitive than any other. 
We must avoid having a platform. 54 
That is, Eeldrop transcends Bergson's philosophy, in the sense 
in which it depends upon arguments of the intellect, in order to 
live the philosophy as the intuition or duration towards which 
it strives. Perhans, thent just as Eeldrop's refusal of Berg- 
sonism is actually the act of a Bergsonian, so Eliot's refusal 
to acknowledge Bergson's impact is not so much an act of repres- 
sion,, as an unconscious--or even tac it-- acceptance of BerqsonisTn. 
Much of Eliot's criticism is, in fact, couched in Bergsonian 
terms. As Philip Le Brun points out, Eliot often seems to have 
specific passages from Bergson's work 
in mind. Whereas, in Time 
I 
116 
and Free Willt Bergson wr-J. -tes of duration as "a musical nhrase 
which is constantl77 on the point of endina and constantlv al- 
tered in its totality by the addition of some new note, 1155 
Eliot,, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " writes of 
literary duration in similar terms: 
what hannens when a new work of art is created is 
something that hannens simultancousIv to all the 
works of art which preceded it. The existing monu- 
ments form an ideal order among themselves, which 
is modified bu the introduction o-F- t'. _, Le new (the 
reallv new) work of art among them. The existing 
order is comnlete before the new work arrives; for 
order to persist after the supervention of novelty, 
the whole exist-ing order must be, if ever so sliahtlv, 
altered. ... 
56 
And similarly, whereas Bergson warns that having turned inner 
states into objects "we no longer perc-eive them exceent in the 
homoqeneous medium in which we have set their image, and through 
the word which lends them its comnonnlacce colour, , 
57 
Eliot notes, 
in "Philip Massinger, " that it "is to be feared that the feeling 
of Massinger is simple and overlaid with received ideas, ,58 and 
warns, in "Blake, " that the ordinary processes of society which 
constitutem education "consist largelv in the accruisition of 
impersonal ideas which obscure what we really are and feel, what 
we really wantr and what really excites our interest. "59 More- 
over, as Le Brun noints out, Eliot's observation, in "John Donne,, " 
that in the case of Baudelaire "evenr new mood is nrepared by 
and imnlicit in the precedinq mood, 
60 is naralleled bv Dassages 
in An introduction to Metavhvsics--where Bergson suggests that 
each conscious state "announces that which follows and contains 
that which Precedes it 1161 --and Time and Free Will--where, dis- 
117 
cussing a curved line which chanaes direction, Berason declarýns 
that "every new direction is indicated in the 1precedincT one. 162 
Similarl, 7, as Bergson describes the function of art, within 
consciousness as a whole, as "to nut to sleep the active or 
rather resistant powers of our persona li -Itnr, " 
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so Eliot, within 
the realm of poetry, describes the role of meaning as "to satisfy 
one habit of the reader, to keen his mind diverted and quiet, 
while the poem does its work unon him: much as the imaginarv 
burglar is always provided wit-h a bit of nice meat for the 
house-dog. 1,64 Eliot's conception of Poetic crea- 
tion in "The Frontiers of Cr-Ji-ticism"-whes-re he exnlains that 
in the "creation" of a locem "somethina new has hamosm-neld, scme- 
thing that cannot be wholly explained b-,, r anythina that went 
before" 6-0 --is an echo of Berason's Creative Evolution, which 
declares that creation cannot be exnlained as that which is 
"already invented. " 66 Eliot, then, was clearly well-versed in 
Bergsonian texts. 
It is also clear that Bergson's influence extends beyond 
mere words to the very structure of Eliot's critical thought. 
Eliot displays a Bergsonian and Bradlevan desnair of the in- 
tellect as earlv as Knowledae 'and Exreriencm: "if we attemnt 
to put the world together again, after havinq divided it into 
consciousness and objects, we are condemned to failure. We 
cannot create experience out of entities which are indeDendent 
of experience. , 
67 The difficulty in understandina experience, 
I. 
according to Bergson, arises from the imnossibil-itv of beina 
inside and outside an experience at the same time. This is one 
of the problems inherent in an anthroDological nerspective, 
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a point Eliot first made in Josiah Royce's seminar classes 
of 1913 and 1914. The idea is still shaning Eliot's thought 
thirt, %7-five years later, for he explains in Notes towards the 
Definition of Culture that to understand a foreign culture 
is to understand the people, and this means an 
imaginative understanding. Such understanding can 
never be complete: either it is abstract--and the 
essence escapes--or else it is lived; and in so f ar 
as it is -lived, the student will -tend to identify 
himself so completely with the people whom he studies, 
that he will lose the point of view from which it was 
worth while and possible to study it. Understanding 
involves an area more extensive than that of which 
one can be conscious; one cannot be outside and inside 
at the same time. 68 
Essentially, these observations hold true for individual ex- 
perience as well as cultural experience, for a perfect under- 
standing of one's own experience comes only from living that 
experience; one must be comDletn. lv inside, and so beyond the 
consciousness which objectifies personal experience. Practical 
consciousness, however, is a fact of life; the result, there- 
fore, is a Bergsonian despair at what Eliot describes as "the 
awful separation between potential passion and any actualization 
possible in li e. . 
69 
In the world of literature, Eliot sees this problem re- 
f lected in the distinction between prose and poetry: 
It seems to me that beyond the namable, class- 
ifiable emotions and motives of our conscious life 
when directed towards action--the part of life which 
prose drama is wholly adequate to expreess--there is 
a fringe of indefinite extent,, of feeling which we 
can only detect, so to speak, out of the corner of 
the eye and can never completely focus; of feeling 
of which we are only aware in a kind of temporary 
detachment from action .. *. This peculiar range 
of sensibility can be expressed by dramatic poetry, 
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at its moments of greatest intensity. At such 
moments, we touch the border of those feelings which 
only music can express. 70 
According to Eliot, then, language as a whole-apart from 
poetry--tends to run counter to feeling in so far as it is 
directed towards action. On this account, Eliot's "language" 
opposes feeling as Bergson's matter opposes life. Similarly, 
Eliot observes that language and the accepted way of life 
change "under the pressure of material changes in our environ- 
ment in all sorts of ways"; faced, therefore, with the prospect 
of an unwitting material assimilation of sensibility through 
the neglect of literature, Eliot warns that "unless we have 
those few men who combine an exceptional sensibility with an 
exceptional power over words, our own ability, not merely to 
expresso, but even to feel any but the crudest emotionsr will 
degenerate. , 71 But that Bergson's conception of the life force 
serves as a ground for Eliot's conception of poetic language is 
best indicated in the latter's cormnents about the poetry of 
Swinburne: 
only a man of genius could dwell so exclusively 
and consistently among words as Swinburne. His 
language is not, like the language of bad poetry, 
dead. It is ven7 much alive, with this singular 
life of its own. But the language which is more 
important to us is that which is struggling to 
digest and express new objects, new groups of ob- 
jects, new feelings, new aspects, 
72 
1 
This process of verbal digestion and expression, in effect, is 
the same process of material digestion and expression which 
Bergson sees life itself performing as it cuts its way through 
matter. For Eliot, the author enters 
his fiction, and so brings 
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life to the characters of his drama, in the same wav: "The 
creation of a work of art, we will sav the creation of a 
character in a drama, consists in the process of transfusion 
of the personalitv, or, in a deeper sense, the life, of the 
author into the character. , 
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Eliot's criticism, therefore, owes a great deal to Berg- 
sonism. Despite his professed distaste for this confusing, 
intellectual French folly, Eliot unquestionably found it 
instrumental in enabling him to articulate his critical prin- 
ciples. Whatever else his objective correlative may be, for 
instance, it is certainly Berqsonian in so far as it can 
"direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a 
certain intuition to he seized. " Indeed, it was probablv 
in grappling with Bergson's questions as to how--or even 
whether--real, concrete, living states of mind can be con- 
veyed to another person that Eliot arrived at his objective 
correlative. And similarly, however diverse and numerous the 
sources of inspiration and modes of develonment of Eliot's 
critical conceptions of creativity, language, time, and im- 
mediate experience, these conceptions nonetheless incorporate 
a significant element of Bergsonism. 
Not surprisingly, then, Bergson's philosophy appears in 
Eliot's poetry as well. Evidence, however, of an awareness 
of time in his poetry--an awareness which Nott describes as 
"the sine qua non of poetic exverience in genera 1"-- actual ly 
predates his awareness of Bergson. 
74 In his teens, for in- 
stance, one finds already the carpe them theme which Berg- 
sonisin ref ines to a metaphysic of the moment: 
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But let us live while vet we may, 
While love and life are free, 
For time is time, and runs away, 
Though sages disagree. 75 
Here, then, in adolescent verse, Eliot reveals the poetJLc 
awareness of the experience of time traceable within all his 
poetrv. More particularly, he reveals a predisn. -osition toward 
marking the difference between the perceptual tire. of "love 
and life" and the concentual time about which "sages disaaree"-- 
a pre-disposition which Bergsonism enables him to conf irm and 
articulate. throuqhout his poetry. 
Bergson's influence is evident, for instance-,, in "The. 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, " a poem completed during 
Eliot's -,, rear in France. His preoccupation with time appears 
as the word itself is used eiqht times within twelve lines: 
And indeed there will be time 
For the yellow smoke that slides along the street 
Rubbing its back upon the window-panes; 
There will be time, there will be time 
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet; 
There will be time to murder and create, 
And time for all the works and davs of hands 
That lift and drop a question on your plate; 
Time for you and time for me,, 
And time yet for a hundred indecisions, 
And for a hundred visions and revisions, 
Before the taking of a toast and tea. 76 (13-14) 
Moreover, time is as essential to activity in "Prufrock" as it 
is to free will in Time and Free Will. As Piers Grav points 
out in his analysis of the poem's logic, "the greater the space, 
the greater the time; the greater the time, the greater the choice; 
the greater the choice, the greater the indetermination; the 
greater the indetermination, the 
less the action. , 
77 It is 
12 2 
more than possible, then, that, in Staffan Bergsten's words 
in Time and Eternit, ý7, "The poern mav in f act be interpreted as 
an illustration of the decadent impotence against which Bergson 
reacted in preaching his gospel of free-will. " 
78 
Eliot thus 
depicts the contemporary experience of impotence through Pruf- 
rock's indecision and revision. That is, Prufrock suffers 
from the inability to assert the priority of his inner experi- 
ence of time over clock time. According to Nancy K. Gish, in 
Time in the Poetrv of T. S. Eliot, this poem is primarily con- 
cerned with "the split between Prufrock's inner and outer life, 
with his inability to take the chance of living according to 
his own feelings and desires, and, hence, with his surrender 
to time in the form of an empty round of events. "79 Prufrock, 
in fact, in so far as he has "lingered in the chambers of the 
sea / By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown 
seems occasionally to have experienced the living dura- 
tion to which he is all too often inadequate. Unfortunately, 
however, he objectif ies the dilemma of his a(Te; wanting to 
express his inner experiences, he can present only a prepared 
face. The poem, then, in the sense in which it represents 
Prufrock's thoughts, amounts to no more than a series of 
"Streets that follow like a tedious argument / Of insidious 
intent / To lead you to an overwhelming question ... 11 (13) 
In other words, the poem itself represents Prufrock's problem, 
for Prufrock's thoughts, as represented by the poem, objectify 
his anxieties concerning inner experience and so, to the extent 
of this objectification, remove 
these very anxieties from his 
inner experience. The overwhelming question is never asked, 
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therefore, because the anxieties which prompt it inevitably 
dissipate as the question approaches the point of articulation- 
that is, the point at which the entire matter becomes impersonal 
through language. Eliot's poem, however, as opposed to "Pruf- 
rock's" poem, certainly manages to pose the question, for the 
Prufrockian dilemma leaves one asking how, on the one hand, 
Bergsonian duration is possible and how, on the other, it is 
expressible. 
Similarlv, much of what has been said about "Prufrock" 
applies equally well to the remaininq poems of the 1917 collec- 
tion. "Preludes, " for instance, develops the same Bergsonian 
concern about self, immediate experience, and time. Written 
about the same time as "Prufrock, " it parallels the "time / 
To prepare a face to meet the f aces that you meet" (14) of 
"Prufrock" with its own reference to time's "masquerades" (22). 
Time,, it seems,, masquerades as evening and morning, as winter, 
as "four and five and six o'clock" (23), and as night, wherein 
the soul is revealed through a "thousand sordid images" (23) 
These images, moreover, are themselves an aspect of time's 
masquerade, for they bring past and present together in the 
soul as memory. As Bergson explains, 
In reality, the past is preserved by itself, auto- 
matically. In its entirety, probably, it follows 
us at every instant; all that we have felt, thought 
and willed from our earliest infancy is there, lean- 
ing over the present which is about to join it, 
pressing against the portals of consciousness that 
would fain leave it outside. 80 
The soul at any one moment, therefore, depends upon time past 
and present. And similarly, time past and present depends upon 
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a soul able to make the distinction. J. F. Lynen thus argues, 
in The Design of 'the Present,, that clock time in "Preludes" 
is "created by the progressive development of consciousness. 
In each of the poems one sees the self realizing its identity 
by observing the time of day. " 
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In other words, reading 
"soul" for "consciousness" here, the souls in "Preludes" are 
constituted of the present moment of awareness. But the 
present moment itself is partially constituted of the soul 
which is aware; as Lynen remarks, "Time comes into being in 
the process by which immediate experience is organized into 
self and world. , 
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The individual consciousness, self, or 
soul finds its identity in the time of day, therefore, because 
the time of day in "Preludes" represents the present moment 
of the past--a past remembered in the present moment through 
the old "newspapers from vacant lots" (22) and the lingering 
"faint stale smells of beer" (22). In short, the soul is con- 
stituted of immediate experience--but an experience which 
nonetheless includes the past, as well as the present, through 
a "thousand sordid images. " "Preludes, " then,, demonstrates 
Bergson's influence upon Eliot in so far as it explores both 
the relationship between the self and immediate experience, and 
the relationship between this immediate experience, on the one 
hand, as present event and, on the other hand, as remembered 
event. 
Time--particularly clock time--also dominates "Rhapsody 
on a Windy Night. 11 The poem 
is regularly punctuated by the 
passing hours of the morning: 
"Twelve o'clock, n nHalf-past 
one, " "Half-past two,, 
" "Half-past three, " and "Four o'clock" 
12.5 
(24-6). In between, however,, Eliot "shakes the memory / As 
a madman shakes a dead geranium" (24). Lyndall Gordon, in 
Eliot's Early Years, suggests that "In 'Rhapsody on a Windy 
Night' Eliot experimented with Bergson's method of grasping 
truth not by means of analysis but by casting oneself on a 
current off immediate perception as it flowed through time. " 
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But whether consciously or not, Eliot nonetheless represents 
here the contrast between clock time and duration. The ironic 
"last twist of the knife" (26) derives from the fact that 
duration, which is the immediate experience potebntial in every 
moment, is usually only experienced during sleep when the 
intellect's practi c al--c lock time-- re s traints on the enduring 
memory are relaxed or overcome; ironically, therefore, one 
must "sleep" to "prepare for life" (26). Similarly, one finds 
in "The Boston Evening Transcript" a description of a typical 
Boston evening in which The Boston Evening Transcript--presum- 
ably a fragmenting agent of the inteellect-threatens the life 
and real time which "quickens faintly in the street" (28). 
The evigraph to "Gerontion, " moreover, announces the truth of 
duration- "Thou hast nor youth nor age / But as it were an 
after dinner sleep / Dreaming of both" (37)--in opposition to 
the concept of history which the poem develops: "History has 
many cunning passages, contrived corridors 
/ And issues, deceives 
with whispering ambitions, / Guides us 
by vanities" (38). 
Historyt then, is another of time's masauerades. 
Time as history, of course, olays a fundamental role in The 
Wast, m Land. As Bergsten puts it,, " In The Waste Land, the 
historical sense is developed into a sense of simultaneity, or 
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coexistence, of the identity, almost, of events and places of 
widely separate origins in time and snac-Im. " 
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Post-war London, 
pre-war Germamrj, Elizabethan England, and the Mediterranean 
world of Tiresias and Phlebas thus occupy the same poem; that 
is, they occupy the same time and space of the creative duration 
which is The Waste Land. In this posm, then, Eliot provides 
evidence to support Bergson's contention that reality is actually 
an interpenetration of the many elements which the intellect 
distinguishes within the living duration. Yet despite shifting 
his perspective from the individual within time to time or 
history itself, Eliot manages still to ccnvn-v the conflict 
between clock time and duration. As Gish observes, Eliot was 
able "to retain the sense of individual futility and despair 
while placing individuals in a context of all time, and to 
present both the misery of daily routine and the terror of 
emptiness as part of a larger horror. 
85 
So the plaintive 
wife confronts her moribund husband with "What shall I do now? 
What shall I do? " and "What shall we do tomorrow? / What shall 
we ever do? " (65). The Bergsonian inner passion is here con- 
strained by what the practical intellect will allow to be done. 
On the one handj, thent through his historical perspective, Eliot 
implies that what is possible is limited by what, according to 
history, actually happens. Gish thus notes that "The juxta- 
position of all times, denving real change or 
development and 
thus precluding renewal, predominates and intensifies the 
sense of Hell. " 
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on the other hand, however, through his 
anthropological perspective, Eliot 
implies that one's real, 
living, inner passion may yet be releasedf for, in Gish's words 
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aqain, "The symbolism based on Weston relies on a concept of 
time as allowinq f or chanqe, development, re-birth and redemp- 
tion from sterility. " 
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In respect of its historical per- 
spective, thereforee, The Waste Land recognizes the Bergsonian 
despair at what Eliot describes as "the awful se-Paration between 
potential passion and any actualization possible in life. " 
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The poem's anthropological imaaes, however, hold out the hope 
that time may vet be redeemed so as to recover Bergsonian 
duration. If, therefore, as Gish claims, "In this gap between 
possible and actual lies the beginning of an increasing separa- 
tion, throughout Eliot's work, betweem thought and feeling, 1189 
then this increasing separation between thought and feeling 
may actually de-rive some of its impetus from the Bergsonian 
distinction between the practical intellect and intense inner 
femeling. 
Ash-wednesdav assumes the same Bergsonian poetic metaphysic 
as The Waste Land. One f inds "The desert in the garden the 
garden in the desert" (97) ; that is, these two worlds occupy 
the same time and space. And similarly, one can trace Ash- 
Wednesday's call to "Redeem the time, redeem the dream" (95) to 
the goal of Bergson's Philosophy, that is, to recover pure time 
and immediate experience. In "Animula, " morn-over, one finds the 
twisted result of what Bergson calls impure time: 
Issues from the hand of time the simple soul 
Irresolute and selfishr misshapen, lame, 
Unable to fare fox74ard or retreat, 
Fearing the warm reality, the offered good, 
Denying the importunity of the blood, 
Shadow of its own shadows, spectre in its own gloom, 
Leaving disordered papers in a dusty room; 
Living first in the silence after the viaticum. (107) 
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In "Marina, " however, one finds instead a cTlirnT)se of a real 
time which approximates Bergsonian duration: 
This form, this face, this life 
Living to live in a world of time bevcnd me; let me 
Resign my li-fe for this life, my sneech for that 
unspoken, 
The awakened, lips parted, the hope, the new ships. 
(110) 
The inarl. -Aculate time beyond "th4S life" is BercTson's pure time. 
Furtherriore, one finds echos of Bergson in The Rock. Onct, h 
again, there is the awareness of the simultaneity of past and 
present: "of all that was done in the past,, you eat the fruit, 
either rotten or ripe" (152) . Eliot also expresses the Bera- 
sonian awareness of the potentially imnersonal and inaccurate 
nature of language: 
Out of the slimv mud of words, out of the sleet and 
hail of verbal imprecisions, 
Approximate thoughts and feelings, words that have 
taken the place of thoughts and feelings, 
There spring the perfect order of speech, and the 
beauty of incantation. (164) 
In Murder in the Cathedral, moreover, one finds again the 
reluctance to slough of f clock time and the claims of the practi- 
cal intellect: "Ill the wind, ill the time,, uncertain the pro- 
fit,, czemrtain the dancrer. /0 late late late, labe is the time,, 
late too late, and rotten the year (243). The Chorus 
lives comfortably--if really living at all--by living practicallv: 
We do not wish anything to happen. 
Seven years we have lived quietly, 
Succeeded in avoidincT notice,, 
Living and partly living. (243) 
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Harry, however, in The Family Reunion, strives to overcome 
the practical intellect so as to achieve immediate expehrience. 
In confronting the family members, therefore,, he dismisses 
their rather conventional experiences: 
You are all neonle 
To whom nothing has happened, at most a- continual 
impact 
Of external events. You have gone through life in 
sleep, 
Never woken to nightmare. I tell you, life would be 
unendurable 
If you were wide awake. You do not know 
The noxious smell untraceable in the drains, 
Inaccessible to the plumbers, that has its hour of 
the night; you ao not know 
The unspoken voice of sorrow in the ancient bedroom 
At threee o'clock in the morning. I am not speaking 
Of my own experience, but tryina to give you 
Comnarisons in a more familiar medium. I am the old 
house 
With the noxious smell and the sorrow before morning, 
In which all past is present, all degradation 
Is unredeeMable. As for what haiDpens-- 
Of the past you can only see what is 'Past, 
Not what is always present. That is what matters. 
(293-4) 
Actually to become the old house or to see all in a continuous 
present--as Harry professes, or recorimends--reauirn-s that one 
intuit all things in duration. Once again, then, the Bergsonian 
influence upon Eliot's poetrv and plays becomes clear. 
Time, however, is also an important concept and experience 
in Four Quartets. The very first word following the eDigraph 
is "Time" (171). Indeed,, time proves to be the central subject 
of meditation throughout the Doem. Moreover, as Bergsten points 
out,, "The theme of time in the Four Quartets has two different 
aspects: the perceptual and the conceAptual aspect, i. e. time 
as immediate experience and time as the subject of abstract 
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speculation. "90 Exploring time as immediate experience, one 
enters the garden: "Through the first gate,, / Into our first 
world,, shall we follow / The deception of the thrush? Into 
our first world" (171). Exploring time through abstract 
speculation, however, is tautologically sterile: "What might 
have been is an abstraction / Remaining a perpetual possibil- 
ity / Only in a world of speculation" (171) . These are the 
categories through which Bergson, among others, explores time; 
his exploration of time through the speculative or philosophi- 
cal category, however, is designed ultimately to lead to the 
intuition of time under the cataqory of immediate experience, 
Similarly, Four Quartets establishes the opposition between 
talk about time and the actual experience of time. "Words, 
after speech, reach / Into the silence" (175) ; but the real 
experience of time--"Sudden in a shaft of sunlight" (176)-- 
is "Quick now, here, now, always" (176). The structure of 
Four Quartets g, therefore, in so f ar as it involves the 
dialectic 
between speculation about time and the immediate experience of 
time, derives potentially from Eliot's experience of the dia- 
lectic between his experience of Bergson's philosophy of time 
and his own immediate experience of time itself. So closely 
aligned are the sensibilities of the philosopher and poet, in 
fact, that the rose of Four Quartets, for instance, may derive 
in part from Time and Free Will: 
I smell a rose and immediately confused recollec- 
tions come back to my memory. In truth, these 
recollections have not been called up by the perfume 
of the rose: I breathe them in with the very scent; 
it means all that to me. 91 
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Similarly, as Le Brun iDoints outt Bergson's criticism of the 
intellect f inds an echo in East Coker. 92 Berason cla-ims that 
"Preciselv because it is always trying to reconstitute, and 
to reconstitute with what is given, the intellect lets what 
is new in each moment of a historv enscape. 1193 Eliot makes 
the same point: 
s There i.., it seems to us 
At best, onlv a limited value 
In the knowledge derived from experience. 
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been. (179) 
Althouqh, then, there is also the influence of Heraclitus, 
Plato.. and St. Augustine to be considered in any investigation 
of the role of time in Four Ouartets, there is nonetheless a 
sufficient Bergsonian presence in the particular imaaes and 
phrases, on the one hand, and the general structural. dialectic 
between thought and feeling, on the other, to suggest that 
Berqson remains an influence upon Eliot even at this stage of 
his development. 
In the light of Bergson's pervasive poetic and critical 
influence, then, it is not surprising to find that Bergsonism 
played its part in the confirmation and articulation of Eliot's 
religious beliefs as well. Given Eliot's Puritan predisposition 
toward what Matthiessen describes as a "trust in moments of 
vision, " 
94 the Bergsonian prospect of a vision of duration 
naturally attracted the young New England poet. Eliot's tempor- 
ary conversion to Bergsonism, however, was short-lived. Yet 
despite his subsequent hostility towards Bergsonism, this philo- 
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sophy continued to exercise the religious dimension of his 
thought. In his 1926 Clark Lectures, "On the Metanhysical 
Poetry of the Seventeenth Century, " for instance, Eliot--on 
the point of his Christian conversion--shows clearly that he 
regards Bergsonism as a variety of mysticLsm not unrelated to 4 
religious mysticism: 
There is a type of religious mysticism which found 
expression in the XII century, and which is taken 
up into the svstem, of Aquinas. Its origin is in 
the Metaphysics of Aristotle 1072b and elsewhere, 
and in the Nichomachean Ethics, and it is the oD- 
posite of Bergsonism. You know how the Absolute-% 
of Bergson is arrived at: by aturning back on the 
path of thought, by divesting one's mind of the 
apparatus of distinction and analysis, by iolunging 
into the flow of immediate exneriencoe. For the 
XII century, the divine vision or enjoyment of God 
could onlv be attained bv a nroc. 4%ss in which the 
analytic intellect took part; it was through and 
bv and beyond discursive thought that man could 
arrive at beatitude. 95 
The distinction between Bergsonism and twelfth-century myst- 
icism, however, is not as clearly defined as Eliot suqaests. 
In fact, on Eliot's account of the matter, the approaches to 
mysticism in question are much more similar than dissimilar. 
According to Eeldrop, "A philosophy about intuition is 
somewhat less likely to be intuitive than any other. "96 In 
some ways, this is the most penetrating criticism of Bergsonism 
possible. One's first approach to this philosophy, of course, 
has necessarily to be through words--whether those of Bergson's 
lectures, or those of his books. In other words? Bergsonism 
inevitably makes its first impression as a philosophically dis- 
cursive sVstem. But this discursive system must then suggest 
its own non-discursive transcendence if its discourse is to be 
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valid. In short, it must "direct consciousness to the precise 
point where there is a certain intuition to be seiz,.! -nd. " How- 
ever mutually antipatheticy therefore, Bergsonian intuition is 
as much dependent upon the Bergsonian intellect as the Berg- 
sonian intellect upon Berqsonian intuition. That is, some 
sort of intuition presumably led Bergson to his philosonhy of 
duration, and this philosophy should lead to some sort of 
intuition. In short, the process of understanding Bergson 
ought to end in the act of living the Bergsonian duration. In 
effecto, thent Bergson turned back on thought "by a T)roc., -3ss in 
which the analytic intellect took part. " In the end, therefore, 
man achieves not only Bergsonian duration, but beatitude as 
well, "through and by and beyond discursive thought. " In the 
light of Eliot's early criticism of Bergsonism through Eeldrop, 
then, there actually seems to be a certain similarity between 
the approach to'the Absolute bv the Bergsonian mystic, on the 
one hand, and the twelfth-c-entury mystic, on the other. Given 
this interpretation, Bergsonism is able to reinforce the myst- 
ical aspect of Eliot's Christian belief, 
Similarly, Bergson's concept of duration parallels in sone 
respects the Christian concept of faith. The intuitional leap 
to duration, for instance, is not unlike the Christian leap 
to faith, for in neither case can the analytical intellect 
produce intuition or faith. To a certain extent, of course, 
both God and the Berqsonian duration can be apprehended " through 
and by" discursive thought. But God and duration lie "beyond 
discursive thought. " In short, the Christian and the Berasonian 
can only enter a real relation with the Absolute throuqh some 
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form of grace. In other words, Berqsonism is no more a mere 
matter of knowledge or cmosis than Christianitv. Just as one 
can only know the will of God by doing the will of God, so one 
only ever knows Bergsonian duration by living this duration. 
Theoretically, therefore, the Bergsonian's pursuit of the 
Absolute is just as active as the Christian's. 
Similarly, Berqson's concept of duration is potentially 
Christian in so far as it is incarnational. Robert Sencourt, 
however, feels that the Christian Incarnation contradicts 
Bergsonian duration-especially thle concevt of duration exDlained 
by Bergson's version of creative evolution: 
At the College de France, in 1910-1911, Eliot had 
listened with eaqer ears to Berqson lecturing on 
Creative Evolution. Now in 1927 he had to accept 
that at a certain point in this evolution--say, 
2,000,000 years after the appearance of what Teilhard 
de Chardin has called "the Phenomenon of Man"--the 
Logos became more closely identified with man and 
man's environment. He entered time; He became 
Incarnate; in other words, one Christ was both God 
and man, not by conversion of the Godhead into 
flesh but by the taking of manhood into God--one 
not by confusion of two separate categories of being 
but by the union of the two separate categories in 
His own person. As far as His divinity was concerned, 
He was equal to the Father; but in so far as He was 
created man, He was not co-equal with his Creator. 97 
But although Bergson has no conception of such a special creation 
as Christ within his evolutionary framework, the process by which 
life individualizes matter into living things is in some sense 
incarnational. Life, in fact, is qualified by its material 
nature just as Christ is qualified bv His human nature. That is, 
just as Christ enters time by takinq on a human form, so life 
entemrs impure, extended, material time by taking on a material 
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form. Time, moreover, is redeemed in both the Christian and 
the Bergsonian worlds. Just as Bergsonian duration is an 
eternal presence, and so a potential of every moment, so Christ 
is eternally present and guarantees the redemptive potential 
of every moment. Incarnation? therefore, is not the fundamental 
contradiction of Bergsonism that Sencourt assumes it to be. 
In fact, Eliot's acceptance of the Christian Incarnation in 
119927 should not have begen made any the more difficult because 
of Bergson. If anythinq, Eliot' s unconscious Bergsonism should 
have facilitated his acceptance of the Incarnation. 
In the end, then? Bergsonism is not so much incompatible 
with Eliot's Christianitv as insufficient for it. Just as 
Eliot's immediate experia. -Nnc, -! -N of time transcends Berqsonls 
discursive philosophy--as, according to Bergsonism, it should- 
so his Christian experience transcends this immediate experience 
of time. This development begins with Bergson, however, and one 
must remember that Eliot's "is a mind which changes, and that 
this change is a development which abandons nothing en route, 
which does not superannuate either Shakespeare, or Homer, or the 
rock drawing of the Magdalenian draughtsmen. "98 Neither, then, 
does it superannuate Bergson. What begins in the scepticism 
and confusion of "Prufrock" and the Bergson lectures of 1911 
thus ends in the Christian faith of Eliot's later prose and 
poetry. Once again, thent Eliot's end is found in his beginning. 
Endnotes 
1 Kathleen Nott, The Emneror's Clothes (London: William 
Heinemann, 1953), p. 76. 
2 
Alun R. Jones . The Life and Opinions of T. E. Victor Gollancz, 1960). p. ý77 
3 Irving Babbitt F introd., BelT)heqort by J. Benda, trans. by S. J. I. Lawson (New York: Payson and Clarke, 1929), n. pag. 
4 
T. S. Eliotp 
Essavs on Poetrv 
"The Perfect Critic,, " in The Sacred Wood: 
and Criticism, 7th ed. (19 ; rpt. London: 
mernuen, -L! j-!: )u) I 
4b 
5 
I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Studv of Literarv 
Judgement (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1929), p. 255. 
6 
I. A. Richards, PrinciDles of Literarv Criticism, 4th ed. 
(1924; rpt. London: Routledge and Keqan Paul, 1930), p. 21. 
7 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will,: An Essay on the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. by F. L. Poqson, 4th 
ed. (1889; rpt. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 42. 
8 
C. A. Patrides,, "T. S. Eliot and the Pattern of Time, " in 
Aspects of Time, ed. C. A. Patrides (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1976), p. 162. 
9 T. S. Eliot,, "The Possibility of a PoetiC Drama,, " in The 
Sacred Wood, p. 66. 
10 Herbert Howarth, Notes on Some Fi 
(Boston: Houqhton Mifflin, 1964), p. 1 
Lres Behind T. S. Eliot 
. 
11 
Kristian Smidtf Poetry and Belief in the Work of T. S. Eliot 
(Norwav, 1949; rpt. LonU-on. - Routledge gFnd"' -Kegan Paul, 1961), p'. 17. 
12 
Robert Sencourt, T. S. Eliot: A Memoir, ed. Donald Adamson 
(London: Garnstone Press, 1971), p. 36. 
13 Piers Gray, T. S. 
ment 1909-1922 (Br'1'"-cj'g-t 
Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Devel 
n: Harvester Press, 19823-, p. 86. 
14 F. O. Matthiessent The Achievement of T. S. Eliot, 3rd ed. 
revised and enlarged with a chapter on Eliotrs-'Tater work by 
C. L. Barber (1935; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 
p. 183. 
Hulme (London: 
15 Philip Le Brun,? 11T. S. Eliot and Henri Bergson, " RES, 
NS 18 (1967), p. 150. 
137 
16 
P. Le Brun, p. 285. 
17 
K. Smidt, p. 236. 
18 
Frank Kermoder Romantic Image (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 130. 
19 
H. Bergson, Time and. Free Will, p. xix. 
20 
H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 42,43. 
21 
H. Bergsono, Time and_Fre--n, 
_Will,, 
p. 70. 
22 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 91. 
23 
H. Berqsonr Time and Free Will, p. 100. 
24 
H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 138. 
25 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 138. 
26 H. Bergson,, An Introduction to Metanhvsics, trans. by 
T. E. Hulme (1903; rpt. London: MacMillan, 1913), p. 3. 
27 H. Bergson, An Introduction to MetaDhvsics, p. 3. 
28 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metanhysics, p. 6. 
29 
H. Bergson, An Introduction to MetaTDhvsics, p. 14. 
30 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphvsics, p. 65. 
31 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by A. Mitchell 
(1907; rpt. London: MacMillan, 1911), p. 118. 
32 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 142. 
33 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 24. 
34 H. Bergson, Creative Evolutiont p. 191. 
35 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 263. 
36 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 192. 
37 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 264. 
38 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 186. 
39 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 44. 
40 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 359. 
41 T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " in 
The Sacred Wood, p. 49. 
138 
42 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution,? p. 24. 
43 
T. S. Eliot,, "Tradition and the Individual Talent,, " p. 59. 
44 T. S. Eliot,, "Reflections on Vers Libre,, " in To Criticize 
the Critic (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 185o 
45 T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " 
pp. 52,53. 
46 T. S. Eliot, "Yeats, " in On Pcetrv and Poets (London: 
Faber anct Faber, 1957), p. 255. 
47 
T. S. Eliot, What is a Classic? (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1945), p. 30. 
48 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex, " I,, Little Review,, 
4 (May 1917), 8. 
49 T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and AT)pleplex, " I, p. 8. 
50 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex,, " I,, pe 10o 
51 T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex, " It P. 10. 
52 ew T. S. Eliot, "Eeldrop and Appleplex, " II, Little Revi. 
4 (Sept. 1917) , 18. 
53 T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex,, " 110, p. 19. 
54 T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Applep leex, " I. po 10o 
55 
H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, po 106o 
56 T. S. Eliot,, "Tradition and the Indi vidual Talent, " 
pp. 49-50o 
57 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will,, p. 138. 
58 T. S. Eliot, "Philip Massinger, " in The Sacred Wood, p. 131. 
59 T. S. Eliot, "Blake, " in The Sacred Wood, p. 154. 
60 T. S. Eliot, "John Donnet" Nation & Athenaeum, 9 June 1923, 
331-2, as quoted by P. Le Brun, p. 158. 
61 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metanhysics, pp. 9-10. 
62 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 12. 
63 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 14. 
64 T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1933), pe 151. 
130, 
65 
T. S. Eliot, "The Frontiers of Criticism,, " in On Poetry and Poets, p. 112. 
66 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 370. 
67 
T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and ExT)eriencn (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1964), p. 300 
63 
T. S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definil, --ion of Culture (London: Faber and--Fýaber,, 1948) j, 
-p. 41. 
69 T. S. Eliot, "B,.! n-, yle and Balzac, " Athenaeum,, 30 May 1919, 
392-3, as quoted by Nancy K. Gish, Time in the Poetrv of T. S. Eliot (London: MacMillan, 1981), p. 12. 
70 T. S. Eliot, Poetry and Drama (London: Faber and Faber, 1951), p. 34. 
71 T. S. Eliot,? "Then Social Function of Poetryo, " in On Poetrv 
and Poets, p. 21. 
72 
T. S. Eliot, "Swinburne as Poet, " in The Sacred Wood,, p. 150. 
73 
T. S. Eliot,, "Ben Jonson,, " in The Sacred Wood, p. 118. 
74 
K. Nott,, p. 214. 
75 
-m T. S. Eliot, Poems Writt. -n in Early Youth (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1967) , p. 18. 
76 
T. S. Eliot, The Comiolete Poems and PlaVs of T. S. Eliot 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1969). Unless otherwise noted, all 
quotations from Eliot's poems and plays derive from this edition. 
Page references (within parentheses) follow each quotation. 
77 P. Gray, p. 61. 
78 
Staffan Bergsten, Time and Eternity: A -StudV in the 
Structure and Svmbolism of T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets (Stockholm: 
Svenska B3-k-f'6'-rlaget, 1960) , p. 19. 
79 Nancy K. Gish, Time in the Poetrv of T. S. Eliot: A Study 
in Structure and Theme (London: Mac. Millan, 1981), po 11. 
80 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 5. 
81 
John F. Lynen, "Selfhood and the Reality of Time: T. S. 
Eliot,, " in The Design of the Present: Essavs on Time and Form 
in American Literature (New Haven, Conn.: 7ale University 
Press, 1969), p. 373. 
82 J. F. Lynen, p. 374. 
83 Lyndall Gordonr Eliot's Early Years (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 40. 
140 
84 
S. Bergsten, p. 25. 
85 
N. K. Gish, p. 50. 
86 
N. K. Gish, p. 57. 
87 
N. K. Gish, p. 57. 
88 
T. S. Eliot, "Beyle and Balzac, " p. 12. 
89 
N. K. Gish, p. 57. 
90 
S. Bergsten, p. 43. 
91 
H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 161. 
92 
P. Le Brun, p. 154. 
93 
H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 172. 
94 
F. O. Matthiessen, p. 9. 
95 
T. S. Eliot, "On the Metaphysical Poetry of the Seventeenth 
Century, " as quoted by A. D. Moody in Thomas St. Poet parns Eliot: 
(Cambridge: Cambri dge University Press, 1979), pp. 128-9. 
96 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex, " I, p. 10. 
97 
R. Sencourt, p. 107.1'' IV 
98 T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " p. 51. 
Chanter Four: BradleV and the Absolute 
Amy Lowell, the American-based collaborator with Ezra 
Pound in the effort to publicize Imaqism, once declared of 
The Waste Land: "I think it is a Piece of trine. I know Tom 
Eliot--he was brought up around here, distantlv related to the 
Harvard Eliots. But Tom is an intellectual and an intellectual 
cannot write a poem, which is a matter of heart and enction. "' 
She was correct, of course, in observing that Eliot was distantly 
relat. d. n-d to the Harvard Elicts--Charles William Eliot, for in- 
stance, president of Harvard from 1869 to 1909 and a third 
cousin once removed of T. S. Eliot's grandfather. 
2 
And she was 
correct, furthermore, in pointinq out that Eliot was an intel- 
lectual; his work at Harvard and Oxford concerninq "Experience 
and the Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley" 
more than proved her point. The effect of this early intellectual 
interest, moreover, was an enduring one; "A Commentary" in The 
Criterion of October 1924 reveals its extent: 
Few will ever take the pains to study the consummate 
art of Bradley's style, the finest philosophic style 
in our language, in which acute intellect and passion- 
ate feeling preserve a classic balance: onlv those 
who will surrender patient years to the understanding 
of his meaning. But upon these few, both living and 
unborn, his writings nerform. that mysterious and com- 
plete operation which transmutes not one department 
of thought only, but the whole intellectual and 
emotional tone of their being. 3 
Eliot cannot agree with Amy Lowell, thereforef when she declares 
that "an intellectual cannot write a poem, which is a matter 
of heart and emotion, " -for 
he finds in an intellectual such as 
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Bradley a style "in which acute intellect and passionate 
feeling preserve a classic balance. " Indeed, "the secret of 
Bradley's style, like that of Bergson--whom he resembles in 
this if in nothing else--is the intense addiction to an intel- 
lectual passion. ,4 For Bradleyr intellectual exercise is but 
one way of nursuing the Absolute; he thus sneaks of philo- 
sophy "as a satisfaction of what may be called the mystical 
side of our nature--a satisfaction which, by certain nersons, 
cannot be as well procured otherwise. ,5 In reply to Amy Lowell,, 
t1here-fore, Eliot would have argued that there is potentially 
as much "heart and emotion" in his intellectual as in her poet. 
In fact,, he advances such a claim in his dissertation: "There 
is no greater mistake than to think that feeling and thought 
are exc lus i, 7e-- that those beinqs which think most and best are 
not also those capable of the most feeling. .6 
Amy Lowell's critical opinion of The Waste Land,, then, 
and her reasons for this opinion, are not only amusing, but 
also quite useful in so far as they prompt one to call Bradley 
as a witness in Eliot's defence, for Bradley proves to have 
been a pervasive influence in Eliot's early development--an 
influence, moreover, without which Eliot's "heart and ernotion" 
might never have found their repose in the Church. But although 
Eliot acknowledges in 1924 the change wrought by Bradley in the 
"whole intellectual and emotional tone" of his being, even this 
is an inadequate acknowledgement of Bradley's influence. His 
experience in reading Bradley, in fact, seems comparable to his 
experience in reading certain poets of the Romantic and Vic- 
torian periods. However much influenced by his reading of 
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Bvrono, Shelley, Keats, Rosetti, and Swinhurne--from his four- 
teenth year to his twenty-second-he was not able, at the end 
of this process of poetic development, to recognize their part 
in it: "Being a period of rapid assimilation, the end may 
not know the beqinning, so diff"erent mav the taste become. ,7 
As a result of studying Bradley, Eliot's philosophic, pcetic, 
and religious "taste" had not so much changed as become much 
more articulate and coherent. But as his relative emphasis 
on these tastes changed from the philosophical to the poetic 
and religious, he no longer fully recognized and aT)preciated 
the Bradleyan perspective of the former in the latter. 
Eliot's dissertation-well-received bv members of the 
department of nhilosophy at Harvard such as Josiah Royce-- 
as well as several philosophical articles, and a seminar r)ajoer 
delivered at Harvard, suggest that Eliot might well have 
succeeded as a modern academic philosopher. 
8 
In anv event, it 
certainly demonstrated a thorough command of Bradley Is meta- 
physical concepts--a command which Lewis Freed and Anne C. 
9 
Bolgan reveal in Eliot's prose and poetry, respectively. But 
Bradley's philosophy provided more than a conceptual language 
in which to express a modern poetic; it also provided the con- 
ceptual foundation for Eliot's personal religious development. 
Bradley begins his study of anpearance and reality by 
analyzing knowledge expressed in a relational form--where the 
subject is related to a predicate--for it seems that all know- 
ledge is expressed in this form. In fact, an absence of re- 
lations in the world of knowledge would imply that all realitv 
is onet that there are no real differences to be related, and 
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thus no individual qualities to be discriminated. Having 
robbed the world of knowledge through relations, this world 
of one--but not many--is what Berqson leaves. The loqic of 
relations, he argues, is merely an attempt to reunite the 
differences which a scientific approach to experience has 
caused. Bradley sees it as performing a similar function: 
is an attempt to unite differences which have broken out 
of the felt totality. " 
10 
Neither believes that this attempt 
can be successful. According to Bergson, only duration is 
alive and real; no arrangement of concepts, therefore, can 
recreate it. And Bradley, withholding his judgement as to the 
actual nature of reality, can see no way of knowing reality- 
whatever it may be--by the relational form of thought, for it 
is shot through with contradictions. 
The relation, Bradley claims, is not compatible with 
diversity or unity, the many or the one. In the relation 
"A is not related to BF"f or instance, one is claiming that 
A is not related to B while placing them in a relation--the 
very nature of which suggests that they are related. Now in 
what, Bradley asks, does their difference consist? If the 
difference between A and B is to be placed in the relation 
itself, one merely multiplies the number of relations involved 
in the distinction, for the original relation must now be 
related as a new term to the original terms A and B. This 
process can clearly continue ad infinitum. If one suggests, 
however, that the difference is somehow independent of the 
relationt one denies the relation any meaning; 
in fact, one 
denies the relation itself F for A and B become completely 
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independent owing to their radical difference. Furthermore, 
if one attempts a compromise by suqgesting that part of A is B, 
while part of A is not B. one merely produces in the individual 
terms the difficulties evident in the original relation. 
relation, then, is always self-contradictory: 
It implies always two terms which are finite and 
which claim independence. on the other hand a 
relation is unmeaning, unless both itself and the 
relateds are the adjectives of a whole. And to find 
a solution of this discrepancy would be to pass 
entirely beyond the relational point of view. 11 
In short, a relation atteMPts to force together differences 
by means of an underlying identity and so asserts simultaneously 
both plurality and unity, difference and identity. 
Space, for instance, seems to consist of space and that 
which is not space. That is, in order to define space, one 
must bound it by something outside it; but this something which 
is not snace must be space as well if it is to be placed out- 
side space. The relation of space and not-space, then, will 
always yield more space. The concept of space itself, therefore, 
is relationally infinite. Moreover, as it is self-contradictory, 
space must be merely an appearance of reality. Similarly, 
time is incoherent as a relational concent. If time is held to 
be the relation between individual units of time which them- 
selves possess no duration, then, as Bergson would argue, one 
cannot create duration from the relation of these units. If, 
howeverj, each unit of time is held to possess duration, then 
each unit of time is all time, that isr duration itself. As 
Bradley points out, 
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All that we reguire is the admission of some process within the 'now'. 
For any process admitted destrovs the 'now' from 
within. Before and after are diverse, and the-air incompatability compels us to use a relation between them. Then at once the old wearisome game is plaved 
again. The aspects become parts, the 'now' consists 
of Inows ,, and in the end týese Inows' prove undis- 
coverable. 12 
Time;, then, is just as much a mere appearance as space. Each 
claims a simultaneous difference and identitv within itself. 
The self itself cannot escape these difficulties. The 
self to which one refers as "I, " for instance, enqages in an 
infinite number of relations with the objects of its experience. 
It thus suffers the contradictions of all relations. According 
to relational logic, that is, the self must be distinct from 
its objects, on the one hand, while identical with them, on 
the other. In short, this self is but an appearance. The 
actual self never, in any of its states, has itself before 
itself as itself; instead, it presents to itself what it feels 
itself to be. The self referred to as "I, " in other wordst 
is not the actual self, but the perceived self. But the actual 
self experiences relational difficulties as well. Presumably, 
that is,, the actual self must be related to both the perceived 
self and the objects of the perceived self's experience. This 
qreater self, therefore, must also be simultaneously identical 
with.. and different from, the distinctions it comprises. One 
cannot even posit an infinite self which constitutes all reality 
within its consciousness--at least one cannot do so and hope 
to escape the contradictions of relations--for consciousness 
itself implies an abstraction from, and discrimination within, 
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the primitive unitv of feeling assumed to have preceded this 
consciousness. And all such abstraction and discrimination 
involves relational loqic. In short, the perceived self, the 
actual self, and the hypothetically infinite self are just as 
dependent upon the relational form of thought as space and 
time. The self, then, is but an appearance-, of reality; it 
too attempts to present itself as the one and the many at once. 
Bergson's retreat to pure, undifferentiated duration, then,, 
is not an unreasonable tactical move at this point in the 
argument, for, as Bradley observes, "if you go back to mere 
unbroken feeling, you have no relations and no qualities. But 
if you come to what is distinct, you get relations at once. " 
13 
In the state of unbroken feelinq there is not yet a distinction 
in experience between the self and the not-self; it seems that 
at this stage, then, experience may be reality itself. But 
though this state of unbroken feeling must be prior in time to 
consciousness of self and not-self--prior, that is, to conscious- 
ness itself--one finds, as Eliot notes,, that "no actual experience 
could be merely immediate, for if it were, we should certainly 
know nothing about it. .. a , 
14 That is, the awareness of such 
an immediate experience requires the very consciousness which 
the experience denies. The immediate unity of unbroken feeling, .L 
then, is just as much an intellectual construction as any 
relational thought; it too is a self-contradictory concept. 
Bradley puts it this way: 
through its own imperfection such first experience 
is broken up. Its unity gives way before inner 
unrest and outer impact in one. And then self and 
Ego, on one side, are produced by this development, 
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and.. on the other side, appear other selves and the 
world and God. 15 
Bradley cannot agree with Bergson, therefore, that this hypo- 
thetical first experience, unbroken feelingr or pure duration 
is reality itself, for its self-contradiction is an imperfection 
which Bradley regards as inconsistent with reality. 
In short, man can never, by mere thought alone, apprehend 
reality; he will always become caught up in the contradictions 
of relations. The human mind, therefore, interprets experience 
largely in terms of the ideal: 
Our experience in short is, essentially and very 
largely, ideal. It shows an ideal process which, 
beginning from the unity of feeling, produces the 
differences of self and not-self, and seeparates the 16 divisions of the world from themselves and from me. 
The mind thus does not have reality as its object, but truth: 
"Truth is the object of thinking, and the aim of truth is to 
qualify existence ideally. " 
17 This involves the attribution 
of characteristics to reality such that reality can rest in 
these characteristics consistently and harmoniously. Falsehood, 
then,, or error, attributes characteristics to reality which 
reality finds inconsistent and unharmonious. In the end, how- 
ever,, truth and error are but appearances of reality. To think 
of the reality of falsehood or error, for instance, is to at- 
tribute imperfection to reality--clearly a contradiction, for 
one would then have to posit a reality in which this imperfec- 
tion was made perfect. Error, then, cannot be real; it is, in 
Bradley's words, "the collision of a mere idea with reality, "18 
Truth,? also, however, is but an appearance of reality. An idea 
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appears to be true, that is, appears to be reality itself, 
only from the perspective of those relations which it subsumes. 
And that which subsumes all relations no longer merely cor- 
responds with reality, but is reality itself; it is no longer 
true or false, but real--the very Absolute. 
The Absolute, then, is that toward which all appearance 
approximates; it comprises everything: "the ultimate Realitv,, 
where all appearance as such is merged, is in the end the actual 
identity of idea and existence. "19 The Absolute, however, 
although it is everything, is never one thing exclusively; but 
one appearance--seemingly a true one, for instance--can be more 
real than another one--which is also in some sense true: 
taken for itself and measured by its own ideas, 
every level [of appearance] has truth. It meets, 
we may say, its own claims, and it proves false 
only when tried by that which is already beyond it. 
And thus the Absolute is immanent alike through every 
region of appearances. There are degrees and ranks, 
but, one and all, they are alike indispensible. 20 
Everything, r then, in some deqree contains a vital function of 
the Absolute. And the more individual anything may be, that 
much more reality does it possess, "for it contains within its 
own limits a wider region of the Absolute, and it possesses more 
intensely the type of self-sufficiency, 1,21 Self-sufficiency, 
then, or independence from relational thought, is the criterion 
by which Bradley judges reality--and the Absolute is self- 
sufficient. 
It remains, of course, for Bradley to demonstrate that this 
hypothetically all-inclusive reality--that is, the Absolute-- 
actually exists. Toward this end, he begins writing Appearance 
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and Reality with at least a conviction of its existence: 
"I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the 
Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our com- 
prehension is miserably incomplete. " 22 One may be certain, 
he goes on to argue, that the contradictions and errors in 
this world of appearance become consistent in a reality beyond 
the relational form of thought. This resolution of all con- 
tradictions in an Absolute is certain because it is conceivable. 
Since a fundamental aspect of thought is the fact that contra- 
diction is to be avoided as invalidating thought, the Absolute 
not only may exist, but, as the only existence which can resolve 
all contradiction, must exist in order to save thought from 
contradictory relations. As Bradley explains, "what is possible, 
and what a general principle compels us to say must be, that 
certainly is.,, 
23 Reality, then, must be one, for plurality 
inevitably contradicts itself; that is, plurality necessitates 
relations which imply a superior unity to which the relations 
are adjectives. The Absolute, then, is an inescapable conceptual 
conclusion: to posit something other than the Absolute implies 
another, greater Absolute as the unity superior to the relation 
between the original concept of the Absolute and that "something 
other" which has been distinquished from it. This Absolute, 
therefore, "cannot be doubted, since it contains all possibil- 
ities. jr 
24 
The possibility of such an analysis of appearance and 
reality derives from Bradley's three-stage logic. In the first 
stage, one assumes that an object such as A exists and can be 
known to exist simply as A. But it soon becones clear, in what 
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one might call the relational stage, that A cannot be known 
without aB which denies A, or which is at least in some way 
distinct from it; this is the second stage. But the final 
stage--Bradley's stage--involves the recognition that any 
such relation betweemn A and B depends upon a whole in which 
such a relation is possible. Relations are contradictory and 
therefore depend upon a whole which reconciles such contra- 
dictions in its wholeness. The relation between husband and 
wife, for instance, is operative only within that whole denoted 
by "marriage, " and the relation between knower and object 
known is operative only within the possibility of a whole such 
as knowledge. Relations themselves, moreover, are possible 
only within that whole which contains all possibilities--the 
Absolute. 
Bradley's metaphysical emphasis upon wholes proved an 
important influence upon Eliot. In Knowledqe and ExDerience, 
for example, one finds that facts are not merely "found in the 
world and laid together like bricks, but every fact has in a 
sense its place prepared for it before it arrives, and without 
the implication of a system in which it belongs the fact is 
not a fact at al l""25 Similarly, he concludes "The Function 
of Criticism" with this notice: 
if any one complains that I have not defined truth, 
or fact, or reality, I can only say apologetically 
that it was no part of my purpose to do so, but 
only to find a scheme into which, whatever they are, 
they will fit, if they exist. n26 
In both of these instances? Eliot's talk of systems and schemes 
seems to derive from that Bradleyan conception of ever greater 
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wholes subsuming more and more relations of knowledge. It is 
the business of Eliot's literary critic, furthermore, "to see 
literature steadilv and to see it whole. ... n27 There is 
something of Bradley, then, in Eliot's use of this line from 
Arnold's sonnet "To a Friend. " The poet's mind, moreover,, 
whenever confronting new experiences--no matter how disparate-- 
is always "forming new wholes. " 
28 
Not surprisingly, then, 
the literature produced by the individual, the single country, 
Europe, and the world forms "orqanic wholes. " 
29 And so criticism 
itself must be just as concerned with orqanizing these wholes: 
It [criticism] is a second stage in our understanding 
of poetry, when we no longer merely select and reject, 
but organise. We may even speak of a third stage, 
one of reorganisation; a stage at which a person 
already educated in poetry meets with something new 
in his own time, and finds a new pattern of poetry 
arranging itself in consequence. 30 
Similarly, Eliot suggests that the sensibility of the poet 
ought to form a unified whole. Although, then, Eliot's concern 
is more psychological than metaphysical or epistemologicall it 
is nonetheless Bradley's great whole--the Absolute--which has 
left this mark upon Eliot's thought, 
But one can also trace quite practical matters of Eliot's 
poetic back to Bradley. One f inds already in* Knowledge and 
Experience, for instance, evidence of Eliot's determination to 
combine thought and feeling in his poetry: he feels that there 
"is no greater mistake than to think that feeling and thought are 
exclusive--that those beings which think most and best are not 
also those capable of the most feeling. " In agreement with 
Bradley, Eliot points out that one cannot really know anything 
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about the actual state of unbroken feelinq or immediate ex- 
perience, for ideal construction--that is, relational thought-- 
is necessary before this feeling or experience can be known. 
Unbroken feeling may seem to be prior in time to relational 
thought, but one can never quite reach the limit of this process 
of ideal construction; as Eliot puts it,, "the line between the 
experienced, or the given, and the constructed can nowhere be 
clearly drawn. . 
31 Viewed from the opposite persl-: )ective,, 
one might assume that if feeling were itself episteMologically 
self-sufficient, then there would be no such thinq as conscious- 
ness--no subject, no object, no feelings about either--because 
exr)erience would have remained unbroken, and relations would 
have remained unnecessary. Eliot points out, therefore, that 
consciousness is not only the natural result of what Bradley 
calls the "imperfection" of unbroken feelingw but is also 
necessary in order that feeling be apprehended at all: 
in order that it should be feeling at all, it must 
be conscious, but so far as it is conscious it ceases 
to be merely feeling. Feeling therefore is an aspect, 
and an inconsistent aspect, in knowing; it is not a 
separate and isolable phase. 32 
From this early acceptance of Bradley Is analysis of immediate 
experiencef thereforef Eliot's determination to establish a 
poetic sensitive to both intellectual and emotional experiences 
follows quite naturally. 
Eliot's earliest speculations concerning the origins of 
the aesthetic use of language, in fact, occur 
in his dissertation 
on Bradley. Prior to speech, 
he suggests, knowledae could have 
been no more than a similar way of acting 
in the presence of 
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similar objects. These objects thus were not known as such, 
but "lived. " A dog, f or example, does not know a cat as a 
human being knows a cat--by name, that is--but by the behaviour 
it calls forth from him. Although Eliot acknowledges that 
language is in some sense a behaviour prompted by such things 
as cats, he makes it clear that language is more than such 
simple behaviour. Unfortunately, however, just as the point 
at which unbroken feeling becomes ideal construction is in- 
definite, so is the point at which behaviour changes into 
articulate mental lif,. n-%. But nonetheless, before the change, 
one merely has passions; after the change, one has objects; 
"Or at least we have no objects without language. " 
33 
Having 
thus concluded that language is the objectifier of human ex- 
perience, Eliot speculates that the indefinite transition from 
behaviour to language may -ýctually be the root of the fine 
arts: "what was at f irst expression and behaviour may have 
developed under the complications of self-consciousness, as we 
became aware of ourselves as reacting aesthetically to the 
object. "34 The "lived" aesthetic experience, in other wordso, 
became expressible not only through language, but also through 
the fine arts. Eliot's objective correlative, therefore, derives 
in part from his speculation here as to the role of language 
in objectifying experience--speculation which he offers "only 
as a suggestion" concerning the origin of aesthetic objects 
35 
in consciousness, 
But Bradley also helped Eliot to realize that there is 
a danger in the objectification which consciousness, through 
language, performs upon i'mmediate experience. As that which 
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is most individual--being thus most self-sufficient--is most 
real, it would seem that the truest, most important, most real 
experience is the private experience--the experience, that is, 
which is most individual and thus most self-sufficient. And 
so Eliot suggests that "All significant truths are private 
truths, " 36 He sees in the public nature of language, then, 
the same danger apprehended by Bergson and Hulme; as private 
truths "become public thev cease to become truths; they become 
facts, or at best, part of the public character; or at worst, 
catchwords. , 
37 
The danger that a very private experience might-- 
in fact, usually does--become trivialized as a catchword is 
the same danger Hulme apprehends when he objects to words being 
used as "counters" which express only the lowest common emo- 
tional denominator in any experience. Lanquage, then, cannot 
hope to capture the whole truth. In the first place, any 
"lived" truth is only partial and fragmentary because it can 
never be more than an approximation of the Absolute, which alone 
is absolutely true. In the second place, lanquage exnresses 
the least particular truth about an exDerience in order that it 
may be understood by the greatest possible number of its users. 
The lived truths interpreted by one language, one individual, 
one qeneration, one civilization, and so on, must, therefore, 
"be taken up and reinterpreted by every thinking mind and every 
civilization. , 
38 otherwise, absolute truth is even more remote 
than it ought to be. The historian, the literarv critic, the 
metaphysician, and the artist, therefore, must maintain some 
sort of cross-cultural contemporaneity; in short, they must 
possess the historical sense: 
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the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own qeneration in his bones, but 
with a feelinq that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own countrv has a simultaneous 
existence and composes a simultaneous order. 39 
This historical sense is presumably the result of that constant 
reinterpretation of culture which Eliot recommends. In any 
event,, the recommendation itself derives clearly enough from 
Bradley's concevtion of reality, for what does not exist now 
simply does not exist. The Absolute, that is, comprises everv- 
thing- including every possibility of existence. Literature,, 
then,, must be felt as a simultaneous existence, or a simultaneous 
order, if it is to exist at all. 
From Appearance and Realitv, therefore, and from Bradlev's 
metaphysics in qeneralf Eliot derived a sense of literature as 
a "whole" with a simultaneous existence. The existing monu- 
ments of literature thus form an ideal order among themselves 
in which the "existinq order is complete beforee the new work 
arrives. 
40 He derived as well a sense of the importance 
of lanquage in articulatinq feeling--in other words, a sense 
of the importance of language in any endeavour to exnress reality. 
At the same time, however, he found good reason to beware the 
infelicities of language--infelicities which the modernists in 
general tried to avoid by using not one word more than necessary. 
Both Eliot's thoughts on literature and his actual practice, 
then, demonstrate how radically the "whole intellectual and 
emotional tone" of his being had been influenced by Bradlev's 
metaphysics and epistemology. 
But although the Absolute has certain similarities with 
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the God of the Old Testament, Bradley makes it difficult for 
Eliot, or any other, to equate the Absolute with the Christian 
God. According to Bradley, God is but an asvect of the Ab- 
solute. He is only an aspect of it--and not the Absolute itself-- 
because He maintains a relation with man. In other words, if 
He were pantheistically all in all, He would be the Absolute; 
but then He would not be the God of the Christian religion- 
nor,, indeed, the God of most other religions. Eliot, then, 
could not reach God through Bradley's metaphysics. But meta- 
physics itself--even, presumably, Bradley's metaphysics of the 
Absolute--is only an appearance of the Absolute. Its disquali- 
fication. of God as the Absolute, therefore, is itself not 
absolute. God, then, is not yet dead--and this is a good thing 
for both Bradley and Eliot, for God is in many ways the ultimate 
conclusion of Bradley's ethics. 
Bradley's Ethical Studies was published about seventeen 
years earlier than his AiDpearance and, Reality. In retrospect,, 
his concept of the Absolute, and his conception of the meta- 
physical implications of a relational epistemology, can clearly 
be seen in the earlier work. In this sense, then , Bradley 
Is 
end is in his beqinning too. 
is not to discuss metaphysics: 
But his purpose in Ethical Studies 
"Beyond us lie the fields of 
metaphysict which the reader must remember we are, so 
far as 
possible, not to enter but merely to 
indicate. 1@41 Coincidentally, 
Eliot's essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent, 
" also 
$'proposes to halt at the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism, 
and confine itself to such Practical conclusions as 
can be 
applied by the responsible person 
interested in poetry. " 
42 But 
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coincidental though phrasing such as this may be, it nonethe- 
less points toward a definite parallel between Eliot's poetic 
and reliqious development and Bradley's ethics. 
Morality, Bradley observes, implies both something to be 
done and the doinq of it by a particular individual. The latter 
recTuires that the individual not merelv perform the act, but 
actually desire to perform it. And in desire, the individual 
in some sense desires himself, for he desires that he should 
be in a particular state--"our wanting anvthing else would be 
psychologically inexplicable. , 
43 
Consistent, then, with the 
later development of his doctrine of wholes, Bradley argues 
that the whole self is present in each of its states , given 
that what one desires is a state of one's self. Desire, there- 
fore, and particularly moral desire, aims to realize the whole 
self. Morality, then, is a matter of self-realization. 
In a moral decision, for instance, one must first dis- 
tinguish oneself from the choices possible. By this act, the 
individual places himself above these choices, for he thus 
assumes the function of the superior whole in which the rela- 
tion between the choices may hold. This is the universal aspect 
of a moral decision. But the act of making the decision itself 
is particular; one must identify oneself with one of the possible 
choices. The actual moral volition, however, involves a rela- 
tion between these manifestations of the self--that is,, a rela- 
tion between the self in the fact of choice and the self in 
the fact of the choice made. In short, carrying the moral 
decision into existence realizes the self both in the decision 
as to what actually has to be done and in the decision that 
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somethinq does have to be done. The moral volition, therefore, 
is in the end a matter of self-realization: the self as a 
whole is present in each volition as the state which is willed, 
and thus the one self comes to have life in the many states 
which realize it. 
The self,, then, is the key to morality: "I wish to be 
nothing but my true self, to be rid of all external relations, 
to brinq them all within me, and so to fall wholly within 
myself 0 
, 44 But in questions of moral choice, the individual 
cannot escape external relations, for these relations are the 
very means of identifying the self with this or that choice. 
The self, therefore, if it is to become a whole, must not 
iqnore the relations in which it enqaqes, but must instead 
aspire to extend itself so as to include these relations as 
part of its wholeness. But as Bradley observes: "The difficulty 
is: beinq limited and so not a whole, how extend myself so 
as to be a whole? " 
45 
There is only one answer: become a member 
of a whole. In short, one must realize in oneself a greater 
whole in order to partake of that wholeness. When such a whole 
is truly infinite, and one's will made one with it, one realizes 
oneself both as a whole and as one of the infinite particular 
relations which specify that whole. 
All moral beings, therefore, must look to a greater whole 
in order to realize their own wholeness. This greater whole, 
however, necessary as the whole implied by moral relations, is 
only realized in the free self -development of the individual, 
The circularity of this relationship is intended by Bradley. 
The individual member of the whole is but a parasite if its 
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life is not one with the li--4e of the whole; and the whole 
life does not exist except in the life of its members. The 
qreater whole, therefore, which makes morality possible, coTn- 
prises the common life of all. The individual, then, must make 
his moral life the moral life of all: "the individual can 
only truly develop his individuality by specifying in himself 
the common life of all. , 
46 The means of this specification, 
of course, is the individual's moral will. The will which is 
qood, therefore, wills the realization of self; that is, wills 
the realization of a greater whole; that is, wills the realiza- 
tion of a common will. What is good, then, is the will to whole- 
ness, which, in the end, is the moral will itself since this 
will wills wholeness. Bradlev thus concludes: 
In short, the good is the Good Will. The end is 
will for the sake of will; and, in its relation to 
me, it is the realization of the good will in myself, 
or of myself as the good will. In this character I 
am an end to myself, and I am an absolute and ultimate 
end. There is nothing which is good, unless it be 
a qood will. 47 
To act for the sake of the qood will, therefore, is also to act 
for one's own sake, for the good will necessarily attempts to 
realize the ideal self. 
Bradley's argument to this point, though amenable to a 
Christian adaptation, is not an overtly religious one. Eliot, 
however, was nonetheless influenced by Bradley's analysis of 
the individual will. Bradley, for instancer relates the present 
reality of the past to the will: 
"the will is what it has 
done; and the present is thus also the past. Evil 
deeds must 
survive in a present evil will which 
is a Positive evil, just 
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as good deeds are not lost, but live in a present good will. 11 
48 
From this, Eliot derived confirmation of his belief that the 
past--in the form of a tradition or a historical sense--is 
necessary in any contemporary literature. And so his account 
of the historical sense which "involves a perception, not only 
of the pastness of the past, but of its presence. .e* 
49 
But more importantly, Eliot found in Bradley's moral will an 
insistence upon the relevance of evil to the possibility of 
good--a relevance claimed, but not proved systematically, by 
the classical sensibilities of Babbitt, Maurras, and Hulme. 
Essentially, Bradley's position on good and evil is the Biblical 
one: the Fall led from innocence to an awareness of evil. 
He writes: 
a being not limited, and limited by evil in himself, 
is not what we call moral. ... A moral will must be finite, and hence have a natural basis; and it must 
to a certain extent (how far is another matter) be 
evil, because a beinq which does not know good and 
evil is not moral, and because .*. the specific 
characters of good and evýý can be known only one 
against the other. ... 
Similar thoughts and phrases occur in Eliot's essay "Baudelaire" 
in which he concedes that even Satanism is a way of affirming 
belief--"an attempt to qet into Christianity by the back door. , 
51 
That is: 
So far as we are human, what we do must be either 
evil or good; so far as we do evil or good, we are 
human; and it is better, in a paradoxical way, to 
do evil than to do nothing: at least we exist. It 
is true to say that the glory of man is his caDacity 
for salvation; it is also true to say that his qlory 
is his capacity for damnation. 52 
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Eliot,, then, was clearly of the same mind as Bradley concerning 
the necessity of both a good and bad will. Eliot, however, 
ultimately developed a much more religious point of view than 
Bradley. 
Yet,, surprising1v enought Bradley felt a religious point 
of view to be the logical conclusion of morality. Morality 
properlv begins only when the self consciouslv identifies 
itself with the act to be done; it realizes itself in a good 
or bad act and thus accepts responsibility for this goodness 
or badness. In practice, then, there is both a good self and 
a bad self. The qood self, of course, is identified with the 
morally good; it realizes the good will, and so realizes the 
ideal self. The bad self, however, is identified with whatever 
is antagonistic to the good; "The content of the bad self has 
no principle, and forms no system, and is relative to no end. , 
53 
The ideal self sought by the good self, however, remains un- 
attainable in a moral world, for morality requires a bad self 
as well. The ideal self remains as an "ought" only. But the 
object of religion--the religion, that is, of which Bradley 
speaks--is this same ideal self; it is the supreme existence. 
In a transcendent religious realmr therefore, the ideal self, 
sought by the good self through the good will, not only ought 
to be, but actually is. The identification of the individual 
will with the good will in the realm of morality is thus the 
identification of the individual will with the divine will in 
the realm of religion. 
Consistent again with his triadic logicp Bradley argues 
that the individual will cannot be identified with the divine 
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will unless these wills are the wills of one subject--the whole, 
that is, in which such a relation can exist. In Bradley's 
religious terms, a self is not just good and bad, but human 
and divine. This distinction between the human and divine 
selves, moreover, causes turmoil: "we have the felt struggle 
in us of two wills, with both of which we feel ourselves 
identified. '' 54 The possibility of such an identification, 
however, is necessary to the reliqious consciousness; without 
it, much of religion would seem to be nonsense: 
You can not understand the recognition of and desire 
for the divine will; nor the consciousness of sin 
and rebellion, with the need for grace on the one 
hand and its supply on the other; you turn every 
fact of religion into unmeaning nonsense, and you 
pluck up by the root and utterly destroy all poss- 
ibility of the Atonement, when you deny that the 
religious consciousness implies that God and man 
are identical in a subject. 55 
What remains to be answered, however, is the question of how 
the individual will can in fact be identified with the divine 
will. 
The individual will, as the will of the private self, 
never can be the divine will; the imperfect individual will 
"must die, and by faith be made one with the ideal"; in short: 
"You must resolve to qive up your will, as the mere will of this 
or that man, and you must put your whole self, your entire 
will,, into the will of the divine. 1156 In other words, one must 
die to one's individual self in order to be born aqain into an 
identity with the ideal or divine self. The divine self must 
become one's true self, one's only self; any other self with a 
claim upon this new self must be renounced. In short, the 
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identity between the individual will and the divine will occurs 
by an act of faith. And as faith, according to Bradley, "is 
both the belief in the reality of an object, and the will that 
that object be real ... " one must both believe that one's 
own will is identified with the divine will and act as though 
one believed it as well. 
57 
Bradley's doctrine of the two selves thus results in a 
reliqious conceptual framework. The ideal self, or the divine 
self, is clearly enough a version of God--though not necessarily 
an explanation of God. This much Bradle-v acknowledges. He is 
less willinq, however, to describe the relationship between the 
divine self and the individual self as incarnational. But so 
it is,, for Bradley posits a self which is suDerior to the 
individual self and yet somehow possible within that individual 
self. And this is just the sort of relationship that the 
Christian believes to hold between his own particular individual- 
ity and Christ. Bradley's development of an incarnational 
perspective in explaining Christian doctrine, if not in just- 
ifying it, was thus the aspect of his Ethical Studies which 
most interested Eliot. In the essay "Francis Herbert Bradley,, 
" 
for instance, Eliot quotes Bradley in Ethical Studies: " How 
can the human-divine ideal ever be my will? ... You must 
resolve to give up your will, as the mere will of this or 
that 
man,, and you must put your whole self, your entire will, 
into 
the will of the divine. " 
58 This is not, Eliot argues, the 
extinction of the individual; rather, Bradley 
is merely dis- 
tinquishinq between "the individual as himself and no more, a 
1,59 
mere numbered atom, and the individual 
in communion with God. 
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In other words,, the human-divine ideal fulfils the concept of 
individuality; it does not destroy it. In fact, as Bradley 
points out, "The mere individual is a delusion of theory; 
and the attempt to realize it in practice is the starvation 
and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the 
production of monstrosities. " 
60 
The individual self is more 
truly itself, more individual, in fact, when comnleted by a 
greater self. 
Having been influenced thus by Bradley, Eliot could no 
longer be happy in the post-Heqelian world, for, according 
to A. C. Bolgan in What the Thunder Really Said, "within T)ost- 
Hegelian philosophy god is dead. .*. "61 He is dead, that 
is, in so far as He is regarded as transcendent beinq, for 
in place of being, post-Hegelian philosophy has established 
becoming. At the centre of a dialectical universe, the post- 
Hegelian naturally enough places a dialectical qod--a god whose 
death as thesis and antithesis leads to his resurrection as a 
more inclusive synthesis. The post-Hegelian principle of divin- 
ity,, then, is not the fact of being, but the possibility of 
becominq; absolute integrity or wholeness is never actual in the 
post-Hegelian god, it is merely potential in the dialectical 
process. In other words, the post-Hegelian god is always 
becoming more and more whole, but never is so absolutely. As 
Bolgan concludes, it is the spiral of the dialectical process 
which drives the hypothetical post-Hegelian god "to his own 
ever-expanding integrity or wholeness and which confers on the 
dialectical hero the only principle of divinity which can 
62 
possibly exist in a post-Heqelian world. " Eliot, therefore, 
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had necessarily to be concerned about post-Hegelian philosophy, 
for, if it did not kill God, it transformed Him radically. 
Eliot, however, could not object to dialectical reasoning 
itself, for he was committed to Bradlev's dialectical idealism. 
Rather, anv objection he might wish to raise against the post- 
Hegelian dialectical god must rest on the distinction between 
the Hegelian and Bradlevan dialectics. Hegel's dialectic is 
productive, or generative, in that it creates reality. Bradley's 
dialectic, however, never actually creates reality, but merely 
reveals it. Hegel strives towards a whole, Bradley presupposes 
it. In respect of the self, then, the post-Heqelian presuines 
a qreat deal of freedom in its creation. Bradley, however, 
argues that the realization of the individual self begins with 
its sacrifice to the absolute self; whether this is a result 
of free will or grace, or a combination of the two, is difficult 
to determine. What is clear, however, is that the Hegelian 
dialectic is in some sense romantic and the Bradleyan dialectic 
modern. That is, the Hegelian gives priority to self-expression 
and self-creation, whereas Bradley is more concerned with the 
self as an object existinq and revealed than as a subject 
created and expressed. As Bolgan puts it: 
Inwardness as feeling expressed, or inwardness as 
outwardness absorbed--these seem to be the major 
ideological polarities dividing the post-Kantian 
German Absolute Idealism of Schlegel and Hegel from 
the post-Kantian English and American Absolute 
Idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet and, as a con- 
sequence, the romantic literary tradition from the 
modern. 63 
The romantict she explains, displays his self by acting out his 
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internal life in the various roles he enjoys playing; the 
modern, on the other handr is one in whom these roles "are 
actualized and made real rather than acted out or impersonated, " 
64 
In this sense, Yeats is perhaps the first modern poet--and not 
just the "last romantic" --for, as Frank Kermode notes in his 
Romantic Image, "He is the poet in whose work Romantic isolation 
achieves its full quality as a theme for poetry, being no longer 
a pose, a complaint, or a programme. .** , 
65 
But it is 
Eliot--fresh from the encounter with Bradley's dialectic--who 
recognizes the artificiality of all personality and so sets 
about the deconstruction of the romantic ego. 
Prufrock and Gerontion, for instance, are depicted as 
self-romanticizing egos. Even when Prufrock is apparently most 
self-aware--as, for instance, when he declares, "No! I am not 
Prince Hanlet, nor was meant to be , 
66 (16)--he can only express 
his own personality by objectifying it in terms of a character 
such as Polonius, "Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse" 
(16). Similarly,, Gerontion is preoccupied with his own incon- 
sequential role in history: 
I was neither at the hot gates 
Nor fought in the warm rain 
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass, 
Bitten by flies, fought. (37) 
Eliot himself, however, must not be equated with these personae. 
Instead, one must recognize his use of these ironic masks to 
expose the artificiality of the personalities which they re- 
present. The relevance--and perhaps even the legitimacy--of 
Gerontion's claim to be a wasted and decrepit old man, for 
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instance . is undercut by the quotation which bngins the poem: 
"Thou hast nor youth nor age / But as it were an af ter dinner 
sleep / Dreaming of both" (37). Prufrock, moreover, is no 
more than one of the faces that he prepares to meet the f aces 
he may meet. Ultimately, Prufrock's face is the face that 
Eliot himself has prepared to meet the reader's face. In this 
early poetry, then, Eliot affirms the artificiality of all 
personality-even the most private personality which Prufrock 
and Gerontion assume to be their true self. Personality, in 
general, is as inconsistent and fragmented as the personality 
of the friend in "Portrait of a Lady": 
And I must borrow every changing shape 
To find expression ... dance, dance Like a dancing bear, 
Cry like a parrot, chatter like an ape. (21) 
Having largely accepted Bradley's analysis of the self, there- 
fore,, Eliot set about revealing through his early poetry the 
prevailing romantic illusions about the self, 
Indeed, Bolgan sees the problem of the self as the main 
concern of The Waste Land. The poem, she suggests, is Eliot's 
Hamlet--his most notable artistic failure. It is full of some 
stuff that Eliot could not bring to light. 
67 The poem requires 
a dialectical hero--a hero, that is, who is both a man and a 
god--in order to reunite the fragmented modern personality. 
Toward this end, Eliot puts before the reader the myth of the 
Fisher King, for this myth depends upon two individuals--a hero 
and an ailing king--who have divine, as well as human, powers 
and responsibilities. The poem fails, Bolgan suggests, because 
it fails to establish a relationship between its human and 
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divine aspects. On the one hand, the human self is represented 
by the monologue which is the Doem. The personality Eliot 
portrays is in some respects hysterical--" You! hypocrite 
lecteur! --mon semblable, --mon frere. "' (63)--and so suggests 
the "monstrosity" that results, according to Bradley,, from 
the attempt to realize in practice the mere individual. On 
the other hand, one has the divinity suggested by the hanged 
man, the sprouting corpse, and the thunder. That is, there are 
distinctly human and distinctly divine elements in The Waste 
Land, but there is no dialectic between the poem's human and 
divine dimensions. Eliot's hero, the self whose internal mono- 
logue--The Waste Land itself--reveals what Bolgan calls the 
"significant self -in- becoming, " suffers from too radical a 
distinction between his two selves: the human self and the 
divine self. 
68 Eliot's mistake, according to Bolgan, was in 
not heeding the lessons of Bradley's triadic dialectic; he 
treated his hero's two selves as "actual but disjoined existents 
in precisely the way that his romantic predecessors had done 
before him instead of as terms in a developing 'relation' internal 
to them both and to their actual formation as existents. , 
69 The 
result of such a radical distinction between the human and divine 
selves.. as Bradley makes clear, is the logical impossibility of 
any relation between them. But this is not necessarily a mis- 
take on Eliot's part. Indeed, in portraying the human and 
divine selves as "actual but disjoined existents, " Eliot ob- 
jectifies the problem of the modern fragmented personality. 
Although, then, The Waste Land does not actually overcome "the 
metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul"-- 
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a theory which concedes too distinct an existence to the in- 
dividual personality--it nonetheless defines the problem, and 
defines it, furthermore, in Bradley's terms. 70 
What Eliot was workinq toward was Bradlev's ethical ver- 
sion of incarnation. According to Bradley, the divine self 
may enter the individual self, remaining divine while becoming 
human. At the same time, the individual self remains human 
while becoming divine. Simply to have allowed the Hegelian 
dialectical relation would have been to argue for the divine 
at the expense of the human, for such a dialectic assumes a 
linear, temporal progress towards divinity. The Bradleyan 
incarnational dialectic, however, assumes a simultaneous human 
transcendence and divine condescension. Guarding against the 
incorrectly exclusive direction of Hegel's dialectical relation 
on the one hand, and aiming at Bradley's inclusive incarnational 
whole on the other, Eliot lapsed into the theory of the sub- 
stantial unity of the human soul. That is, in spite of his 
own warnings, he accorded too much importance to human person- 
ality; the very form of the poem--an overheard internal mono- 
logue--emphasizes the importance he placed upon personality. In 
thus preventing any relation between the human and divine, Eliot 
at least prevented the exclusively divine Hegelian conclusion, 
but he also prevented Bradley's incarnational conclusion. 
In the end, Tiresias proves to be the poem's proper re- 
presentative--even if he is not the main character that Eliot 
sugqests he is. In Eliot, Stephen Spender observes that in 
Tiresias "subjectivity has been acted upon by all that has 
happened in history between his Thebes and modern times. He 
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has become its objective voice, with nothing left of his own 
subjectivity. " 
71 
The loss of subjectivity, Bradley argues, 
is necessary if one is to realize oneself as the divine self. 
But Tiresias' loss of subjectivity is essentially negative. 
He has not actively surrendered or sacrificed it to the divine 
self; he has merely lost it. Neither the Bradleyan nor Christian 
incarnation can thus take place. In his spiritual impotence, 
therefore, Tiresias represents the spiritual impotence of the 
personality whose thoughts the poem comprises, the society 
reflected in the poem, the poem itself, and Eliot himself in 
so far as he is unable to reach an incarnational conclusion 
at thi s time. 
But even so, Eliot continued to develop his poetic con- 
ception of self and personality. In contrast to the early 
poetry, the language of the poetry after Ash Wednesday, for 
instance, becomes less personal; Eliot withdraws to a certain 
extent from individual manners of speech. As Hugh Kenner puts 
it in The Invisible Poet,, "This poetry 
I 
that af ter Ash Wednesdav 
I 
is related less intimately now to the speakinq voice than to 
renovated decorums of the impersonal English lanquage.,, 
72 
By 
Four Quartets, Eliot's individual voice has all but disappeared. 
In Kenner's words again, "No persona,, Prufrock,, Gerontion,, 
Tiresias or the Magus, is any longer needed. The words appear 
.00j, 
73 
-nd of the to be writing themselves. In short, convinc. 
artificiality of all personality and the illusion of any por- 
trayal of selff Eliot concluded by restraining--if not actually 
eliminating-personality and self in his poetry. This process 
accomplished, Eliot found a further development of the poetic 
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treatment of self and personality to be possible within poetic 
drama. After all, if no constructions of self or personalitv 
can ever be real, whv not treat them in the theatre where self 
and personality are recognized as fictions? The characters 
in Eliot's plays suffer the same problems of self and person- 
ality as those in his early poetry. Harry Monchensey, Celia 
Coplestone, Colby Simpkins, Lord Claverton, and even Thomas 
Becket suffer a crisis of identity. Eventually, they discover 
that their individual fulfilment is possible only in conforminq 
their individual wills to the will of God. The necessity of the 
sacrifice of the individual self to the transcendent self is 
thus a constant and consistent factor in Eliot's poetry and 
drama both before and after his conversion. 
one finds a similar attention to Bradley's theory of the 
two selves in Eliot's critical prose. Passages in "Tradition 
and the Individual Talent" concerning the sacrifice or extinction 
of the poet's individual personality are numerous; surely 
Bradley is in part responsible for Eliot's conception of this 
process as the poet's "continual surrender of himself as he is 
at the moment to something which is more valuable. 1174 The $#some- 
thing which is more valuable" is a historical poetic personality 
which offers a poetic perspective greater than that of any 
individual poet. According to Bradley's conception of the in- 
carnational relation between the individual self and the greater 
self, one would expect the individual poet to achieve his greatest 
success and fulfilment when animated by the spirit of the greater 
poetic personality to which he has sacrificed himself; so Eliot 
suggests that "we shall often find that not only the best,, 
but 
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the most individual parts of his 
Ia 
poet's 
I 
work may be those 
in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality 
most vigorouslv. 11 
75 
There. is also something of Bradley's pattern 
of thought in Eliot's conclusion, in After Strange Gods, that it 
is "the struggle of our time to concentrate, not to dissipate; to 
renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a 
1176 vital connexion between the individual and the race. .. * 
Although talk of this vital connection may well have derived from 
contemporary psychology and anthropology, Eliot's receptivity to 
such an idea seems to have been conditioned in Dart by Bradley's 
philosophy, a philosophy which teaches that the real--including 
the real personality--is concentrated in an absolute; dissipation 
is merely appearance. In short, the individual is fulfilled, 
not extinguished, by his relation to the Absolute. One ought 
not to be surprised, then, at the apparent contradiction when 
Eliot sugqests, in his essay "Yeats, " that the sacrifice of 
self which produces impersonality may yet sustain the particul- 
arity of the poet's personality. That is, having recognized 
that there is a sense in which impersonality fulfils personality, 
Eliot dismisses his earlier discussion of imT)ersonalitv as 
badly expressed, as perhaps revealing "only an adolescent grasp 
of that idea. " 
77 
In fact, 
There are two forms of impersonality: that which is 
natural to the mere skilful craftsman, and that which 
is more and more achieved by the maturing artist. 
The f irst is that of what I have called the I antho- 
logy piece', of a lyric bv Lovelace or Suckling, or 
of Campion, a finer poet than either. The second 
impersonality is that of the poet who, out of intense 
and personal experience, is able to express a general 
truth; retaining all the particularity of 7 
pis ex- 
perience, to make of it a general symbol. 
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The discussion of impersonality in "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent, " therefore, is not so much inadequate or wrong as in- 
complete. That Eliot takes up the matter again, twenty years 
later, and once again casts the matter in a Bradleyan mould, 
shows how Bradley's impact had endured. 
Similarly, Eliot's analysis of culture derives in important 
ways from Bradley's philosophy of wholes. He begins Notes 
towards the Definition of Culture, for example, with a typically 
Bradleyan analysis of the hierarchical definitions of culture 
possible from the different perspectives of the individual, the 
group or class, and, finally, the whole society: 
It is a part of my thesis that the culture of the 
individual is dependent upon the culture of a group 
or class, and that the culture of the group or class 
is dependent upon the culture of the whole society 
to which that group or class belongs., '79 
Any author, then, who is to be judged a landmark of a national 
literature must demonstrate "strong local f lavour combined with 
unconscious universality"; aesthetically, he must move freely 
80 
through all three levels of culture. Ultimately, however, 
national artists must develop a world culture, a culture con- 
ceived--in Eliot's wordst but Bradley's philosophical terris-- 
as "the logical term of relations between cultures. , 
81 He 
goes on to elaborate the concept: 
Just as we recoqnise 
have in one sense, a 
culture is only actu 
so we must aspire to 
yet not diminish the 
parts. 82 
that the parts of Britain must 
common culture, though this common 
al in diverse local manifestations, 
a common world culture, which will 
particularity of the constituent 
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In this last phrase, one- again finds the incarnational per- 
spective suggested by Bradley's dialectic between the two 
selves; that is, the universal does not diminish the particular. 
But one also finds, in the tendency to aspire to a greater 
cultural whole, the acceptance of Bradley's triadic dialectical 
logic; that is, assuming an Absolute, Eliot concludes that 
culture is, at some primitive stage, actually identical with 
religion--or, at least, "religion and culture are aspects of 
one unity. , 
83 
And yet, in order that any such relation 
might obtain, Eliot must follow Bradley's argument to the end 
and so claim somewhat contradictorily that religion and culture 
"are two different and contrasted things. , 
84 
Once again, then, 
Eliot follows Bradley's philosophy to its conclusion in a 
relational logic which necessitates an Absolute. And once 
aqain one sees in Eliot's discussion of the relation between 
local culture and world culture the pseudo-religious Bradlevan 
incarnational relation between the particular human self and 
the universal divine self. But whereas Bradley believed in his 
incarnational dialectic only in so far as it was the necessary 
conclusion of his Ethical Studies, Eliot came to believe in 
the Christian Incarnation. 
Bradley thus takes Eliot to the end of philosophy which, 
for Eliot, proves to be the beginning of religion. Lewis Freed, 
in T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher, sugqests how Eliot 
managed the intellectual transition: 
With Bradlevr though the Absolute is immanent in 
finite centers and finite centers are immanent in 
the Absoluter the manner of this coherence is "in- 
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explicable. 11 The point at which Bradley stops thus leaves space for mystery, wonder, and doubt. For 
Eliot, the problem posed by Bradley is resolved by the Incarnation. 85 
That is, the problem is solved not just by the intellectual 
machinery of incarnation, but by a faith in the fact of In- 
carnation. But Bradley proves to be of even further use in 
moving Eliot towards a full conversion, for he argues, in 
Ethical Studies , that faith requires not only belief in the 
reality of the divine object, but also the will that this 
object be real. In short, 
In order to be, religion must do. Its practice is 
the realization of the ideal in me and in the world. 
Separate religion from the real world, and you will 
find it has nothing left to do; it becomes a form 
, 86 and so ceases. 
If, that is, one's religious experience is indeed genuine, one's 
conviction must be actualized and made real rather than acted. 
Bradley points out, moreover, that real faith cannot qo un- 
expressed: 
That inward assurance, the self-consciousness that 
we are one with the divine, and one with others 
because one with the divine, naturally does not exist 
without expressing itself. And moreover it is right 
that it should express itself; because that expression 
reacts most powerfully upon the self-consciousness. 
to intensify itj and so strengthen the conviction and 
will in which faith consists. It is right that the 
certainty of identity with the divine, and with others 
in the divine, should be brought home by the fore- 
tasted pleasure of unalloyed union. ... 
87 
Eliot's decision to live his faith publicly is thus consistent 
with--if not actually suggested by--Bradley's analysis of the 
Christian faith. So too is his declaration, in the essay 
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"Religion and Literature, " that "Literary criticism should 
be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theo- 
logical standpoint, " for Eliot knew that real faith could hardly 
go unexpressed in one's literary work. 
88 
Bradley's main contribution towards Eliot's religious 
development, therefore, was his incarnational metaphysical 
and ethical dialectic. There were certainly other influences 
leadinq Eliot to accept the Christian Incarnation as fact, but 
Bradley's usefulness in layinq the incarnational tracks for 
that train of thouqht to follow is undeniable. The incarnational 
perspective he advanced concerning the relationship between the 
individual self and the greater self appears throughout Eliot's 
poetry--gaininq in clarity and conviction as Eliot's faith 
becomes more certain. Bradley's transcending and condescending 
whole similarly appears in Eliot's literary and cultural 
criticism; in every instance its reelation to particular in- 
dividuals is incarnational. And finally, after Eliot's formal 
conversiont Bradley's philosophy seems to have gained a new 
influence in suggesting--perhaps even in some sense documenting-- 
the course which Eliot's religious life was to follow. To 
conclude once again, then, that in Eliot's intellectual beginning 
is his religious end, is to confirm and extend the Bradleyan 
analysis of Eliot's experience, for Eliot's life, poetry, and 
thought are thus the unified whole in which the relation between 
his beginning and end subsists. 
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Chapter Five: Saints and Mystics 
Writinq of the influence of Yeats, in his 1941 essay 
"Yeats, " Eliot noted that "the poetr-,;, of the young Yeats hardly 
existed for me until after my -n won by the enthusiasm had ben 
poetry of the older Yeats; and by that time--I mean,, from 
1919 on--my own course of evolution was already determined. " 
1 
The important point to note here is that Eliot, at the time of 
the composition of Four Ouartets, believed his own poetic 
evolution to have been determined by 1919. Presumably, then, 
given the necessary relation which Eliot, in 1941, assumed to 
obtain between poetry and religion, this suggests that the 
mystical aspect of the poetic and religious development evident 
in Four Quartets is determined to a certain extent bv Eliot's 
pre-1919 experiences. Matthiessen's observations support this 
suggestion, for in The Achievement of T. S. Eliot he notes that 
New England intellectuals such as Henry James and T. S. Eliot 
were born into the Puritan Mind with "its absorption in the 
problem of belief and its trust in moments of vision. 11 
2 Eliotr 
in other words, inherited a predisposition towards the visionary 
aspect of mystical experience. One is not surprised, then, to 
find Lyndall Gordon reporting that Eliot experienced a vision 
at the age of twenty-one; in this vision--the subject of his 
poem "Silencer" dated June 1910--Eliot saw the streets of Boston 
"suddenly sink and divide. ,3 According to Gordon, the year 
1910 "marked the beginning of a religious ferment and a rebellion 
aqainst. the world's dull conspiracy to tie him to its lifeless 
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customs. 114 And the critical year, in terms of Eliot's religious 
evolution, was not 1927, but 1914: 
Eliot's Notebook and other manuscript noems show 
that he began to measure his life by týe divine goal 
as far back as his student days, in 1910 and 1911, 
and that the turning-point came not when he was 
baptized in 1927 but in 1914 when he first interested 
himself in the motives, the ordeals, and the achieve- 5 ments of saints. 
According to Gordon, again, "During Eliot's last years at 
Harvard he made a study of the lives of saints and mystics, 
St. Theresa, Dame Julian of Norwich, Mme Guvon, Walter Hilton, 
St. John of the Cross, Jacob Bo**hme, and St. Bernard. ,6 In 
1914, then, Eliot "was circling, in moments of agitation, on 
the edge of conversion. ,7 
In fact, however, Eliot's actual conversion was delayed 
until 1927. But so strong was the case for conversion in 1914 
that he unconsciously became his own apologist in later explaining 
the religious climate of his youth. Writing in "Thoughts After 
Lambeth" in 1931, Eliot suggests that 
whereas twenty years ago a young man attracted by 
metaphysical speculation was usually indifferent to 
theology, I beiieve that to-day a similar young man 
is more ready to believe that theology is a masculine 
discipline, than were those of my generation. 8 
Similarly, in After strange Gods, he explains the difficulty 
of interpreting mystical experience: 
of divine illumination, it may be said that probably 
every man knows when he has it, but that any man is 
likely to think that he has it when he has it not; 
and even when he has had it, the dailv man that 
he 
is mav draw the wrong conclusions from the enlighten- 
ment which the momentary man has received. ... 
9 
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And, by describing an age in which modern literature is so 
secular "that it is simply unaware of, simply cannot understand 
the meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural over the natural 
life .**p 1110 and an age in which almost all contemporary 
novelists except James Joyce "have never heard the Christian 
Faith spoken of as anything but an anachronism, " 
11 
Eliot de- 
monstrates again not onlv how difficult his conversion in 1927 
must have been, but also how much more difficult the public 
acceptance of such a faith would have been in 1914. 
Just as strong, however, were the forces acting to make 
mysticism once again intellectually respectable. Helen Gardner, 
in The Limits of Literary Criticism, summarizes the process by 
which mvstical interpretation has become respectable in literature: 
The method of 'mystical interpretation' can hardly 
any longer be said to be 'alien and repellant to 
the modern mind'. On the contrary it is plainly 
only too fascinating. The work of anthropologists 
studying primitive myths and rituals supports it, as 
does the work of psycho-analysts analysing dreams 
by the interpretation of symbols. The efforts of 
philosophers constructing theories of symbolism, the 
discussion of the language of poetry as a symbolic 
language, and the conception that the work of art is 
a symbol, objectifying experiences which defy con- 
ceptual expression, have encouraged critics of 
literature to look below the surface of narratives 
or dramatic actions, and the thread of the discourse 
of a lyric, in an attemiDt to discover the realities 
which the writer is symbolizing, and find personal 
symbols or archetypal myths. 12 
While many of these developments occurred during Eliot's years 
as a mature poet, many also occurred during his early years . 
Frazer's work, for instance, made mystical ways of thought seem 
reasonable and natural even if somewhat limited. Similarly, 
The Symbolist Movement in Literature, by Arthur Symons, introduced 
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to Eliot the concept of the work of art as a symbol. Berq- 
sonism, moreover, seems to be a type of mysticism and is inter- 
preted as such by Eliot in his Clark Lectures in 1926: the 
Bergsonian Absolute as reached "by a turning back on the path 
of thought" is compared with the twelfth-centurv vision of God 
"through and by and beyond discursive thouqht. , 13 And Bradley,, 
furthermore, the subject of masculine metaphysical interest in 
Eliot's youth, reveals in his philosophy a similarly non- 
discursive aspect of realitv. As R. L. Brett observes, 
For Bradley, metaphysical systems were like great 
works of art; elaborate expressions of a sensibility 
which tried to impose some order upon experience. 
indeed, Bradley can be seen not as a metaphysician, 
but as a mystic, who believed that realitv can never 
be described in discursive terms at all. 14 
But whereas these anthropoloqists, philosophers, and critics 
helped to make possible for Eliot the appreciation of a mystical 
sensibility, whether in the literary criticism of which Helen 
Gardner speaks, or in the lives of the saints and mystics about 
which he read at Harvard, it was Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism- 
from which "Eliot made copious notes"--which enabled him to 
articulate his own mystical sensibility, 
15 
Underhill's Mvsticism consolidated Eliot's experience of 
Berqsonism, for it established from its earliest pages the parallels 
and sympathies between Bergsonism and mysticism. Vitalism--the 
modern philosophy of which Berqsonism is a type--is but a 
"new" way of seeing the Real [that] goes back to 
Heracleitus, whose "Logos" or Energizing Fire is 
but another symbol for that free and living spirit 
of Becoming, that indwellinq creative power, which 
Vitalism acknowledges as the very soul or immanent 
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reality of things. .0. Its theory of knowledge is close to that of the mystics: or would be, if those wide-eyed gazers on reality had interested 
themselves in any psychological theory oFtheir 
own experiences. 16' 
Vitalism furnishes the prospective modern mystic with an essen- 
tial message: "Cease to identify your intellect and your 
self. .. 0 , 
17 
As Underhill points out, "the true intellect- 
ualist, who concedes nothing to instinct or emotion, is obliged 
in the end to adopt some form of sceptical philosophy. "18 But 
even the best intentioned idealistic philosophy--such, pre- 
sumably, as Bergson's Vitalism--proves inadequate to the Real: 
Idealism, though just in its premises, and often 
daring and honest in their application, is stultified 
bv the exclusive intellectualism of its own methods: 
by its fatal trust in the squirrel-work of the in- 
dustrious brain instead of the piercing vision of the 
desirous heart. It interests man, but does not 
involve him in its processes: does not catch him 
up to the new and more real life which it describes. 
Hence the thing that mattered, the living thing, has 
somehow escaDed it; and its observations bear the 
same relation to reality as the art of the anatomist 
does to the mystery of birth. 19 
According to Underhill, that which achieves "the piercing 
vision of the desirous heart, " that which obtains a true relation 
to reality, is mysticism: 
I understand it [mysticism] to be the expression 
of the innate tendencv of the human spirit towards 
complete harmony with the transcendental order; 
whatever be the theological formula under which 
that order is understood. This tendency, in great 
mystics, gradually captures the whole field of con- 
sciousness; it dominates their life and, in the 
experience called "mystic union, " attains its end. 
Whether that end be called the God of Christianity, 
the World-soul of Pantheism, the Absolute of Philo- 
sophyr the desire to attain it and the movement 
towards it--so long as this is a genuine life process 
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and not an intellectual speculation--is the proper 
subject of mvsticism. 20 
Vitalism, then, is clearly inadequate to the mystic's conception 
of the Real, for it merely explains the Real without actually 
offering a way to live it. Vitalism, moreover, recognizes only 
the Spirit of Becoming, whereas mysticism harmonizes both 
Becoming and Pure Being. As Underhill explains, the mystic, 
on the one hand, 
knows, and rests in, the eternal world of Pure Being, 
the "Sea Pacific" of the Godhead, indubitably pre- 
sent to him in his ecstasies, attained by him in the 
union of love. On the other, he knows--and works in-- 
that "stormy sea, " the vital world of Becoming which 
is the expression of Its will. 21 
In its emphasis on the Spirit of Becominq, however, Vitalism 
serves Underhill as a useful contemporary subject by which to 
introduce the sympathetic and, in Underhill's opinion, more 
spiritually sophisticated subject of mysticism. Underhill, 
then, in recalling Bergson and Vitalist philosophy in general, 
not for the sake of its philosophical validity, but for the 
sake of its spiritual validity, thus ensured that she would 
attract Eliot's attention, for the latter unconsciously digested 
Bergsonism in the same way. 
Mysticism, according to Underhill, is the art of establishing 
11 22 man s conscious relation with the Absolute. The metaphor of 
the mystic as artist, moreover, is extended and emphasized through- 
out the book. The artist is a mystic in that he is a "mediator 
between his brethren and the divine,, for art is the link between 
appearance and reality. 1123 Similarly, Underhill describes the 
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mystic as an artist in his attempts to communicate his vision- 
an artist, in fact, who recalls the artist described bv Hulme 
and Berqson: 
The mystic, as a rule, cannot wholly do without 
symbol and image, inadequate to his vision though 
they must always be: for his experience must be 
expressed if it is to be communicated, and its 
actuality is inexpressible except in some side-long 
way, some hint or parallel which will stimulate the 
dormant intuition of the reader, and convey, as all 
poetic language does, something beyond its surface 
sense. 24 
Furthermore, the violent swings from pleasure to pain, from 
rapture to despair, and from rest to unrest, mark another 
similarlity between artist and mystic; Underhill suqgests that 
the mystical consciousness belongs "to that mobile or 'unstable' 
type in which the artistic temperament also finds a place. 1,25 
Not only, however, do the artist and mystic share a psychic 
or mental instability, but they also share an extreme sensitive- 
ness in respect of things both material and spiritual. Further- 
more, the artist and mystic share the experience of ecstasy: "all 
real artists, as well as all pure mystics, are sharers to some 
degree in the Illuminated Life: are sojourners in, if not true 
citizens of, the land of heart's desire. " 
26 The artist, that is, 
during the brief moments of his genuinely creative activity, 
is able for that time to experience a glimpse of the reality which 
is the goal of the mystic's life-process. The artist's moment 
of ecstasy is cut short, however, for "the senses have somewhat 
hindered the perfect inebriation of 
[his I soul. " 
27 Nevertheless, 
as Underhill explains, the ecstatic state--in which contact with 
reality occurs--"does appear in a less violent form, acting 
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healthily and normally, wherever we have the artistic and 
creative personality in a complete state of development. 1128 
According to Underhill, then, there is a very real, and 
not merely superficial or coincidentalt relationship between 
the artistic and mvstic consciousnesses. Mysticism is actually 
a" lif e- struggle": the "struggle of the self to disentangle 
itself from illusion and attain the Absolute ... "; therefore, 
"it will and must exhibit in every case something of the freedom 
and originality of life: will, 
rather than scientific laws, " 
29 
as a process, obey artistic 
In other words, the eccentri- 
cities of mystic and artist alike are both a necessary response 
to the vagaries of illusion and a condition of the perception 
of the Absolute, for, as Bergson points out, the scientific 
approach to life is not flexible enough to do it the least 
justice. Furthermore, art is the only means of communication 
which the heart possesses: 
When essential goodness, truth, and beauty--Light, 
Life, and Love--are apprehended by the heart, whether 
the heart be that of lover, painter, saint, that 
apprehension can only be communicated in a living, 
that is to say, an artistic form,, 30 
This living, artistic means of the heart's communication, more- 
over, more often than not derives from the language of the 
mystic's faith, for he finds in the language of his faith 
metaphors perfectly suited to the description of his mystical 
life-process. 
In Underhill's Mysticism, therefore, Eliot first encountered 
.... 91- 
a perspective from which mysticism and art seemed necessarily 
related. Eliot later came to maintain a similar perspective 
in 
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respect of religion and literature in general. To suggest 
at this point, however, that Eliot's reading of Underhill's 
Mysticism in his final vears at Harvard not only influenceds, 
but to a certain extent determined, his mature, anglo-catholic 
perception of the relationshiT) between religion and literature 
may seem premature. The deqree to which Underhill's work 
pervades Eliot's early critical prose, however, makes this 
suggestion seem quite plausible. 
Underhill's most marked influence upon Eliot's earlv prose 
concerns personality. Mysticism, she argues, is an intensely 
personal experience. Consequently, mysticism has found its best 
means of communication, its surest metaphors, in the language 
of the Christian faith, for Christian philosophv "supports 
and elucidates the revelations of the individual mystic as no 
other system of thought has been able to do. , 
31 Christianity 
begins, that ist by restating "the truths of metaphysics in 
terms of personality "--the personality of Christ--and so 
necessarily maintains a sympathy with the mystic whose life- 
struggle is a struggle to overcome his own personality in 
favour of the divine personality. 
32 In short,, "the essence of 
the mystic life consists in the remaking of personality: its 
entrance into a conscious relation with the Absolute. " 
33 To 
remake his personalityr howeveri, the mystic must give it up; 
that is,, he must deny his self. The self "has got to learn 
to cease to be its 'own centre and circumference': to make that 
final surrender which is the price of final peace. " 
34 Underhill 
continues: 
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So long as the subject still feels himself to be 
somewhat he has not yet annihilated selfhood and 
come to that ground where his being can be united 
with the Being of God. 
Only when he learns to cease thinking of himself 
at all, in however depreciatory a sense; when he 
abolishes even such selfhood as lies in a desire for 
the sensible presence of God, will that harmony be 
attained. This is the "naughting of the soul, " the 
utter surrender to the great movement of the Absolute 
Life, which is insisted upon at such length by all 
writers upon mysticism. 35- 
With each concession, with each movement towards the act of 
utter surrender, 
the Transcendental Self, that spark of the soul 
which is united to the Absolute Life, has invaded 
more and more the seat of personality; advanced 
in that unresting process which involves the remakina 
of the self in conformity with the Eternal World. 36 - 
The mystic, therefore, must serve without hope of reward; not 
only must his self become nothing, but his will must become 
quiet, for to will his spiritual reward is to assert his person- 
ality. Paradoxically, then, the mystic "obtains satisfaction 
because he does not seek it; completes his personalitv because 
he gives it up. " 
37 Here, then, one finds another source for 
Eliot's early critical concepts in respect of poetry and person- 
ality: the poet makes "a continual surrender of himself as he 
is at the moment to something which is more valuable"; the 
"progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual 
extinction of personality"; poetry "is not the expression of 
personality, but an escape from personality"; the "poet cannot 
reach this impersonality without surrendering himself wholly 
to the work to be done. , 
38 Images of self-sacrifice and surrender, 
if they do not derive exclusively from Underhill's mvsticism, 
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are at least strongly reinforced by her work. 
Similarly, Underhill seems to have influenced Eliot's 
articulation of the concept of tradition as it appears in 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent. 11 In the Preface to her 
work she declares that "mysticism avowedly deals with the 
individual not as he stands in relation to the civilization 
of his time, but as he stands in relation to truths that are 
timeless. ,39 Adjusted slightly to serve as a preface to Eliot's 
essay, j Underhill's words here would prove more than adequate. 
Furthermore, Underhill's descrintion of mystical writing proves 
at least as clear an explanation of the historical sense as 
Eliot's discussion of it in terms of "a sense of the timeless 
as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the 
temporal together ": 40 
Each mystic, original though he be, yet owes much 
to the inherited acquirement of his spiritual 
ancestors. These ancestors form his tradition, 
are the classic examples on which his education is 
based; and from them he takes the language which 
they have sought out and constructed as a means 
of telling their adventures to the world. It is 
by their help too, very often,, that he elucidates 
for himself the meaning of the dim perceptions of 
his amazed soul. From his own experiences he adds 
to this store; and hands on an enriched tradition 
of the transcendental life to the next spiritual 41 
genius evolved by the race. 
In other words--in Eliot's words concerning the traditional 
poet,, that is--"not only the best, but the most individual parts 
of his work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, 
assert their immortality most vigorously. 1142 Underhill expresses 
a similar thouqht in respect of the immortality of the qreat 
mystics: "Strange and far away though they seem, they are not 
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cut off from us by some impassable abyss. They belong to us. 
They are our brethren; the giants, the heroes of our race, " 
43 
Underhill concludes, then, that in mysticism, "as in all the 
other and lesser arts which have been developed by the race, 
education consists largely in a humble willingness to submit 
to the discipline, and prof it by the lessons, of the nast. 11 
In short,? "Tradition runs side by side with experience; the 
past collaborates with the present. , 
44 Once again, then, Eliot 
found in Underhill the very concepts and phrases by which to 
articulate the poetic of his early years. 
In addition to such major areas as these, Underhill's 
influence appears in miscellaneous aspects of Eliot's prose. 
She quotes St. John of the Cross to the effect that though many 
visions, sensations, or illusions "may happen to the bodily 
senses in the way of God, we must never rely on them nor encourage 
them; yea, rather we must f ly from them, without examining 
whether they be good or evil. , 
45 Underhill goes on to claim 
that vision 
is recognized by the true contemplative as at best 
a very imperfectr obliquer and untrustworthy method 
of apprehension: it is ungovernable, capricious, 
liable to deception, and the greater its accompanying 
hallucination the more suspicious it becomes. 46 
Eliot himself shares such a healthy scepticism concerning 
automatic writing; no doubt with Yeats in mind, he writes: 
I have no good word to say for the cultivation of 
automatic writing as the model of literary composi- 
tion; I doubt whether these moments can be cultivated 
by the writer; but he to whom this happens assuredly 
has the sensation of being a vehicle rather than a 
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maker. No masterpiece can be produced whole by such means: but neither does even the higher form of religious inspiration suffice for the religious life; 
even the most exalted mystic must return to the 
world, and use his reason to employ the results of his experience in daily life. 47'- 
Not only the scepticism about manual or scriptoral "vision,, ## 
but the related remarks about mystical vision, demonstrate 
Eliot's debt here to Underhill's Mysticism. One can see as 
well, given this attitude, why Eliot should criticize the early 
Yeats for trying to "take heaven by magic, " that is,, by "self- 
induced trance states, calculated symbolism, mediums, theosophy, 
crystal-gazing, folklore and hobgoblins. , 
48 
Magic, Underhill 
argues, "is an individualistic and acquisitive science: in all 
its forms an activity of the intellect, seeking Reality for its 
own purposes, or for those of humanity at large. " 
49 
mysticism, 
however, although often confused with magic, is actually non- 
individualistic--in fact, radically non-individualistic: 
It is essentially a movement of the heart, seeking 
to transcend the limitations of the individual stand- 
point and to surrender itself to ultimate Reality; 
for no personal gain, to satisfy no transcendental 
curiosity, to obtain no other-worldly joys, but purely 
from an instinct of love. 50 
Magic,, then, because of Underhill's harsh exposure of its radically 
defective religious nature, served Eliot as a suitable term of 
critical opprobrium for Yeats's early poetry. Moreover, Under- 
hill's distinction between magic and mysticism may have proved 
useful to Eliot in his. accommodation of Frazer, who was happy to 
make little, if any, distinction between magic and mysticism-- 
dismissing both as primitive and outmoded ways of thought. 
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Furthermore, just as Underhill's use of Bergson reinforced 
Eliot's experience of Bergsonism, so certain phrases and con- 
cepts used to explain mysticism reinforce, or perhaps even 
modifyF Eliot's understanding of Bradley. Underhill notes, for 
instance, that mystics believe that "life as perceived by the 
human mind shows an inveterate tendency to arrange itself in 
vv51 triads. a09 She adds that "Even the separation of things 
into Subject and Object implies a third term, the relation 
between them, without which no thought can be complete. " 
52 
Essentially, this is a summary of Bradley's triadic logic. 
This logic applies, in the end, to God Himself--at least ac- 
cording to Underhill's account of the matter. She describes 
God as extended in two directions--the directions of Being and 
Becoming; but these directions are merely opposites "which 
ecstasy will carry up into a higher synthesis.,, 
53 God, that 
is, forms a triad with Being and Becoming, transcending them 
in a synthesis which yet allows their continued existence apart. 
In the end, however, Bradley proves as inadequate to mysticism 
as Bergson; whereas Bergson leaves only Becoming, Bradley leaves 
only Being. Neither is sufficient for mysticism: "Neither the 
utter transcendence of extreme Absolutism, not the utter im- 
manence of the Vitalists will do. Both these, taken alone, are 
declared by the mystics to be incomplete. " 
54 Interestingly 
enough, Eliot eventually reached the same conclusion. 
That Eliot's early prose demonstrates certain qeneral 
mystical characteristics, however, does not mean that he was 
influenced exclusively by Underhill's Mysticism. To say that 
there is n something outside of the artist to which he owes 
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allegiance, a devotion to which he must surrender and sacrifice 
himself in order to earn and to obtain his unique Position" is 
but to speak as all mystics speak of their spiritual obligations 
to God; the influence in this case might derive from Underhill, 
St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa, or a variety of others, 
55 
Here, however, Eliot merely adapts the language of mystical 
experience to his own poetic; there is no obvious emotional 
commitment to mysticism in this way of speaking. But in re- 
viewing a book, in 1916, which purported to make easier the 
following of Christ, Eliot remarked that "certain saints found 
the following of Christ very hard, but modern methods have 
facilitated everything"; his sarcasm here shows how deeply 
he had been affected by his reading of the lives of St. Teresa, 
Dame Julian of Norwich, Mme Guyon, Walter Hilton, St. John of 
the Cross, Jacob B'o'hme, and St. Bernard. 
56 
one finds as well 
that there is a great deal of emotion in Eeldrop of the "Eeldrop 
and Appleplex" stories. Note that "Eeldrop was a sceptic,, with 
a taste for mysticism . .. " and " was learned in theoloqy" --in 
short, he was very much like Eliot. 
57 
Eeldrop's complaint that, 
with "the decline of orthodox theology and its admirable theory 
of the soul, the unique importance of events has vanished,, " is 
really a complaint that the redemption of time made possible 
by the Incarnation--in according a unique importance to every 
moment of time--is no longer understood. 
58 It thus foreshadows 
similar complaints in The Rock that man now only alternates 
"Between futile speculation and unconsidered action , 
59 (154). 
Eeldrop's complaint also shows that Eliot, as Eeldrop, feels a 
real sense of loss in comparing the present with the past, 
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Something has vanished. People are no longer aware of the 
significance of a spiritually successful or spiritually ruined 
life: "The awful importance of the ruin of a life is over- 
looked. , 60 whereas, in Eeldrop's view, the modern world tends 
to conceive of evil as something which will disappear after 
suitable reforms, "the mediaeval world, insisting on the eternity 
of punishment, expressed something nearer the truth. " 61 That 
is, the mediaeval world--the world of Eliot's saints and mystics-- 
perceived the spiritual significance of decisions made in the 
material world, a significance which Eliot, having read about 
the lives of these saints and mystics, not only recognized, 
but felt. Years later, therefore, he rephrased Eeldrop's 
observations in his own words in After Strange Gods: "It is in 
fact in moments of moral and spiritual struggle depending upon 
spiritual sanctions, rather than in those Ibewilderina minutes' 
in which we are all very much alike, that men and women come 
nearest to being real. " 
62 
From his early readings about the 
ordeals of saints and mystics, therefore, Eliot came to ap- 
preciate the emotional struggle of mysticism as a life-process. 
Not surprisingly, then, Eliot's emotional reaction to his 
early readings in mysticism appears in the poetry of this period. 
Taking to heart, for instance, the warnings by all mystics 
against any dependence upon the senses, the body, or the flesh, 
Eliot exhibits an attitude of fascinated repugnance and fear 
towards women--his symbol of the senses, the body, and the flesh. 
The laughing woman in "Hysteria" and the epileptic in "Sweeney 
Erect" demonstrate Eliot's ambiguous perspective; he is at once 
fascinated and frightened by the shaking of a woman's breasts 
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and the general "promise of pneumatic bliss" (52). Such is 
the fear of Grishkin in "Whispers of Immortality" that "even 
the Abstract entities / Circumambulate her charm" (53). woman, 
in short,, is "The eternal enemy of the absolute,, (33). In 
"Conversation Galante" --where "galante" seems to mean "attentive 
to womenr complimentary, or flattering"--the woman, in a mere 
two lines, manages to confute the speaker's "mad poetics" (33) 
and,, in her final line--"Are we then so serious? " (33)--manages 
to confute the previous confutation. If nothing else, "Con- 
versation Galante" compliments woman in so far as it proves she 
is a serious threat to man. The desire to murder women, there- 
fore,, is a metaphor for the desire to overcome the corrupt 
body; thus a variety of characters in Eliot's prose and poetry-- 
from the Gopsum Street man in "Eeldrop and Appleplex" to Sweenev 
in Sweeney Agonistes and Harry in The Family Reunion--actually 
I 
kill or want to kill a woman: "Any man might do a girl in / 
Any man has to, needs to, wants to / Once in a lifetime, do a 
girl in" (124). From his earliest poetry, then, Eliot conceived 
of the body as a real threat to the spirit. 
Similarly, one finds throughout Eliot's poetry the recurring 
images of steps and stairs. These images derive ultimately from 
the description by several mystics of the degrees of love, or 
the degrees of prayer, along the spiritual way to mystical vision. 
Walter Hilton, for instance, wrote a work called The Ladder of 
Perfection which Eliot read in his final years at Harvard. Years 
later, in Burnt Nortont one finds Eliot alluding to this mystical 
image in his reference to "the figure of the ten stairs" (175) 
but this is by no means his first use of the image. Even in 
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"Prufrock, " written before Eliot had seriously begun his study 
of the lives of saints and mystics, he shows a predisposition 
towards internreting the secular by images of the sniritual-- 
and thus implying the spiritual in the secular--as he reveals 
Prufrock, in a moment of spiritual crisis, thinking that there 
is yet "Time to turn back and descend the stair" (14). In 
"Rhapsody on a Windy Night" one finds the observation that "The 
little lamp spreads a ring on the stair" is followed by the 
command to "Mount" (26) . Similarly, in "The Boston Evening 
Transcript, 11 one finds the speaker "mount the steps and ring 
the bell, turning / Wearily" (28) , much as in Ash-Wednesdav 
the speaker pauses, and turns to look below him,, "At the first 
turninq of the second stair" (93) . In "La Fiqlia Che Piangell 
the poem begins with the command "Stand on the highest pavement 
of the stair" (34). And in "Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein 
with a Cigar,, " "Princess Volupine extends /A meagre, blue- 
nailed, phthisic hand / To climb the waterstair" (41). Similarly, 
in The Waste Land, "Footsteps shuf fled on the stair" (64) ; and 
later, the young man carbuncular groped his way--up or down-- 
"finding the stairs unlit" (69). Though none of these characters 
is a saint--"Not for me the martyrdom, the ecstasy of thought 
and prayer, / Not for me the ultimate vision" (105) --the stair 
upon which Eliot has them mounting or descending is "the saints' 
stair" (105). 
The influence of Eliot's readings in mysticism upon his 
later major poetry is quite marked. Dame Julian of Norwich is 
quoted directly in Four Quartets: 
All manner of thing shall be well" 
"All shall be well, and / 
(195). 63 Furthermore, whereas 
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Christ appears in a vision to Julian and declares "I am Ground 
of thy beseeching .*e" Eliot combines this with the previous 
quotation in the lines "All manner of thing shall be well / 
By the purification of the motive / In the ground of our be- 
seeching" (196). 
64 
Julian of Norwich: 
The anchorite in The Rock, therefore, is 
"Even the anchorite who meditates alone, / 
For whom the days and nights repeat the praise of GOD, / Prays 
for the Church, the Body of Christ incarnate" (152). Similarly, 
the fructifying moment in The Drv Salvages may derive from 
mystical writings. The fructifying moment here is the moment 
of death; it depends, in the end, "on whatever sphere of beinq / 
The mind of a man may be intent / At the time of death" (188). 
Essentially, this is what Walter Hilton means when he states 
that they "shall be saved and come to the full reforming in the 
bliss of heaven" who are found in a reforming spirit at "the hour 
of their death. " 
65 Therefore,, the "most sinful man that liveth 
in earth, if he turn his will through grace from deadly sin with 
soothfast repentance to the service of God, he is reformed in 
his soul, and if he die in that state he shall be saved. " 
66 
Similarly, the way toward peace and fulfilment in Four Quartets 
is the way advocated by St. John of the Cross. Eliot learned 
from him that "In order to possess what you do not possess / 
You must qo by the way of dispossession" (181). One must, as in 
the church at Little Gidding, "put off / Sense and notion" (192). 
One must seek "The inner freedom from the practical desire, / 
The release from action and sufferinq, release from the inner 
And the outer compulsion" (173). Salvation is to be found "not 
in movement / But abstention from movement; while the world 
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moves / In appetancy" (174),, for "the faith and the love and the 
hope are all in the waiting" (180). The way of dispossession-- 
involving the rejection of the bodily appetites, the rejection 
of the individual will, and the acceptance of a passive and 
quiet attendance upon God's grace--constitutes the mystical way. 
The same mystical perspective appears in Ash-Wednesday 
and The Rock. The lines from Ash-Wednesdav, "Teach us to care 
and not to care / Teach us to sit still" (90), show the mystic's 
efforts to overcome his individual will; he must await God's 
will in rest and quiet, that is, in stillness, 
lines are expanded later in the poem: 
Teach us to care and not to care 
Teach us to sit still 
Even among these rocks, 
Our peace in His will. (98) 
These same 
Similarly, in the first "Chorus" of The Rock, one encounters 
the following questions: "Where is the Life we have lost in 
living? / Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? / 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? " (147). 
The society which inspires these questions has not got beyond 
what Hilton describes as the first stage of the contemplative 
life; this "lieth in knowing of God and of ghostly things,, gotten 
by reason, by teaching of man, and by study in Holy Writ; without 
ghostly affections and inly savour felt by the special gift of 
the Holy Ghost. " 
67 This ghostly--that is, spiritual--affection, 
which is the love of God through the grace of God, is the way 
back to the Life lost in living. And the way to ghostlv affection, 
as every mystic knows, and as "The Rock" commands,, is to "Make 
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perfect your will" (148). Nothing must be done but for God's 
greater glory: "Shall we not bring to Your service all our 
powers / For life, for dignity, grace and order, / And intellectual 
pleasures of the senses? " (164). After all, "The Lord who created 
must wish us to create / And employ our creation again in His 
service / Which is already His service in creating" (165). In 
The Rock and Ash-Wednesday, then, Eliot displays the mystical 
frame of mind which had developed in both his religious and 
poetic beliefs. In short, one can see in The Rock, Ash-Wednesdav, 
and Four Ouartets--not to mention Murder in the Cathedral, The 
Family Reunion, and The Cocktail Partv--that there is indeed a 
divine something "outside of the artist to which he owes al- 
legiance, a devotion to which he must surrender and sacrifice 
himself in order to earn and to obtain his unique position. " 
68 
But that Eliot should have recalled his early readings 
in mysticism, and studied them again after his conversion, is 
no more surprising than that his early minor poetry should show 
the immediate influence of this early reading. The image of 
woman as the symbol of the corrupt body, and the various images 
of steps and stairs, are significant mystical aspects of the early 
poetry, and demonstrate the influence of Underhill and the 
saints and mystics which Eliot read, but, though previously 
unacknowledqedr this influence is not unexpected, given Eliot's 
reading-list of mystics. Similarly, images of sacrifice and 
surrender, and mystical concepts such as the way of dispossession, 
the perfection of the will, and spiritual quietude, seem natural 
developments in the poetry of a convert who, like Eeldrop, was 
from the beginning a man "with a taste for mysticism" and a man 
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"learned in theology"; thus the prevalence of these mystical 
images and concepts throughout Eliot's mature poetry. More 
interesting, however, is the question as to the mystical in- 
fluence in the major poems between Eliot's readings in mysticism 
at Harvard and his conversion in 1927. That is, what residual 
mysticism is there to be found in "Gerontion" and The Waste 
Land--poems written at a time when Eliot, rightly or wrongly, 
is assumed to have been at his most sceptical? Should not only 
a residual mysticism be discovered in these poems, but a still 
strong emotional sympathy with mysticism as a life-struggle 
and life-process, then the mysticism in Eliot's early prose 
and poetry need not be considered distinct from the mysticism 
of his post-conversion prose and poetry. Rather, the mystical 
dimension of Eliot's spiritual development would be another part 
of that continuum wherein Eliot's end is in his beginning. 
The dominant image in "Gerontion" is the image of a decayed 
house: "My house is a decayed house .** ll (37). But, as J. S. 
Brooker points out, there is more than one house in the poem. 
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First,, of course, there is the literal house in which the old 
man actually lives. But his body is also a house--a house for 
his dry brain--and his dry brain serves as a house for his dry 
thoughts. Moreover, as Brooker observes? "Gerontion's brain, of 
course,, is a very inclusive house, for the poem is an interior 
monologue, and all of its houses are contained in his mind. " 
70 
The literal decayed house, then, " is occupied by decayed tenants 
who themselves become, 'as the reader re-focusest decayed houses 
containing decayed tenants.,, 
71 The image of the decayed houses, 
however,, culminates, by way of contrast, in the imaqe of Christ: 
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"In the case of Jesus of Nazareth, the tenant of the body is 
a god; the house, therefore, is much more than a house--it is 
a temple. , 
72 
The idea of Christ as "the temple" ist of course, 
Biblical. So is the idea of the soul as God's dwelling-place. 
The religious dimensions of these Biblical images of houses, 
however$, are confirmed and reinforced bv Eliot's readings in 
mysticism. In her Revelations of Divine Love, Dame Julian of 
Norwich suggests: 
Highly ought we to rejoice that God dwelleth in our 
soul, and much more highly ought we to rejoice that 
our soul dwelleth in God. Our soul is made to be 
God's dwelling-place; and the dwelling-place of the 
soul is God, which is urunade. 73 
And presumably, being unmade, it will not decay. Similarly, 
Walter Hilton places Christ and man in the same house: 
See now then the courtesy and the mercy of ihesu. 
Thou hast lost Him, but where? Soothly in thine 
house, that is in thy soul. If thou haddest lost 
Him out of thine house, that is to say, if thou 
haddest lost all the reason of thy soul by the first 
sin, thy soul should never have found Him again; but 
He left to thee reason, and so He is in thy soul 
and never shall be lost out of it. 74 
The decayed houses of "Gerontion,, " therefore, serve as images 
of the spiritual alienation which the speaker in particular, 
and mysticism in general, struggle to overcome. 
Similarly, the Biblical images of dryness and rain assume 
a wider spiritual significance when interpreted in the light of 
certain mystical writings. The poem begins by describing "an 
old man in a dry month, / Being read to by a boy, waiting for 
rain" (37) and ends with Gerontion's own conclusion that the poem 
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presents but the "Thoughts of a dry brain in a drv season" 
(39). This dryness, and the anxiety which accompanies it, 
has a spiritual explanation; St. John of the Cross, in The 
Dark Night of the Soul, explains dryness as the anxious fear 
of God which usually precedes the love of God: 
love,, in general, is not felt at first, but only the dryness and emptiness of which I am speaking: 
and then, instead of love, which is afterwards en- kindled, what the soul feels in the dryness and the 
emptiness of its faculties is a genera-1 painful 
anxiety about God, and a certain painful misgiving 
that it is not serving Him. 75 
To be "waiting for rain" (37), them, is to be waiting for the 
love of God. But more than this, it is to be waiting for the 
grace of God, for the love of God is impossible except by God's 
grace. St. Teresa thus acknowledges that "we know that no 
efforts of ours are availinq if God withholds from us the water 
of grace, and we must despise ourselves as nothing and as less 
than nothing.,, 
76 Dryness, water, and waiting, then, are combined 
in the spiritual imagery of St. Teresa: 
one must never be depressed or afflicted because of 
aridities or unrest or distraction of the mind. If 
a person would gain spiritual freedom and not be 
continually troubled, let him begin by not being 
afraid of the Cross and he will find that the Lord 
will help him to bear it; he will then advance happily 
and find profit in everything. It is now clear that, 
if no water is coming from the well, we ourselves 
can put none into it. But of course we must not be 
careless: water must always be drawn when there is 
any there, for at such a time God's will is that we 
- 77 should use it so that He may multiply our virtues. 
Water drawn from a well, however, is but one method of watering 
the soul as God's garden. one may also draw water, given God's 
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grace, by means of a water-wheel, or by the diversion of .. 4 ýa 
stream or hrook. But the garden is most thoroughly saturated 
"by heavy rain, when the Lord waters it with no lahour of ours, 
a way incomparably better than any of those which have been 
described. .78 From Eliot's early readings in mysticism, then, 
come images of dryness, representing the spiritual state in which .4 
the love of God is not yet actual but nonetheless possible, and 
images of rain, representing God's grace. The opening lines of 
"Gerontion, " therefore, sugqest that mysticism is an important 
c 
element in the poem. 
Not surprisinqly,, thtb-n, mystical patterns of thought inform 
the key central passaqes of "Gerontion. " The question with which 
this section'begins--"Af ter such knowledge, what forgiveness? " 
(38)--recalls Walter Hilton's definition of the first part of the 
contemplative life. This I'lieth in knowing of God and of ghostly 
things, gotten by reason, by teaching of man, and by study in 
Holy Writ; without ghostly affections and inly savour felt 
by the special gift of the Holy Ghost. ,79 Gerontion's question, 
then, is "What forgiveness results from the knowledge that 
'In the juvescence of the year / Came Christ the tiger .9*1 
(37)? " The question, of course, is rhetorical, for Gerontion 
has such knowledge and knows as well that no forgiveness results 
from it. The passage continues, then, as a revelation of the 
vanity of human knowledge: "History has many cunning passages, 
contrived corridors / And issuest deceives with whispering am- 
bitions, / Guides us by vanities" (38). Human knowledger in the 
form of history, can never satisfy the heart's desire for trans- 
cendental knowledge or the mystical experience of union with God: 
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Think now 
she qives when our attention is distracted 
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions 
That the giving famishes the craving. (38) 
The knowledge, moreover,, that "In the juvescence of the year / 
Came Christ the tiger (37) , is given too late. Even so, 
however, this knowledge is "not believed in,, or if still be- 
lieved,, / In memory only, reconsidered passion" (38). This,, 
then, is the inadequate knowledge of God and ghostly things 
described by Hilton. In his knowledge of Christ's crucifixion, 
Gerontion, lacks the "ghostly affections and inly savour felt 
by the special gift of the Holy Ghost. " But whereas this know- 
ledge is, in any event, given too late to be believed in, the 
disposition toward belief is given too early. History gives 
"too soon / Into weak hands, what's thought can be dispensed 
with / Till the refusal propagates a fear" (38). In other 
words, behind Gerontion' s complaint here is the apologetic 
Eliot explaining why belief was not possible in 1914. It is 
still not possible for either Gerontion or Eliot, but the re- 
fusal--either their refusal to believe, or God's refusal of the 
grace which would make belief possible--has begun to propagate 
a fear, that is, the fear that the individual is not serving 
God. The old man realizes, however, that he is dependent upon 
God's grace; through his own will he can accomplish nothing: 
"Neither fear nor courage saves us" (38). Ironically, to seek 
salvation by one's own will becomes a vice: "Unnatural vices 
Are fathered by our heroism" (38). The activity of the individual 
will in seeking salvation therefore frustrates itself, for the 
individual must give up his impudent will in order to experience 
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union with God. In the end, the inevitable frustration of the 
impudent individual will forces those seeking salvation to await 
the grace of God. In short, "Virtues / Are forced upon us by 
our impudent crimes" (38). Ultimately, then, although know- 
ledqe comes too late, and the disposition to believe too soon, 
"an old man in a dry month" (37) still manages, through the 
tears "shaken from the wrath-bearing tree" (38) of the cruci- 
fixion, to deepen his understanding of the fact that salvation 
depends, not upon knowledge, but upon the grace of God. And 
note, moreover, that according to St. Teresa "tears achieve 
everything: one kind of water attracts another. 1180 This 
passage, then, contrasting the deliberate, active search for 
forgiveness with waiting in quiet and stillness for grace, does 
not end without hope. 
Grace, in fact, appears in the next passage in the devouring 
form of Christ the springing tiger. This image, according to 
Underhill, is common amongst mediaeval mystics who speak of the 
human soul pursued by the Hound of Heaven, or the Green Liony 
in a spiritual love-chase: the n idea of the love-chase, of the 
spirit rushing in terror f rom the overpowering presence of God, 
but followed, soughtf conquered in the end, is common to all 
mediaeval mystics. j, 
81 Far from having reached conclusion when 
his body stiffens "in a rented house" (38),? Gerontion will but 
be beginning the real life of the spirit. This "show" (38)-- 
referring to both the poem and the life which it discusses--has 
not been made purposelessly, for it discovers and demonstrates 
the necessity of waiting for God's grace. Gerontion, that 
ist 
has realized, through the activity of writing the poem, that 
he 
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cannot achieve his own salvation. Instead, he must give him- 
self up to God and await God's will. He perceives a purpose, 
therefore, in his alienation from God: "I that was near your 
heart was removed therefrom / To lose beauty in terror, terror 
in inquisition" (38). The loss of whatever beauty he possessed- 
or believed himself to possess--leads through terror, propagated 
by his inability to believe, to the equanimical reflections 
which constitute the poem. In discovering that he cannot produce 
his own salvation, Gerontion loses his passion. The resiqnation 
which results is the necessary first step in opening the self 
to the grace of God, for, so long as the individual will is 
maintained, it is stained by its human limitations. In short, 
what is kept by the individual "must be adulterated" (38). 
Having lost not his senses, but his dependence upon his senses, 
Gerontion is then able to offer his will to God: "I have lost 
my sight,, smell, hearinge taste and touch: / How should I use 
them for your closer contact? " (38). Like Madame Guyon, there- 
fore, Gerontion discovers that suffering is not only a manifesta- 
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tion of God's will, but also a manifestation of His grace. 
In the end, what Gerontion has lost is his passion for 
created things. He is thus commencing a mystical approach to 
God. Though still far from the mystic's perfect contemplative 
cognition and affection, Gerontion has, through the poemp got 
beyond the stage of simple knowledge. He is on the verge of 
what Hilton calls "ghostly affections. " The dryness and 
dis- 
illusion with which the poem concludes are, in fact, consistent 
with the mystical experience described by St. john of the 
Cross: 
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The cause of this dryness [of the senses] is that 
God is transferring to the spirit the go ds and 
energies of the senses, which, being now unable to 
assimilate them,, become dry, parched up, and empty; 
for the sensual nature of man is helpless in those 
things which belong to the sDirit simply. Thus the 
spirit having tastedr the flesh shrinks and fails. 83 
Ironically, then, the "Thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season" 
(39) suggest not despair, but hope. 
Furthermore, just as "Gerontion" demonstrates Eliot's 
continuing preoccupation with mysticism, so The Waste Land, for 
which "Gerontion" was at one time to serve as an introduction, 
displays a mystical influence. Certain of the influences upon 
imagery, of course, are the same as in "Gerontion. " Dryness, for 
instance, is the image underlying not only the title, but the 
entire poem. In "The Burial of the Dead,, " "the dead tree gives 
no shelter, the cricket no relief, / And the dry stone no sound 
of water" (61). The result is "fear in a handful of dust" 
In "What the Thunder said, " the poet is still waiting for the 
sound of water: "If there were the sound of water only .-- if 
(72) . But there is no water: 
Here is no water but only rock 
Rock and no water and the sandy road 
The road winding above among the mountains 
Which are mountains of rock without water 
If there were water we should stop and drink. *eo 
(72) 
These images of drought and wilderness --popular throughout English 
literature--ultimately derive, of course, from the Bible. But 
in Eliot's case, these images are reinforced--if not originally 
suggested--by his readings in mysticism. Dryness, according 
to 
St. John of the Crossr is merely a stage in the mystic's struggle 
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to overcome his senses and give himself to God: "instead of 
lovel, which is afterwards enkindled, what the soul feels in 
the dryness and emptiness of its faculties is a general painful 
anxiety about God, and a certain painful misgiving that it is 
not serving Him. " 
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In this respect, the dryness in The Waste 
Land is similar to the dryness in "Gerontion. 11 
In The Waste Lando however, dryness appears in the form 
of a desert. But even here Eliot is guided to some extent by 
his readings in mysticism. A passage in Mysticism, for instance, 
in which Underhill quotes Johann Tauler's description of the 
desert as the meeting-place between God and the self, suggests 
a source for Eliot's imagery: 
Says Tauler of this ineffable meeting-place, which 
is to the intellect an emptiness, and to the heart 
a fulfilment of all desire, "All there is so still 
and mysterious and so desolate: for there is nothing 
there but God only, and nothing strange. ... This 
Wilderness is the Quiet Desert of the Godhead, into 
which He leads all who are to receive this inspiration 
of God, now or in Eternity. n From this "quiet desert, " 
this still plane of being, so near to her though she 
is far from it, the normal self is separated by all 
the "unquiet desert" of sensual existence. 
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Similarly, one f inds in 
'The 
Dark Night of the Soul a passage 
describing the desert as the way to God, Quoting the Psalmist, 
St. John of the Cross argues that the spiritual desert is 
preferable to sweetness and delight: 
"In a desert land, and inaccessible, and without 
water; so in the holy have I appeared to Thee, that 
I might see Thy strength and Thy glory. " The Psalmist 
does not say here--and it is worthy of observation-- 
that his previous sweetness and delight were any 
dispositions or means whereby he might come to the 
knowledge of the glory of God, but rather that it 
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was through an aridity and emptying of the powers 
of sense, spoken of here as the barren and dry land. 86 
According to certain mystics, then, dryness-representing the 
desert in which the senses must languish if one is to give 
oneself up to God--is a hopeful spiritual development. whereas 
in the natural world, a waste land such as Eliot' s represents 
sterility, in the spiritual world, with which Eliot is more 
concerned, it represents potential spiritual fertility. Images 
of dryness and desert, therefore, are consistent with a positive 
spiritual interpretation of The Waste, Land. As St. John of the 
Cross notes, the Psalmist 
does not say that his reflections and meditations 
on divine things, with which he was once familiar, 
had led him to the knowledge and contemplation of 
God's power, but, rather, his inability to meditate 
on God, to form reflections by the hejý of his imagin- 
ation; that is the inaccessible land. 
In the end, this inability to form reflections on God by the 
help of the imagination is the inaccessible waste land of 
Eliot's poem. 
Other images in The Waste Land may also derive from Eliot's 
mystical readings. Madame Sosostrisr for instancer seems to 
derive in part from The Story of Mv Heart, the spiritual auto- 
biography of the pseudo-mystic Richard Jeffries. In Eliot's 
ironic caricature, one finds not just clairvoyancer but the 
greatest wisdom in Europe. Yet, through allusions to the 
figures 
of a "drowned Phoenician Sailor" (62) and a "Hanged Man" (62),, 
one also finds in Sosostris a suggestion of the present relevance 
Of ancient fertility rituals. Similarly, Jeffries' Sesostris 
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is associated with the consciousness of past and present: 
"Sesostris on the most ancient sands of the south, in ancient, 
ancient days, was conscious of himself and of the sun. This 
sunlight linked me through the ages to that past conscious- 
"88 ness. Jeffries continues: 
With all the energy the sun-beams had poured unwearied 
on the earth since Sesostris was conscious of them on 
the ancient sands; with all the life that had been 
lived by vigorous man and beauteous woman since first 
in dearest Greece the dream of the gods was woven; 
with all the soul-life that had flowed a long stream 
down to me, I prayed that I might have a soul more 
than equal to, far beyond my conception of, these 
things of the past, the presenti, and the fulness of 
all life. 
Jeffries, then, connects the present with the past through 
sun-beams. In The Waste Land, however, the sun is blocked by 
"the brown fog of a winter dawn" (62) and "the brown fog of 
a winter noon" (68). Not surprisingly, then, the speaker "can 
connect / Nothing with nothing" on the fine modern sands of 
"Margate Sands" (70). Not just Sosostris, then, but The Waste 
Land itself , owes something to Jeffries' Sesostris. 
Similarly, Eliot finds in Jeffries an account of a vision 
which the latter experienced as he was crossinq one of London's 
bridges: 
From the stone bridges I looked down on the river; 
the gritty dust, the straws that lie on the bridges, 
flew up and whirled round with every gust from the 
f lowing tide; gritty dust that settles in the nostrils 
and on the lips, the very residuum of all that is 
repulsive in the greatest city of the world. The noise 
of the traffic and the constant pressure from the 
crowds passing, their incessant and disjointed talk, 
could not distract me. One moment at least I had, a 
moment when I thought of the push of the great sea 
forcing the water to flow under the feet of these 
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crowds, the distant sea strong and splendid. ... 
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just as Jeffries' vision focuses upon one of London's bridges 
as an example of "the very residuum of all that is repulsive in 
the greatest citv of the world, " so Eliot focuses upon London 
Bridge itself as an image of the death- in-lif-e. suffered by 
modern man in the modern city: 
Unreal Citv 
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn, 
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many. 
Sighs, short and infrequent, wero exhaled, 
And each man fixed his eves before his feet. 
Flowed up the hill and down King William Street, 
To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours 
With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine. (62) 
In Jeffries, then, Eliot finds not only the image of the bridge 
itself, but the image of the oppressive crowd crossing the 
bridge. Although the one crowd exhales sighs "short and in- 
frequent" (62) , and the other passes with "incessant and 
dis- 
jointed talk, " Eliot and Jeffries react to the crowds with the 
same attitude of wonder and sadness. Furthermore, Eliot follows 
Jeffries in making the connection between the crowds on the bridge 
and the flowing tide beneath. Although, then, The Waste Land's 
picture of London owes something to the opening of Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness, it also owes something to the visions of Richard 
Jeffries. 
The reference to chess in "A Game of Chess" is also evidence 
of the influence of Eliot's readings in mysticism. Underhill, 
for instance, mentions St. Teresa's "game of chess" as a version 
of what the mediaeval mystic called Ludus Amoris, the game of 
215 
love. In this game, which re-Dresents "the characteristic 
intermediate stage between the bitter struggles of pure Puraa- 
tion, and the peace and splendour of the Illuminative Life, " 
God plays with the soul, alternately granting and withdrawing 
rapturous vision. 
91 St. Teresa, however, simnly. complares the 
learning of prayer with the learning of chess. In both prayemr 
and chess, one must know the beginning and end of the exercise 
if there is to be any hope of success. In The Wav of Perfection, 
St. Teresa explains her metaphor: 
I am but (as they say) setting the men f or a game 
at chess. Ye desired me to tell vou the beginning 
of prayer; I, daughters, though God conducted me not 
by this beginning, for I certainly have scarce the 
beginning of these virtues, do know no other. Believe 
then that whoever knows not how to rank the men at 
chess will be able to play but ill; and if he know 
not how to give check, he will not know how to give 
the mate. 92 
The distressed woman in "A Game of Chess" clearly does not 
know the rules of the game if she must ask,, "What shall I do 
now? What shall I do? " (65). Her very preoccupation with the 
necessity of doing something shows that she does not understand 
that the game of spiritual chess demands, as check, the giving 
up of the individual will, and, as mate, the waiting for God's 
grace,, that is,, the "waitinq for a knock upon the door" (65) . 
The woman's preceding questions thus prove ambiguous and 
rhetorical. That is,, when she asks "Do / You know nothing? Do 
you see nothing? Do you remember / Nothing? " (65), she means 
to imply by this rhetorical question that her companion deserves 
contempt on account of his passivity. She interprets the passivitY-t 
which the state of individual nothingness represents, as death: 
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"Are you alive, or not? Is there nothing in 1-mur head? " 
But the mystic regards the state of individual nothingness as 
a spiritually healthy condition. Indeed, the naughting of the 
soul is a precondition of receiving God's grace. Ironicall1r, 
the image of "nothing" with which the woman taunts her com- 
panion represents the very object of his moves in this spiritual 
qame of chess. Here, then, the hysterical woman, as in the 
early poetry, represents the senses; she demands constant 
stimulation, rangincT from the "cTlitter of her jewels" (64), 
and her perfumes which trouble, confuse, and drown the sense 
"in odours" (64), to the imaginary noises promDted bv "The wind 
under the door" (65) . All is well in this world of the senses 
if it still the world pursues" (64) the beauty and passion re- 
presented by Philomel. Satisfaction with nothing, however, 
is the greatest possible threat to this material world. In 
"The Fire Sermon, " then, the conflict between the spiritual 
worlds is made explicit: "My people humble people who expect / 
Nothing" (70). "My people" may refer to the bankers who provided 
Eliot's paid leave during his convalescence at Margate. If sOr 
they serve as a fine example of the material world. Or "my 
people" may refer to the speaker's companions in adversity. But 
whoever the humblers of those who expect nothing may be,, they 
unintentionally perform the greatest service in forcing humility 
upon those who seek it. The goal of the mvstic, after all, is 
to dispossess himself of his material possessions. Underlying 
much o If The Waste Land, then, is a rhetorical confusion between 
the conflicting values of the material and spiritual worlds; the 
apparent ascendence of material values often only masks a sniritual 
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potential on the point of becoming actual. 
This spiritual potentialt in fact, seems to become actual 
in the exclamation, "0 Lord Thou pluckest me out /0 Lord Thou 
pluckest" (70) In short,, the poet claims to have been chosen 
to receive the grace of God. In "What the Thunder saidt 
however,, he returns to the desert and dryness which have been 
present from the beginning, indicating, Perhans, that he is still 
playing that qame of chess in which rapturous vision is al- 
ternatelv given and withdrawn. The question which mystics must 
ask themselves at this noint is, "what have we given? " (74). In 
order to obtain grace, one must give un one's individual will in 
"The awful daring of a moment's surrender" (74). Only b7, )' this 
extinction of personality can the life of the spirit beain: 
"By this, and this only, we have existond (74). The poet 
speaks here as though he has actually experienced this awful 
moment. He claims: 111 have heard the. key / Turn in the door 
once and turn once only (74) ; thus he waits, in this 
game of chess,, "for a knock upon the door" (65). He waits,, 
thinking of the grace which alone will open the door. He thus 
recognizes the impotence of his own will: "We think of the 
key, each in his prison / Thinking Of the key, each confirms 
a prison" (74). The poem concludes, then, with the poet apolog- 
izing for not having responded properly to the earlier instance 
in which the key turned in the door during that awful daring of 
a moment's surrender. He seems to think that grace was given 
"too soon / Into weak hands" (38) ; it would have been accented 
had his faith been stronger: "your heart would have responded / 
Gaily, when invited, beating obedient / To controlling hands 
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(74). In the end,, Eliot's poetic 
'persona 
is left waiting for 
the waters of grace in the knowledge that, as St. Teresa af firms, 
"water must always be drawn when there is any there, for at 
such a time God's will is that we should use it so that He may 
multiply our virtues. , 
93 
The Waste Land, then, whatever else it may be, and however 
much criticism may tend to ignore the fact, is verv much a 
spiritual poem. AS R. L. Brott observes, critical attention 
has only been deflected from the poem's spiritual content 
because of the accident of Eliot's over-emnhasis upon his 
anthropological concerns: 
The emphasis in the Notes on Frazer's Golden Bough, 
Jessie Weston's From Ritual to Romance and the remark 
that Tiresias is the central character of the poem 
have turned our attention away from the spiritual to th; 
anthropological, and have tended to concentrate the 
reader's mind not on the progress of the soul, but on 
the decay and death of civilization. 94 
The Waste Land, in short, shows " that salvation cannot come 
from culture, intelliqence, or any other product of man's mind. "95 
That is , 
Man cannot construct a tower which will reach Heaven, 
nor contrive a ladder which will enable him to climb 
out of the 'foul raq-and-bone shop' of his heart. 
The ladder when it comes will not be erected by those 
on earth, it will descend from Heaven. 96 
But Eliot's spiritual concern is not simple; it is articulated 
in a language which suggests that his concern has advanced 
beyond that of the average layman. That is, he speaks the 
language of the Mvstics--a language he learned from his early 
readings in mvsticism. These readings thus prove an active and 
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enduring poetic and spiritual influence through the years which 
pass between Eliot's study at Harvard and the period of the 
composition of The Waste Land. 
In qeneral, the influence of Underhill's Mvsticism, ap- 
pearing more often in the prose, and the influence of the saints 
and mystics that Eliot read at Harvard, appearing more often in 
the poetry, demonstrate within Eliot an active spiritual debats 
far in advance of his 1927 conversion. From his first vision 
in 1910, at the age of twenty-one, to the publication of The 
'Waste 
Land, in 1922, this spiritual debate is continuous, as 
examples from Eliot's prose and poetry show. It seems, then, 
that from that awful daring of a moment's surrender in 1914, 
when he was circling on the edge of conversion, to his actual 
conversion in 1927, Eliot was waiting for grace to knock upon 
the door once morn.. He was waiting, that is, as his experience 
of mysticism had taught him that he must. Moreover, in articul- 
ating his experiences during this period of waiting by means 
of a poetry which uses the images and ideas of mysticismr Eliot 
is true to both the mystic tradition and his own sense of the 
poetic tradition. Underhill's explanation of the mystical 
tradition in general thus applies to Eliot in particular: from 
his spiritual ancestors, 
he takes the language which thev have sought out and 
constructed as a means of telling their adventures 
to the world. It is by their help too, very often, 
that he elucidates for himself the meaning of the dim 
perceptions of his amazed soul. From his own exneri- 
ences he adds to this store; and hands on an enriched 
tradition of the transcendental life to the next 
spiritual genius evolved by the race. 
97 
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The spiritual struggle of Eliot's early years, then, is actuallv 
continuous with the relative sniritual calm which follows his 
conversion. The distinctions in spiritual sensibilitl_,, which 
mark the intervening years merelv reflect Eliot's proaress uD 
the ladder of perfection. In short, in his beginning is his 
end. 
Endnotes 
1 
T. S. Eliot,, "Yeats,, " in 
, 
On Poetrv and Poets (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1957) , p. 252. 
2 F. O. Matthiessenr The Achievement of T. S. Eliot, 3rd ed. 
revised and enlarqed with a chapter on Eli7t-Is later work by 
C. L. Barber (1935; rpt. London: Oxford Universitl,, Press, 
1959), p. 9. 
3 Lyndall Gordon, Eliot's Earlv Years (Oxford: Oxford 
Universitv Press, 19771-, p. 15. 
4 L. Gordon, p. 32. 
5 L. Gordon, P. 1. 
6 L. Gordon, p. 60. 
7 L. Gordon, p. 58. 
8 
T. S. Eliot, "Thouqhts After Lambeth, " in Selected Essays, 
3rd enlarged ed. (1932; rT3t. London: Faber and Faber, 1951). 
pp. 365-6. 
9 
T. S. Eliot, After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern 
Heresy (London: Faber and Faber, 1934)f p. 977. 
10 
T. S. Eliot,, "Religion and Literaturej, " in Selected Essavs, 
p. 398. 
11 
T. S. Eliot, "Reliqion and Literature, " p. 392. 
12 
Helen Gardner, The Limits of Literary Criticism: 
Reflections on the Interpretation of Poetry and Scripture 
(Lond-on: Oxford Un-iversitv Press, 1956), p. 16. 
13 
T. S. Eliot,, "On the Metaphysical Poetry of the Seven- 
teenth Century,, " as quoted bv A. -D. Moody in Thomas Stearns. 
Eliot: Poet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressr 1979), 
p. T2_T_. 
14 
R. L. Brett, "Mysticism and Incarnation in Four Quartetst" 
, 
Enqlish, 16 (1966) 0,95. 
15 
L. Gordon, P. 60. 
16 
Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism A Study in the Nature and 
f Man's Spiritual Consciousness, lith &F. -(1911; 
rpt. London: Methuen, 19 * 33. 
222 
17 
E. Underhill,, P. 38. 
18 
E. Underhill, p. 17. 
19 E. Underhill, p. 15. 
20 E. Underhill, p. x. 
21 E. Underhill,, pp. 43-4. 
22 E. Underhill, p. 97. 
23 E. Underhill, p. 89. 
24 
E. Underhill, p. 94. 
25 
E. Underhill, p. 273. 
26 
E. Underhill, p. 284. 
27 
E. Underhill, p. 286. 
28 
E. Underhill, p. 437. 
29 
E. Underhill, p. 275. 
30 
E. Underhill, pp. 287-8. 
31 
E. Underhill, p. 125. 
32 
E. Underhill, p. 125. 
33 
E. Underhill, p. 448. 
34 
E. Underhill, p. 475. 
35 
E. Underhill, pp. 477-8. 
36 
E. Underhill, p. 481. 
37 
E. Underhill, p. 110. 
38 
T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent,, " in 
The-Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetrv and Criticism, 7th ed. (1920; 
rpt. London: Methuen, 1950), pp. 52-3f 53,58,59. 
39 
E. Underhill, p. ix. 
40 
T. S. Eliot,, "Trad ition and the Individual Talent, " p. 49. 
41 
E. Underhill, p. 542. 
42 
T. S. Eliot.. "Trad ition and the Individual Talent,, " p. 48. 
43 
E. Underhill, p. 534. 
pp- 
223 
44 E. Underhill,, p. 359. 
45 St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, as quoted by E. Underhill, p. 336. 
46 E. Underhill,, p. 337. 
47 
. 10 1 T. S. Eliot,, "The 'Pensees of Pascal, " in Selected 
Essays, p. 405. 
. A- 
48 
T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetrv and the Use of Criticism (London: Faber and Faber, 1913-Y, p. 140'. 
49 E. Underhill, p. 85. 
50 
E. Underhill, p. 85. 
51 
E. Underhill? p. 132. 
52 
E. Underhill, p. 133. 
53 
E. Underhill, p. 235. 
54 E. Underhill, p. 49. 
55 
T. S. Eliot,, "The Function of Criticism,, " in Selected 
Essays, p. 24. 
56 
T. S. Eliot, rev. of Conscience and Christ: Six Lectures 
, 
on Christian Ethics, by Hastinqs Rash7all, IJE, 27 (1916), 112. 
57 T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplex, " I,, Little Review,, 4 
(May 1917).. 8. 
58 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and AT)T)leplex, " I. pe 90 
59 
T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot 
(London: Faber and' Faber, 1969). All quotations from E17io-t-rs 
Poems and plays derive from this edition. Page references 
(within parentheses) follow each auotation. 
60 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and App. leplexo, " Io, p. 9. 
61 
T. S. Eliot,, "Eeldrop and Appleplexo, " I,, pe 99 
62 
T. S. Eliot, After strange Gods, p. 42. 
63 
Julian, Anchoress of Norwich, Revelations of Divine 
Love: Shewed to a Devout Ankress bir Name Julian of Norwich, 
eT---`Dom Roger Hudleston, 2nd ed. (1927; rpt. London: Burns 
Oates, 1952), p. 48. 
64 
Julian, Anchoress of Norwich, p. 72. 
'Amp 
224 
65 Walter Hilton,, The 
, 
Scale of Perfection,, ed. Evel'urn 
Underhill, (London: John M. Watkins,, 1923), pT). 255-6. 
66 W. Hilton, p. 256. 
67 W. Hilton, p. 6. 
68 T. S. Eliot,, "The Function of Criticism, " p. 24. 
Jewel Spears Brookeri, "The Structure 
69 
n of Eliot's 'Geron- 
tion': An Interpretation Based on Bradley's Doctrine of the 
systematic Nature of Truth, " ELH, 46 (1979), 314-40. 
70 
J. S. Brooker, p. 324. 
71 J. S. Brookerr p. 324. 
72 
J. S. Brooker, p. 327. 
73 Julian, Anchoress of Norwich, p. 110. 
74 W. Hilton, p. 119. 
75 
St. John of the Crossr The Dark Night of the Soul, in 
I The Mystical Doctrine of St. JFhn of the cross, selectej by 
R. H. J. Stewartr trans. by David Lewis, 2nd eT. - (1935; rpt. 
London: Sheed and Ward, 1974), p. 86. 
76 
St. Teresa of Avila,, The Life of the Holy Mother Teresa 
of Jesus, in The Complete Works of Saint Teresa, I, trans. and 
ed. by E. Allison Peers (London: Sheed and R-ardt 1946), p. 87. 
77 
St. Teresa, The Life of the Holy Mother Teresa of 
, p. 70. 
78 St. Teresar The Life of the Holy Mother Teresa of 
, P. 65. 
79 
W. Hilton, p. 6. 
80 
St. Teresa, The Life of the Holv Mother Teresa of 
, 
Jesus, p. 113. 
81 
E. Underhill, p. 161. 
82 
Thomas C. Upham, The Life.. Religious. 
- 
Opinions and Ex- 
2eriences of Madame Guvonr ed. An English Clergyman (LonTon: 
H. R. Allenson, 1905), p. 23. 
83 
St. John of the Cross, P. 81. 
84 
St. John of the Cross, p. 86. 
85 
E. Underhill, p. 364. 
225 
86 St. John of the Cross, pp. 87-8. 
87 St. John of the Cross , p. 88. 
88 Richard Jeffries, The Storv of My Heart (1883; rnt. 
London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904)j, p. 14. 
89 R. Jeffries, pp. 15-16. 
90 R. Jeffries, pp. 84-5. 
91 E. Underhill, p. 274. 
92 St. Teresa of Avila, The Way of Perfection, ed. A. R. 
Waller (London: J. M. Dent, 1901), p. 74. 
93 St. Teresa, The Life of the Holv Mother Teresa of 
Jesus, P. 70. 
94 R. L. Brett,, 11T. S. Eliot,, " a lecture given in 1978 at 
Jadavpur University, Calcuttar and the University of Baroda, 
India, under the auspices of the British Council, p. 9. 
95 R. L. Brett,, 11T. S. Eliot,, " p. 11. 
96 
R. L. Brett,, "T. S. Eliot, " p. 
97 
E. Underhill, p. 542. 
Chanter Six: Anglican Divines 
Eliot emphasized his interest in sixteenth and seventeenth- 
century theology by dedicating his 1928 collection of essays to 
Lancelot Andrewes. The title essay, "Lancelot Andrewes, " 
actually appeared in The Times Literary Supplement in 1926.1 
At this time, according to Robert Sencourt,, "This interest in 
the writings of Anglican divines in the seventeenth century 
was very much at the forefront of Tom's mind. .. * ,2 In 
fact, as a prospective candidate for a Research Fellowship 
at All Souls, Eliot's "proposed line of research was to in- 
vestigate the theory that the writings of seventeenth -century 
Anglicanism did not lead to any theological outcome. ,3 But 
Eliot had revealed his interest in this subject many years 
earlier; his 1919 review of Logan Pearsall Smith's selections 
from the sermons of John Donne showed that he had been reading 
a great deal of sixteenth and seventeenth- century theology. 
Those to whom he makes reference in this review, "The Preacher 
as Artist, " include: John Donne, Lancelot Andrewes, Hugh 
Latimer, Jeremy Taylor, Sir Thomas Browner and Richard Hooker. 
4 
This particular theological preoccupation, however, can be 
traced back even further. In the 1918 Syllabus for a Tutorial 
Class in Modern English Literature lectures sponsored by the 
University of London's Joint Committee for the Promotion of 
Higher Education for Working People--one finds Eliot's outline 
Of the beginnings of Tudor prose: "How English prose grew up: 
effect of theological writing, books of travels, history. The 
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Prayer Books of Edward VI,, 15 He refers specifically to Hooker's 
Ecclesiastical Polity and Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici; 
the latter, in fact,, is "not exactly in the period,, but may .A 
well be read in connection with it.,, 
6 
By 1918, then, Eliot 
was well enough read in this theological prose to include it in 
his comprehensive and coherent programme of study concerning 
Elizabethan literature. 
Eliot seemed glad of the opportunity to study this litera- 
ture. A letter he wrote to his mother in May, 1918 reveals a 
renewed interest in the class at Southall: 
-M-y Southall people want to do Elizabethan Literature next year which would interest me more than what we 
have done before, and would be of more use to me too, 
as I want to write some essays on the dramatists who 
have never been properly criticized. 7 
Indeed, according to Ronald Schuchard, by the time Eliot was 
faced with the cancellation of the class because of an insuf- 
ficient enrolment, he had become so "absorbed in the material 
that he wrote to the Joint Committee requesting permission to 
continue the course for a reduced fee if the Board of Education 
refused to pay grant on it. n8 Eliot made this offer despite 
the fact that he could not actually afford the reduced fee. 
It seems,, then, that the literature of this period exerted a 
firm grip on Eliot's imagination. 
As Northrop Frye observes, Eliot regarded the seventeenth 
century as a period which contained "in embryo all the dis- 
integrating tendencies of our time. "9 In its poetry#, for instancep 
he found the beginnings of the dissociation of sensibilitY which 
troubled the English mind from Milton and Dryden to Eliot'S Own 
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day. Dryden and Milton had each "performed certain poetic 
functions so magnificently well that the magnitude of the effect 
concealed the absence of others. " As a result, the language 
improved in some respects, "But while the language became more 
refinedt the feeling became more crude. "10 Eventually, however, 
"poets revolted against the ratiocinative, the descriptive; 
they thought and felt by fits, unbalanced; they reflected. " 
11 
In general, however, "the decay of the senses is not inconsistent 
with a greater sophistication of language. But every vital 
development in language is a development of feeling as well. "12 
From Eliot's perspective, therefore, sixteenth and seventeenth- 
century developments in prose, just as much as developments in 
poetry, must be developments of feeling. So Eliot notes that 
Andrewes, Donne, and Taylor "had the sensitiveness necessary to 
record and to bring to convergence on a theological point a 
"13 multitude of fleeting but universal feelings. Just, then, 
as Eliot looked to the poetry of this period for an explanation 
of the subsequent splitting up of what he calls the English 
mind, so he must have studied the prose of this period with the 
expectation, or hope, of finding in it a further explanation of 
the development of that English mind he was adopting and adapting 
to be hi s own. 
But regardless of Eliot's conscious intentions in pursuing 
his studies in sixteenth and seventeenth- century theological 
prose,, one has every right-- according to Eliot himself--to 
expect an influence or effect greater than, and different 
from, 
the one intended. As human beings, he argues, we are affected 
by our reading "whether we intend to be or not, " just as we are 
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affected by the food we eatr whether we intend to be or not: 
I suppose that everything we eat has some other 
ef fect upon us than merely the pleasure of taste 
and mastication; it affects us during the process 
of assimilation and digestion; and I believe that 
exactly the same is true of anything we read. 14 
Given, r theni, Eliot's early reading in the sermons of John Donne, 
Lancelot Andrewes, Hugh Latimer, and Jeremy Taylor, his study 
of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Politvf Browne's Religio 
Medici, and The First and Second Prayer-Books of King Edward 
VI, one must determine the influence of this reading and study 
upon the whole man--not just upon Eliot the extension lecturer, 
that is, but upon Eliot the poet, critic, and Christian. 
Eliot reveals that he first encountered John Donne in a 
1906 Freshman English class at Harvard in which Professor Briggs 
read the verses of Donne "with great persuasiveness and charm": 
I confess that I have now forgotten what Professor 
Briggs told us about the poet; but I know that what- 
ever he said, his own words and his quotations were 
enough to attract to private reading at least one 
Freshman who had already absorbed some of the Eliza- 
bethan dramatists,, but who had not yet approached the 
metaphysicals. I can from that point trace uncertainly 
the progress of my own relations with Donne. .a0 
15 
Moreover, when Eliot arrived in London in 1914, Herbert J. C. 
Grierson had just brought out his edition of Donne's poems; 
Donne was thus a popular subject of conversation: "I know 
that when I came to London I heard more of Donner in social 
conversationr than I had heard before. " 
16 Donne, thent is a 
factor in the beginning of Eliot's intellectual life in America 
and England, 
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But the relationship between Eliot and Donne, begun so 
earlyp was by no means a simple one. In "The Preacher as Artist" 
(1919),, Eliot finds Donne's prose worth reading because it is a 
"significant moment in the history of English prose, and because 
it has at its best uncommon dignity and beauty--a style which 
gives at times what is always uncommon in the sermon, a direct 
, 17 personal communication. This style, furthermore, makes him 
a better sermon writer than Latimer or Andrewes; or so Eliot 
declares in his review of Logan Pearsall Smith's selections from 
Donne's sermons: "many of the passages of Donne given by Mr. 
Pearsall Smith can be paralleled from Latimer or Andrewes; 
paralleled in such a way as to leave it open to us to think 
Donne better, but better only in the same kind.. " 
18 In short, 
as Eliot reiterates in "The Prose of the Preacher: The Sermons 
of Donnell (1929), "The truth is that Donne's sermons are bril- 
liantly written throughout, and brilliantly constructed, with a 
beginning, a middle and an end. " 
19 And yet, just two years 
later,, Eliot criticizes the attention paid to Donne's sermons: 
feel,, myself (it is perhaps to-day an heretical sensation), 
that the essential originality of Donne is rather in the Songs 
and Sonets, in the Elegies, o, and in the Satires, than 
in the 
Sermons. n20 As though sensitive to his apparent change of mind 
here,, but unwilling to acknowledge it, Eliot continues somewhat 
defensively: 
But actually (I f or one have always been convinced) 
in the history of English Theology it is not Donne, 
but Cranmer and Latimer and Andrewes, who are the 
great prose masters; and for the theologian even 
the high-sounding Bramhall and the depressive Thorn- 
dike are more important names than Donne's. His 
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sermons will disappear as suddenly as they have 
appeared. 21 
On the one hand, then, Eliot feels that Donne's sermons are 
well worth reading, while, on the other hand, he feels that 
they will--and perhaps ought--to disappear as suddenly as they 
have appeared . 
The contradiction here, however, is only apparent. John 
Bramhall is not more important than Donne in terms of style, 
for,, as Eliot notes, "we forget Bramhall's phrases the moment 
, ct 
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we turn away from Bramhall's subje Rather, Bramhall is 
more important than Donne in respect of theology; Eliot argues, 
for instance, that Bramhall's Just Vindication of the En 
Church "is a work which ought to be studied by anyone to whom 
the relation of Church and State is an actual and importunate 
problem. "23 When, therefore, Eliot remarks that "in the history 
of English Theology it is not Donne, but Cranmer and Latimer and 
Andrewes, who are the great prose masters .*oj" he means 
that they are greater than Donne not in respect of their prose, 
but their theology. In other words, given Donner Cranmer, 
Latimer,, and Andrewes as great prose masters, Cranmer, Latimer, 
and Andrewes are the great prose masters in respect of theology. 
There is no contradiction in logic, then, between Eliot's state- 
ments concerning the value of Donne's sermons. There is, how- 
ever, a contradiction in Eliot's emotional attitude, for his 
initial enthusiasm for Donne's sermons in 1919 has dissipated 
by 1931. Perhaps he merely reacted against a social and literary 
milieu already over-saturated with Donne: 
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I know that by 1926, when I gave some lectures on Donne, the subject was already popularp almost 
topical; and I know that by 1931 the subject has 
been so fully treated that there appears to me no 
possible justification of turning my lectures into 
a book. 24 
It is more likelyr however, that Eliot's change in attitude 
towards Donne's sermons between 1919 and 1931 mirrors the change 
in Eliot from a largely literary perspective to a more religious 
or theological perspective. During these years, that is, Eliot 
came to discern a significant difference between Donne's rather 
fervid imagery and the cool, contemplative piety of certain other 
Anglican writers. In short, Eliot's enthusiasm for Donne's 
sermons varies inversely according to Eliot's theological concern. 
Essentially, Eliot regarded Donne as a man to whom "the 
A 25 qout pour la vie spirituelle" was not native. He was not a 
mystic; he was "primarily interested in man. 
26 In shortf Eliot 
felt that Donne was not so much theologically or spiritually 
unsound, as unreliable: 
About Donne there hangs the shadow of the impure 
motive; and impure motives lend their aid to a facile 
success. He is a little of the religious spell- 
binder, the Reverend Billy Sunday of his timep the 
flesh-creeper, the sorcerer of emotional orgy. We 
emphasize this aspect to the point of the grotesque. 
Donne had a trained mind; but without belittling the 
intensity or the profundity of his experience, we can 
suggest that this experience was not perfectly controlled, 
and that he lacked spiritual discipline. 
27 
But though his motive might be impurer it was not intentionally 
or consciously so. Eliot believed that Donne was genuinely 
devout; 
"But he was a sincere churchman not because he had passed 
through 
the doubt which his type of mind f inds congenial (I say 
his type 
233 
of mind) j, but because in theology he had not yet arrived 
there. 1128 In other words, Donne had not experienced doubt 
as the modern knows it, but he had the type of mind which 
might have done had it been placed in the modern world. And 
so Eliot explains that Donne "has many means of appeal, and 
appeals to many temperaments and minds, and, among others, 
to those capable of a certain wantonness of the spirit. 1,29 
That is, among others . Donne may appeal to the sceptical, or 
spiritually wanton, modern mind. Moreover, since Eliot, in 
1926, singles out the spiritually wanton from amongst the 
"many temperaments and minds" to whom Donne may appeal, one 
might find therein an unconscious criticism of the Eliot of 
1919 as spiritually wanton, for Donne's sermons certainly 
appealed to Eliot at this time. 
But whether attracted by him or repelled by him, Eliot 
found Donne's means of appeal to consist primarily in his 
personality. In "The Preacher as Artist" (1919) , Eliot notes: 
Donne was an Egoist, but not an egoist of the reli- 
gious, the mystical type. Perhaps he was something 
less important. At all events he was something else; 
and it was an Ego which nowhere in his works finds 30 
complete expression, and only furtively in his sermons. 
Similarly, in "Lancelot Andrewes" (1926), he adds: "Donne is 
a 'personality I... his sermons, one feels, are a 'means of 
self-expression. I He is constantly finding an object which 
shall be adequate to his feelings. .. e 1131 Or 
if not, in fact, 
finding an object adequate to his feelings, he was at least 
always searching for one; thus his recourse to religion: 
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Donne had a genuine taste both for theology and for 
religious emotion; but he belonged to that class of 
persons, of which there are always one or two examples 
in the modern world, who seek refuge in religion from 
the tumults of a strong emotional temperament which 
can find no complete satisfaction elsewhere. 32 
Eliot seems to imply that even Donne's formal conversion re- 
presents an attempt by Donne to find an object adequate to his 
feelings. In short, Eliot analyzes Donne's personality, and 
the latter's attempts to express it, in terms reminiscent of 
the definition of the "objective correlative" in "Hamlet and 
His Problems"; in fact, substitute "life" for "the form of art" 
in this definition and one finds an explanation of Eliot's 
perspective on Donne: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of 
art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in 
other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain 
of events which shall be the formula of that Earticular 
emotion; such that when the external facts, which must 
terminate in sensory ex3erience, are given, the emotion 
is immediately evoked. 3 
According to Eliot, Donne treated life as a form of art; his 
religion was an expression of his own personality. Perhaps, 
then, Eliot not only used the terms of his def inition of the 
objective correlative to explain his impressions of Donne's 
sermons, but actually derived the concept of the objective 
correlative in part from his early reading of these sermons* 
But whereas Donne represented his personality dramatically in 
its wayward obedience to God, Eliot sought to objectify his 
Subjectivity and thus make his personality disappear. None- 
theless, however, Eliot's tendency to regard Donne's religion 
as in some way an objective correlative of John Donne may 
have 
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facilitated his recognition of anglo-catholicism as the ob- 
jective correlative of certain aspects of T. S. Eliot. 
one also finds that Eliot attributes to Donne a confusion 
of sensibility which later comes to be expressed in his theory 
of the general dissociation of sensibility. He writes: "In 
Donne, there is a manifest fissure between thought and sens- 
ibility 99e. His learning is just information suffused with 
emotion, or combined with emotion not essentially relevant to 
it. " This was a chasm, however, which "in his poetry he bridged 
in his own way. " 
34 
In his poetry, Eliot argues, Donne possessed 
a unified sensibility: "A thought to Donne was an experience; 
it modified his sensibility. When a poet's mind is perfectly 
equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate 
experience. .. 4, . 
35 
But in his sermons, Donne's sensibility 
remained dissociated, for here his mind could not amalgamate 
information and emotion, but only combine it--often irrelevantly. 
, 36 In short,, one finds in Donne's sermons a "reasoning in emotion. 
But this reasoning in emotion, although betraying a dissociated 
sensibility, at least led to "a curious knowledge of the human 
heart,, and a stateliness of phrase and image hitherto possible 
,, 37 only in art. Yet, Eliot argues, not until Donne is compared 
with other sermon writers can one appreciate "the difference 
between Donne as an artist doing the traditional better than any 
one else had done it, and Donne putting into the sermon here and 
there what no one else had put into it. "38 In other words, only 
then can one appreciate the relation between tradition and the 
individual talent. And so, once again, one might argue that 
these famous--or infamous--concepts, that is, the concept of the 
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objective correlative and the concept of the relation between 
tradition and the individual talent, not only serve to analyze 
Donne's sermonsr but actually derive in 
-part 
from Eliot's early 
experience of these sermons. 
one has authority from Eliot himself, of course, for 
supposing that his early reading of Donne's sermons may have 
influenced him more than he was consciously aware. The ambi- 
guous psychological relationship between Eliot and Donne, more- 
over, indicates a strong attachment on Eliot's part. Having 
criticized Donne Is sermons for their appeal to a certain wanton- 
ness of spirit, and thereby criticizinq his own enthusiasm for 
Donne's sermons as spiritually wanton, Eliot thus exhibits what 
seem to be feelings of guilt over his early attachment to Donne. 
Yet he also seems to feel uneasy in critizing Donne: he ac- 
knowledges that his dismissive attitude towards Donne's sermons 
"is perhaps to-day an heretical sensation" and makes the claim 
for his own critical and emotional integrity that he,, for one, 
has "always been convinced" of the inferiority of Donne's 
sermons. 
39 Surprisingly, however, running counter to this 
increasing critical detachment f rom Donne's sermons, and runninýr 
parallel to Eliot's unease--and perhaps even guilt--at this 
process of detachment, is an increasing identification between 
]Eliot and Donne. Superficially, certain events in their lives 
correspond. Each, as young poets, led lives perceived by their 
audience to be radically different from--and even spiritually 
wanton when compared to--their mature adult years. In each case 
this perception seems inaccurate. Moreover, at approximately 
the same age--that is, about their fortieth year--each experienced 
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and expressed a formal and public conversion to the Anglican 
faith. These correspondences, of course, are simple coincidences 
and would have no meaning here but for the fact that Eliot 
himself seems to notice them. In "Donne in Our Time" (1931) , 
for instance, Eliot notes the Misconception concerninq Donne's 
early life and dismisses it: 
Nobody now, I suppose, divides Donne's life into 
two periods, one dissolute and irreligious, the 
other a revulsion to intense and austere piety, a 
division so complete as to suggest an alternation 
of personality. We agree that it is one and the same 
man in both early and later life. 40 
Agreement on this point, however, was not, and never has been, 
as unanimous as Eliot suggests. Eliot himself, moreover, was 
at this time still experiencing the contempt of those who dis- 
t 
missed his 1928 conversion as a radical alternation of person- 
ality. In defending Donne's intellectual, spiritual, and 
personal integrity, therefore, Eliot is effectively--though 
perhaps not consciously--defending his own. For the sake of 
the argument, then, Eliot cannot allow Donne to concede a 
dissolute and irreligious youth, but must explain away the 
apparent concession: 
It is pleasant in youth to think that one is a gay 
dog, and it is pleasant in age to think that one 
was a gay dog; because as we grow old we all like 
to think that we have changed, developed and improved; 
people shrink from acknowledging that they are exactly 
the same at fifty as they were at twenty- f ive--some- 
times, indeed, men alter in order to congratulate 
themselves that they have altered, and not out of 
inner necessity. 41 - 
Donne and Eliot did not alter at the age of forty, therefore, 
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however much they may have appeared to alter, for the apparent 
change was the result of inner necessity and so was necessary 
to maintain their identity and integrity. Thus, whether attracted 
or repulsed by Donne's personality, or the sermons through 
which he expressed this personality, Eliot could not resist 
Donne Is appeal. It is the voice of experience speaking in the 
"Lancelot Andrewes" essay of 1926,, then, when Eliot observes 
that Donne and his sermons have "many means of appeal. " 
42 
One finds more evidence of Donne's appeal in Eliot's early 
poetry. In Donne's description of the goal of spiritual liberal- 
ity,, for instance, one discovers an explanation of Eliot's poetic 
goal in "Gerontion": 
To finde a languishing wretch in a sordid corner, 
not onely in a penurious fortune, but in an oppressed 
conscience, His eyes under a diverse suffocation, 
smothered with smoake, and smothered with teares, His 
eares estranged from all salutations, and visits, and 
all sounds, but his owne sighes, and the stormes and 
thunders and earthquakes of his owne despaire,, To 
enable this man to open his eyes, and see that Christ 
Jesus stands before him, and sayes, Behold and see, 
if ever there were any sorrow, like my sorrow, an 
my sorrow is overcome, why is n7o-tthTne-? T-T-74-15) 
Gerontion represents for Eliot the Job-like wretch of Donne's 
sermon. He has his own sordid corner in his decayed and "draughty 
house / Under a windy knob , 
44 (38). In the end, it proves, at 
most, to be a "sleepy corner" (39). Moreover, just as Donne's 
wretch has been "smothered with smoake, and smothered with tears, " 
while his ears have become estranged from all sounds except 
his own sighs, so Gerontion has lost "sight, smelly hearing, taste 
and touch" (38). And like Donne's wretch, Gerontion must use 
his suffering and loss as a means of coming to know Christ; thusr 
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threatened with the loss of his physical senses, he asks: "How 
should I use them for your closer contact? " (38). But why is 
this sufferinq and loss necessary? Donne sugqests an answer: 
God, who, when he could not get into me, by standing, 
and knocking, by his ordinary meanes of entrinq, by 
his Word, his mercies, hath applied his judgements, 
and hath shaked the houser this body, with agues 
and palsies, and set this house on fire, with fevers 
and calentures, and frighted the Master of the house, 
my soule, with horrors, and heavy apprehensions, and 
so made an entrance into me. ... (209-10) 
Gerontion, requires just this course of treatment in order to 
make him receptive to God's grace. It seems, then, that the 
plot of "Gerontion"--if the search for redemption can properly 
be called the plot--derives in part from ideas found in Donne's 
sermons. 
But these sermons provide particular images as well as 
general ideas. The imaqe of "the house,, this body, with agues 
and palsies" is common to Donne and "Gerontion. 11 Donne further 
explains that a house occupied by quarreling tenants proves an 
obstacle to prayer: "I began to think, how many roofs, how 
many floores of separationt were made between God and my prayers 
in that house" (31). Gerontion, between his memory, reconsidered 
passion, and weak hands--"Tenants of the house / Thoughts of a 
dry brain in a dry season" (39)--discovers just as many obstacles 
to a relation with God in his own house, his soul. Similarlyp 
a knowledge of Donne's sermons increases the allusiveness of 
the act of "waiting for rain" (37). Gerontion appears to be a 
second Noah, waiting for the rains which will bring the flood of 
repentance--an image one f inds in Donne: 
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And as fish, when they mud themselves, have no hands to make themselves cleane, but the current of the 
waters must worke that; So have the men of this world no means to cleanse themselves from those sinnes 
which they have contracted in the world, of themselves, till a new flood, waters of repentance, drawne u13, and 
sanctified by the Holy Ghost, worke that blessed 
effect in them. (73) 
Perhaps it would have been better for Gerontion, then, to have 
been claimed by the waters of "the Gulf 11 (39) than to have been 
"driven by the Trades / To a sleepy corner" (39) of that decayed 
house. A knowledge of Donne's sermons, furthermore, suggests 
the reason for Gerontion's scepticism about the value of know- 
ledge. Gorontion asks and warns: 
After such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think now 
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors 
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, 
Guides us by vanities. (38) 
This view of knowledqe may in part derive from Donne, who warns 
that "All knowledge that begins not, and ends not with his 
[Christ's] 
glory, is but a giddy, but a vertiginous circle, 
but an elaborate and exquisite ignorance" (105). Only this 
knowledge gives forgiveness, the rest is vain and vertiginous 
history. 
Do% 
Reference to images in Donne's sermons, furthermore, 
increases the allusiveness of the imagery of The Waste Land. 
Donne's observation that man was made from "the great field of 
clay, or red earth" (1) echoes in The Waste Land. Firstr there 
is the red rock: "There is shadow under this red rock, / 
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock) ... 
11 (61). Then 
there is the red human mud: "red sullen f aces sneer and snarl 
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From doors of mudcracked houses ... It (72) . But Eliot has 
not just borrowed Donne's image, he has also borrowed his Dun. 
According to a note in Donne's Sermons, "Donne was extremely fond 
of this pun on the Hebrew word Adam or red earth. . e*1,45 The 
red human mud, therefore, represents Adam and his descendents, 
that is , mankind in qeneral. The red rock, however, represents 
Christr for Christ is the second Adam--and so red--as well as 
the rock upon which the Church is founded. But that The Wast-em 
Land's images of red rock and red mud derive from Donne's pun 
upon Adam and red earth seems all the more likely, given that 
Eliot's first reference to the rock in question, in "The Death 
of Saint Narcissus, " shows it to be qrav: "Come under the 
shadow of this gray rock-- / Come in under the shadow of this 
gray rock ... 11 (605) . The one red rock mentioned in "The 
Death of Saint Narcissus, " in fact, is simply the gray rock 
turned red by the red light of the fire or the red of the Saint's 
blood. The rock in The Waste Land, however, is red for a reason. 
Similarly, Donne seems to contribute to other Waste Land 
images. Although the reference to "Son of man" (61) , for 
instance,, is ultimately an allusion to Ezekiel, as Eliot points 
out in the notes to the poem, it may come to Eliot by way of a 
Donne sermon: "As God said to Ezekiel, when he brought him to 
the dry bones, hominis, Sonne of Man, doest thou thinke 
these bones can live? " (68). Donne also reinforces the religious 
connotations of that "game of chess" which involves "waiting 
for a knock upon the door" (65): "Imagine God, as the Poet 
saith, Ludere in humanis, to play but a game at Chesse with this 
I 
world (140). Donne's explanation that "God hath made 
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this life a B_ridcTe to Heaven ... it (165), furthermore, provides 
Eliot with another reason f or including London Bridge in The 
Waste Land. Life in the modern cit-V of London Provides no bridge 
to heaven; thus: "London Bridge is fallincT down falling down 
falling down ... 11 (74) . Moreover, the wonder with which the 
speaker in the poen, reagards the crowd of peonle f lowing over 
0 the bridge, and the freenziend and fearful questioning with which 
he confronts Stetson, reinforce Donne's claim that "it is but 
a giddy, and a vertiginous thing, to stand long gazing upon 
so narrow a bridge, and over so deep and roaring waters, and 
desT)erate whirlpools, as this world abounds with ... 11 (165). 
Similarly, a Donne sermon suggests The Waste Land connection 
between hearing and the key to heaven: "I have heard the key / 
Turn in the door (74) . Donne argues that there is "no 
salvation but by faith, nor faith but bv hearing, nor hearing 
but by preaching; and they that thinke meanliest of the Keyes 
of the Church ... will yet allow, That those Keyes 
lock, and 
unlock in Preaching (18) . In the end,, then,, not only 
do Eliot's particular images agree with Donnelst but so does his 
use of them. The voice of Eliot in The Waste Land agrees with 
the voice of Donne in the sermons: "when all is done,? the 
hell of hels, the torment of torments is the everlasting absence 
Of God, and the everlasting impossibility of returning to his 
presence (208) . 
Donne's place in Eliot's af f ections- theological and 
literary--was eventually taken by Lancelot Andrewes. Initiallyp 
h0wever, Eliot seems to have had a very low opinion of Andrewes. 
In "The Preacher as Artist" (1919), for instancer Eliot writes 
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that Donne "is no Buddha, but certainly not an Andrewes either. n46 
The compliment to Donne is at the expense of Andrewes. According 
to Robert Sencourt,, howevero, Eliot's friendr William Force Steadf 
"from their first meeting in 1923, steadily drew Tom towards 
the writings of seventeenth -century Anglicanism, and especially 
those of Lancelot Andrewes. 11 
47 
By the time of the "Lancelot 
Andrewes" essay of 1926, then, Eliot is writing that "among 
persons interested in devotion his 
[Lancelot Andrewes I] 'Private 
Prayers' are not unknown. , 
48 
Presumably, the phrase "among 
persons interested in devotion" includes Eliot himself. Eliot's 
opinion of Andrewes has shifted so much by 1929, in fact, that 
in "The Prose of the Preacher: The Sermons of Donne" he can 
claim--as though he, for one, had always believed it--that 
"Donne was by no means either the first or the last of the great 
English preachers; I believe that his contemporary, Bishop 
Andrewes, is greater. , 
49 Andrewes, Eliot argues, simply 
"rose to greater heights" than Donne. 
50 As Eliot's esteem for 
Donne on theological and literary grounds declined, then, so 
his esteem for Andrewes grew. But although Andrewes may not 
have exerted a conscious influence upon Eliot until 1923 or 
later,, the ef fect of Eliot's early reading of Andrewes' sermons 
makes itself evident f rom a much earlier period. 
Andrewes, Eliot feels, "has the A pour la vie spiritueller 
which is not native to Donne. , 
51 Andrewes was interested in 
the Church; Donne was interested in man: 
of the two men, it may be said that Andrewes is the 
more medieval, because he is the more pure, and 
because his bond was with the Church, with tradition. 
His intellect was satisfied by theology and his 
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sensibility by prayer and liturgy. Donne is the 
more modern--if we are careful to take this word 
exactly, without any implication of value, or any 
suggestion that we must have more sympathy with Donne than with Andrewes. Donne is much less the 
mystic; he is primarily interested in man. He is 
much less traditional. '52 
'D, m 
,, ze-gardless, 
then, of Eliot's apparently dismissive attitude 
towards Andrewes in 1919, Andrewes--given that he is more 
traditional than Donne--was always the more likely to have 
influenced the Eliot of "Tradition and the Individual Talent. " 
The voice of Andrewes, Eliot writes in 1926, "is the voice of 
a man who has a formed visible Church behind him, who speaks 
with the old authority and the new culture. " 
53 In other words, 
Andrewes possesses something of the historical sense; he writes 
"not merely with his own generation in his bones, " but with a 
knowledge of previous theological generations as well. 
54 Eliot' s 
experience in reading Andrewes I sermons in 1918 or 1919 (or 
perhaps even earlier) may, therefore, have contributed signifi- 
cantly to his thought concerning the relation between tradition 
and the individual talent. 
In Andrewes' sermons, moreovert Eliot found the same dis- 
cipline with words that he sought in his own writing. Andrewes 
demonstrates 
that determination to stick to essentials, that 
awareness of the needs of the time, the desire 
for 
clarity and precision on matters of importance, and 
the indifference to matters indifferent, which was 
the general policy of Elizabeth. 
55 
The discipline that Eliot admiredr of course, was not just 
in 
Andrewes' wordst but in his thought: 
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To persons whose minds are habituated to feed on the 
vague jargon of our time, when we have a vocabulary for everything and exact ideas about nothing--when-a 
word half-understood, torn from its place in sone 
alien or half-formed science, as of psycholoqv, con- 
ceals from both writer and reader the utter meanina- lessness of a statement, when all doqma is in doubt 
except the dognas of sciences of which we have read 
in the newspapers, when the language of theology 
itself, under the influence of an undisciplined 
mi7sticism of popular philosophy, tends to become a 
language of tergiversation--Andrewes may seem pedantic 
and verbal. It is only when we have saturated our- 
selves in his prose, followed the movement of his 
thought, that we find his examination of words termin- 
ating in the ecstasy of assent. 56 
In this ecstasy,, Eliot assented to the beliefs about which Donne 
was sceptical, that is, "that there was a unity in existence, 
a relation of real to ideal, which was not beyond the mind oA I: 
man to trace in its outlines. " 
57 
Andrewes' use of words leads 
inevitably to this belief: "Andrewes takes a word and derives 
the world from it; squeezing and squeezing the word until it 
yields a full juice of meaning which we should never have sup- 
posed any word to possess. , 
58 
As Northrop Frye observes, Eliot 
starts "with what he calls, quoting Andrewes, 'The word within 
the word, unable to speak a word, ' at the hidden centre of 
reality" and ends "with the Word as the circumference of 
reality. 
59 
In Donne then, Eliot found "hardly any attempt 
at organisation; rather a puzzled and humorous shuffling of the 
pieces, " whereas in Andrewes' tradition, respect for authorityl 
and discipline, Eliot found much of the classicism, rovalism, 
and anglo-catholicism of his For Lancelot Andrewes declaration. 
60 
But Eliot also finds in Andrewes' sermons more particular 
inf luences. Andrewes I attitude toward the authority of the 
Gospel,, for instance, is similar to Eliot's attitude toward 
the 
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authority of the Bible. Andrewes writes: 
Gospel it how we will, if the Gospel hath not the leqalia of it acknowledged, allowed, and preserved to it; if once it lose the force and vigou-r of a law, it is a sign it declines, it grows weak and 
unprofitable and that is a sign it will not long last. 61 
similarly, Eliotr considering the Bible as literature, asserts: 
the Bible has had a literary influence upon English 
literature not beca it has been considered as 
literature, -Eu-t because it has been considered as 
the report of the Word of God. And the fact that 
men of letters now discuss it as 'literature' robablv 
indicates the end of its 'literary' influence. 
ý2 
Not only is the attitude toward the authority of Scripture the 
same, then, but so is the argument and conclusion concerning the 
neglect of this authority. 
In Andrewes' sermons, moreover, as distinct from Donne's 
sermons, Eliot particularly appreciates the proper subordination 
of the preacher's personality to the spiritual task at hand: 
"Andrewes's emotion is purely contemplative; it is not personal, 
it is wholly evoked by the object of contemplation, to which it 
is adequate; his emotion is wholly contained in and explained by 
its object. 1163 Here, then, is somethinq of the impersonality 
that Eliot demands from the artist. In "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent, 11 he writes that what happens to an artist "is 
a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to 
something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is 
a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality. 
" 
SiMilarly, "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotiono, but an 
escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, 
but 
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an escape from personality. " 
64 Here,? moreoverf there is also 
something of Eliot' s objective correlative in the account of 
how the contemplative emotion of Andrewes I sermons is adequate 
to the object of contemplation: "his emotion is wholly con- 
tained in and explained bv its object. " And in Andrewes, finally, 
Eliot finds a unified sensibility: "Intellect and sensibility 
were in harmony; and hence arise the particular qualities of his 
style. , 
65 There was food, then, in Andrewes, as well as Donne, 
for Eliot's thought on the dissociation of sensibility. Given 
Eliot's analysis of Andrewes' sermons in the language of his 
concepts of the objective correlative, the impersonality of the 
artist, and the dissociation of sensibility, one cannot help 
but suspect that these concepts not only accurately ref lect 
Eliot's early experience in reading these sermons--an experience 
which predates his articulation of the concepts themselves- 
but also derive in part f rom this very experience. 
Eliot's early reading of Andrewes' sermons, however, also 
left its mark in his poetry. As early as 1919, in "The Preacher 
as Artist, " Eliot had noted a passage from Andrewes which was 
similar to--and, in the text, right next to--the passage from 
Andrewes which begins "Journey of the Magi": 
Our fashion is to see and see again before we stir a 
foot, specially if it be to the worship of Christ. 
Come such a journey at such a time? No; but fairly 
have put it off to the spring of the year, till the 
days longer, and the ways fairer, and the weather 
warmer, till better travelling to Christ. 
66 
In the poern of 1928,, Eliot actually quotes from the followinq 
Passage: 
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A cold coming they had of it at this time of the year, just the worst time of the year to take a journey, and specially a long journey in. The ways deep, the weather sharp, the days short, the sun farthest off in solstitio brumali, 'the very dead of winter. t6l -- 
But although this is the passage quoted in "Journey of the 
Magi, " it actually suggests, by contrast, the conclusion of 
the passage quoted in the 1919 review--that is, that modern 
maqi would not make such a journey; instead, they would pro- 
crastinate. Eliot also notes phrases of special Poetic interest 
in "Lancelot Andrewes" (1926): "Phrases such as 'Christ is no 
wild-cat. What talk ye of twelve days? ' or 'the word within a 
word,, unable to speak a word', do not desert us, .a 40 1168 
Indeed, many phrases from the sermons of Andrewes--in addition 
to these--did not desert Eliot in the course of his early poetry. 
"The word within a word, unable to speak a word" (37) of 
"Gerontion" derives from Andrewes' Seventeen Sermons on the 
Na . Andrewes returns again and again to the irony that 
"the Word be not able to speak a word"; he exclaims: "What, 
Verbum infans, the Word an infant? The Word, and not be able 
tO speak a word? How evil agreeth this! " 
69 
Similarly, in 
the same stanza, Eliot's phrases-- I'Signs are taken for wonders. 
'We would see a sign! "1 (37) --are taken from Andrewes: "Signs are 
g "70 taken for wonders. 'Master, we would fain see a sign. ... 
The reference to Matthew (Matt. xii. 3 8) . borrowed from Andrewes I 
is particularly appropriate to a poem conceived as an introduction 
to The Waste Land,, for the next verse continues: "An evil and 
adulterous generation seeketh af ter a sign .*9" 
(Matt. Xii - 
39). And similarly, in a stanza largely given over to Andrewesp 
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"Christ the tiger" (37) may not only allude to Blake's image 
of Christ as a tiger, but may also allude to Andrewes I "wild- 
cat"--one of those phrases which "do not desert us. to 
One also finds in Andrewes' sermons further sources for 
the images in "Gerontion" concerning houses and knowledge. 
Gerontion's claim that his house "is a decayed house" (37) and 
"a draughty house / Under a windy knob" (38) is one way of 
expressing the feelings of inadequacy before God which Andrewes 
expresses in his Preces Privatae: 
I am not worthy,, neither sufficient 
that Thou shouldest enter beneath the filthy roof 
of the house of my soul, 
seeing it is all desolate and downfallen, 
and Thou hast not with me a worthy place 
to lay thy head. 71 
Similarly, Gerontion's account of the efficacy and value of 
historical knowledge--with its "many cunning passages, contrived 
corridors / And issues, " deceptive "whispering ambitions, " and 
vain guidance (38)--finds its counterpart in Andrewes' account 
of the difficulties in attaining self-knowledge: 
A good man had liefer know his own infirmity than 
know the foundations of the earth and the top- 
most heights of heaven. 
But that knowledge of a man's own infirmity is not 
procured save by diligent inquisition, without 
the which the mind is many times blind and 
seeth nought in its own concerns. 
There are many lurkingplaces in the mind and many nooks. 
You must detect yourself or ever you amend yourself. 
A sore unknown waxeth worse and worse and qetteth past 
cure. 
The heart is deceitful above all things: 
the heart is deep and f ull of windings: 
the old man is covered up in a thousand wrappings. 
Therefore take heed to thyself. 72 
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Instead of "cunning passages" and "contrived corridors, " Andrewes 
warns against the "many lurkingplaces" and "many nooks" of the 
mind. And whereas history deceives with "whispering ambiti ns, " 0, 
the heart, according to Andrewes, "is deceitful above all things. " 
Granting their slightly different perspectivest however, Eliot 
and Andrewes agree on their final advice--"take heed to thy- 
self"--for "the old man is covered up in a thousand wrappings. " 
other of Eliot's poems, of course, also suggest the in- 
f luence of Andrewes I sermons. Andrewes uses the same Hebrew 
pun that Donne uses--the pun that lies behind the red rock and 
red mud imaqes in The Waste Land: "He that raised Jesus 
shall by Jesus raise us up from the Adama of Edom, the redd 
mould of the earth, the power of the grave. ... , 
73 
Similarly, 
the twisting and turning in Ash-liednesdav--"At the second turning 
of the second stair /I left them twisting, turning below 
(93)--recalls Andrewes' explanation of repentance: 
Repentance it selfe is nothing els, but redire 
ad principia, a kind of circling; to returne to Him 
By7 repentance, from whom, by sinne, we- have-turned 
away. .** 
First, a turne, wherein we looke forward to 
God, and with Fýurwhole heart resolve to turne to 
Him. Then, a turne againe 14 wherein we 
looke back- 
ward to our sinnes. ... 
Similarly, certain lines from Four Quartets--"In my beginning 
is my end" (177) and "In my end is my beginning" (183) --may 
derive in part from Andrewes. Concerning St. Matthew's de- 
scription of Christ as Dux qui , Andrewes writes: 
'Leading He feeds us, and feeding He leads us' till 
He bring us whither? Even to a principiop back again 
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to where we were at the beginning; and at the begin- 
ning we were in Paradise. That our beginning shall be our end. 75 
With For Lancelot Andrewes (1928), then, Eliot once again con- 
firms his admiration for Andrewes' sermons. In the Introductiont 
however, he not only gives "an indication of what may be expected" 
of him in his future work, but also gives "an indication of what 
may be expected" of him in his past work, for, in the end, 
Andrewes' presence in Eliot's poetry and criticism dates from 
the beginning of Eliot's experience in reading Andrewes' sermons, 
76 
Another preacher whose influence appears in Eliot's early 
poetry and prose is Hugh Latimer. But whereas Donne's personality 
oriqinally fascinated Eliot, and Andrewes' subordination of his 
personality to the object of contemplation later gained Eliot's 
respects Latimer's personality seems to have had no impact upon 
him. Eliot, however, had read Latimer's sermons at the same time 
as he was reading those of Donne and Andrewes. He devoted 
enough attention to them, in fact, to be able to cite in "The 
Preacher as Artist" (1919) a passage which he regarded as 
particularly noteworthy: "Now turn up your trumpr your heart 
(hearts is trump,, as I said before), and cast your trump, your 
heart,, on this card; and upon this card you shall learn what 
Christ requireth of a christian man. .o 4P , 
77 Eliot draws 
attention to the method of Latimer's preaching: "The method-- 
the analogy, and the repetition--is the same as that once used 
by a greater master of the sermon than either Donne or Andrewes 
or Latimer: it is the method of the Fire-Sermon preached 
by the 
Buddha. jg78 It is strictly as a writer of sermons, then, and not 
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as a versonality, that Latimer holds importance for Eliot. 
But even so, "As a writer of sermonsi, Donne is Superior to 
,, 79 Latimer. *9o Theologically, moreovery Latimer's sermons 
rank well below those of Andrewes: 
Compare a sermon of Andrewes with a sermon by another 
earlier master, Latimer. It is not merely that 
Andrewes knew Greek, or that Latimer was addressing a 
far less cultivated public, or that the sermons of 
Andrewes are peppered with allusion and quotation. 
It is rather that Latimer, the preacher of Henry 
VIII and Edward VI, is merely a Protestant; but the 
voice of Andrewes is the voice of a man who has a 
formed visible Church behind him, who speaks with 
the old authority and the now culture. It is the 
difference of negative and positive. .0 41 
80 
If in nothing more, then, "Hugh Latimer was adept in homely 
illustrations to drive a point home to an unlettered audi- 
ence. .. e , 
81 Given, then, that Eliot regarded Donne as a 
more interesting personality and a better writer than Latimerr 
and Andrewas as a very much more important writer theologically, 
one might suspect that Latimer Is sermons made no impact upon 
Eliot. The evidence of his poetryt however, proves otherwiser 
for, in the terms of Eliot's metaphor, having swallowed Latimer's 
sermons, he was then affected by the unconscious process of 
digestion and assimilation. 
Latimer's influence appears primarily in The Waste Land. 
The "wicked pack of cards" (62) of Madame sosostris, for instance, 
seems a parody of Latimer's cards--cards which, as a metaphor, 
had caught Eliot' s attention in 1919. Latimer used his sermons 
on cards to declare Christ's rule: 
And for because I cannot declare Christ's rule unto 
you at one time, as it ought to be done, I will apply 
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myself according to your custom at this time of Christmas: I willf as I saidr declare unto you Christ's ruler but that shall be in Christ's cards. And whereas you are wont to celebrate Christmas in 
playing at cards, I intend, by God's grace, to deal 
unto you Christ's cards, wherein you shall perceive Christ's rule. 82 
Although, then, a mere parody of Latimer's dealing, the i-Dicture 
of Madame Sosostris, the cards she deals, and the advice that 
follows therefrom, is made all the more decadent and impotent by 
the contrast. 
Similarly, Eliot associates the city of London with the 
decadent sexuality of The Waste Land just as Latimer associates 
London with whoredom. Latimer complains that "There is more 
open whoredom, more stewed whoredom, than ever was before" and 
exclaims: "0 Lord, what whoredom is used now-a-days .e. how 
God is dishonoured by whoredom in this city of London. .&4,83 
So, in the London of The Waste Land, women threaten to "walk the 
street" (65), take pills "to bring it off" (66), and think only 
"Well now that's done: and I'm glad it's over" (69). In The 
Waste Land's sigh, "0 City city" (69), and especially in The 
Rock's warning, "Oh London, London, repent, repent, " 
84 there is 
something of Latimer's lament: "Oh Londons, London'. repent, 
repent; for I think God is more displeased with London than ever 
he was with the citV of Nebo.,, 
85 Moreoverr in reading the 
Everyman edition of Latimer's sermons--as it seems likely that 
he did--Eliot would have discovered a further meaning to which 
he might allude in The Waste Land reference to "Leman" 
(67). 
86 
Leman, of course, is another name for Lake Geneva. Eliot attended 
a clinic here during his breakdown. Weeping by these waters 
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alludes to weeping by the waters of Babylon, a city of exile, 
infidelity, and harlotry for the Jews. Leman is also the 
Anglo-Saxon word for lover. Its connotation, according to the 
Everyman editor of Latimer's sermons, is usually negative: 
"Lemano, properlys, 
[is] 
a sweetheart of either sex, but the 
word was commonly used in a bad sense. , 
87 
Hereo, then, in this 
explanation of Latimer's allusion to the begetting of the 
world from Envy, the devil's "well beloved Leman, " is a further 
source of The Waste Land's sexual ambiguity and ambivalence. 
88 
Given these associations, the speaker's tears "By the waters of 
Leman" (67) are entirely justified. 
Latimer's influence is also evident in "The Hollow Men,, " 
although Eliot does not quote directly from Latimer's sermons. 
In periods of spiritual dryness, as illustrated in "Gerontion, " 
The Waste Land, and "The Hollow Men, " Latimer's advice is to 
say the Lord I s; Prayer: "and specially now at this time let us 
resort unto God; for it is a great drought, as we think, and 
we had need of rain. " 
89 From Latimer's perspective? then, the 
concluding reference to the Lord's Prayer in "The Hollow Men" 
is the logical spiritual conclusion not only of this particular 
poem, but of the series of three "dry" poems running from 
"Geriontion" through The Waste Land to "The Hollow Men. " Further- 
morer that the prayer should end in an inconclusive and incoherent 
whimper also follows from Latimer's preaching: 
For there is no word nor letter contained in thiS 
prayer [the Lord's Prayer , but it is of great 
importance and weight; anJ therefore it is necessary, 
for us to know and understand it thoroughly, and 
then to speak it considerately with great devotion: 
else it is to no purpose to speak the words without 
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understanding; it is but lip-labour and vain babbling, 
and so unworthy to be called prayer. ... 9o 
The spiritual state of the speaker in "The Hollow Men" is 
represented literally by the vain and laboured babbling of 
the Lord's Prayer--"For Thine is / Life is / For thine is the" 
(86)--which Latimer suggests is the spiritual effect, if not 
actually the verbal effect, of spirituallv uncomprehending 
prayer. The conclusion to "The Hollow Men, " then, bearing 
Latimer in mind, is ironically positive; for the speaker, 
though still spiritually dry, and so unable to say the Lord's 
Prayer with meaning, at-least recognizes that the prayer is the 
appropriate response to his dilemma, and the poet, as distinct 
from the speaker, recognizes that the Lord's Prayer, although 
the appropriate response to this dilemma, ought not to be 
articulated until known and understood fully. 
In addition to the influence of Latimer, Andrewes, and 
Donne,, however,, one might also argue that Eliot's poetry shows 
a certain influence of Jeremy Taylor. But as with Latimer, 
Taylor's personality made no great impression upon Eliot. In- 
stead, Eliot was concerned to evalute him merely as a preacher: 
"Donne was by no means either the f irst or the last of the great 
English preachers; I believe that his contemporary, Bishop 
Andrewes, is greaterf and Jeremy Taylor certainly must take an 
equal rank. 1191 Taylor, however, "has a sweetness and purity 
Of tone unknown to Donne. , 
92 With Donne and Andrewes, further- 
more, he shared a poetic sensibility; that isy he "had 
the 
sensitiveness necessary to record and to bring to convergence 
on a theological point a multitude of fleeting but universal 
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feelings. , 
93 
Aware.. then, not onlv of Taylor's sensitiveness to theoloqy 
and feeling, but also of Eliot's sensitiveness to Taylor, one is 
not surprised to find somethinq of The Waste Land's spiritual 
rationale in one of Taylor's sermons: 
He that accuses himself of his crimes ... means to forsake them, and looks upon them on all sides, and 
spies out his deformity, and is taught to hate them; 
he is instructed and praved for, he prevents the anger 
of God and defeats the devil's malice, and by making 
shame the instrument of repentance, he takes away the 
sting, and makes that to be his medicine which other- 
wise would be his death. And concerning this exercise, 
I shall only add what the patriarch of Alexandria ... told an old religious person in his hermitage: having 
asked him what he found in that desert, he was answered 
only this, Indesinenter culpare et judicare meipsum, 
, to judge and condemn myself perpetually, Ehat Ts the 
employment of my solitude, " the patriarch answered, 
Non est alia via, 'there is no other wav. v94 
Herer then, one finds not only an explanation of The Waste Land's 
strategy of confession and self -accusation. but one also finds 
another reason f or the waste land imagery: in the waste land, 
the speaker can judge and condemn himself and his society per- 
petually. Similarly, another passage from a Taylor sermon adds 
to the allusiveness of Eliot's images of rocks and shadows. 
Taylor writes: 
even the most innocent person hath great need of 
mercy, and he that hath the greatest cause of con- 
fidence, although he runs to no rocks to hide him, 
yet he runs to the protection of the cross, and 
hides 
himself under the shadow of divine mercies. ... 
95 
Whereas, then, even the most innocent seek to hide under the 
shadow of the cross, the guilty, by implicationt seek to 
hide 
under the shadow of rocks. The Waste Land's invitation 
to "Come 
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in under the shadow of this red rock ... 1, (61) thus exhorts 
the guilty#, who might otherwise seek the shelter of a physical 
rockf to join the innocent in the shadow of the spiritual rock-- 
that is, Christ the "red rock. " 
Eliot was also influenced by Thomas Cranmer. Cranmer-and 
most other Anglican preachers of the timer according to Eliot 
in 1931--was qreater even than Donne: "in the history of English 
Theology it is not Donne, but Cranmer and Latimer and Andrewes, 
who are the great prose masters. .oe 1196 His great works were 
The First and Second Praver-Books of King Edward VI, which Eliot 
had read by 1913. "[I]n his great prayer-book, " Eliot writes 
in "The Prose of the Preacher" (1929), Cranmer "rose to greater 
heights" than Donne. 97 Given this early reading, one ought not 
to be surprised to find certain liturgical allusions in the 
early poetry. In nGerontion, " for instance, one finds an echo 
of the Communion ritual in the statement that Christ came "To 
be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk / Among whispers" (37). The 
communicants themselves, howeverf seem to represent the ritual's 
decline into unmeaning in post-war Europe: Hakagawa partakes 
of the sacraments "bowing among the Titians" (37),, and perhaps 
even bowing to them; Madame de Tornquist does so while somewhat 
darkly and uncertainly "Shifting the candles" (37) ; Fraule n von 
Kulp? moreover, adds to the variety and uncertainty of the 
ceremonies catalogued by turning and pausing#, "one hand on 
the 
door" (38). The communicants' pravers are thus but 
"Vacant 
shuttlesn which "weave the wind" (38). "The Burial of 
the Deadj, " 
of course, is full of echoes of the funeral service 
in the 
Prayer Book--including the title itself - In 
"The Hollow Men, " 
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furthermore, one finds a liturgy without life. In the hollow 
men's "Shape without form, shade without colour, / Paralysed 
force, gesture without motion" (83) r Karen T. Romer riqhtly 
draws attention to certain liturgical allusions: 
"Shane, " "shade, " "qesture" --these words are highly 
suggestive of the Mass, in which throuqh gesture-, 
through the ever strengthening force of worship, 
shape and shade are materialized in the body and 
blood of Christ. The liturgy, here, then, is with- 
out life; worship is without life; the Mvstic Bodv 
of Christ is incorporate rather than corporate, a 
mere scarecrow of straw on crossed staves,, while 
Christ, the Head of the Church, is a mere "Headpiece 
filled with straw. "98 
The hollowness of these men, then, stems from the loss of the 
form, colour, force, and motion of real prayer. Their prayers 
are "As wind in dry grass"; thus: "Our dried voices, when / 
We whisper together / Are quiet and meaningless (83). 
They are not, then, as lost "Violent souls, but only / As the 
hollow men / The stuffed men" (83) ; that is, the hollow men do 
not even have the merit of those lost, violent souls who at 
least affirm the possibility of belief by their radical unbelief - 
Instead, the hollow men are lost in a hollow liturgy between 
belief and unbelief. 
In addition to particular liturqical influencesf however, 
Eliot was also influenced in his appreciation of tradition, 
and the past in general, by Cranmer's argument against 
the 
abolition of ancient Church ceremonies. Cranmer opposed Pro- 
Posals to abolish certain ceremonies for no other reason 
than 
their antiquity: 
But nowe as concernvnq those persones I whiche 
per- 
aduenture will bee offended for that some of 
the 
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olde Ceremonies are retayned stvil: Yf they consyder, that wythoute some Cerem-onies i-t is not possible 'to kepe anye ordre or quyete dvscyplyne in -the churche: they shall easilve perceyue-iuste cause to refourme theyr iudgements. And vf they thynke muche that anve of the olde, dooe rernayne, and wou-1de rather haue al-1 deuised anewe: then such menne (grauntyng some Ceremonves conueniente to bee hadde) I surelye where the olde maye bee :% well used: there thev cannot 
reasonablve reproue the olde (onelve for theyr age) 
withoute bewraiyng of theavr owne folye. For in suche 
a case they oughte rather to haue reuerence unto them for theyr antyquityej, vf they wvll declare themselues 
to bee more studious of unitie and concorde, then of innouacions and newefanglenesse, whiche (as muche as 
maye bee wyth the trewe settyng foorthe of Christes 
religion) is alwayes to bee eschewed. 99 
Here, then, in Eliot's early reading, is another source for 
his thought concerning the classical virtues of order and 
discipline, and a hint as well of his picture of the cultural 
and religious "unitie and concorde" fostered by the historical 
imagination. The service of the Eucharist itself , however, 
presupposes a more important relationship between past and 
present, for Christ, who as a rnan once lived in this world, is 
eternally present in the act of Communion- present spiritually, 
if not physically, in the symbols of his body and blood. The 
Anglican liturgyr then, as Romer suggestst was ready-made for 
Eliot: 
To a man fascinated with the relationship of the 
individual to his traditiont with the loneliness and 
estrangement of men, with the complexities of timey 
with symbolism, and with exploring the weiqht of 
associative context that could be born by words or 
a group of words, the Christian faith as expressed 
in 
the liturgy was ready-made for Eliot's special con- 
cerns. 100 
Cranmer's prayer-book, therefore, was not only ready-made 
to 
absorb Eliot's special concerns, but ready-made to helD 
him 
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articulate these concerns from a very early time. 
Similarly, Richard Hooker helped Eliot to articulate some 
of his early critical concerns. Hooker's Laws Of Ecclesiastical 
though not in the sermon form which so preoccupied 
Eliot in 1919, nonetheless impressed him in several respects. 
In respect of structured argumentr Hooker was supreme: "for 
ordonnance, loqical arrangementr for mastery of every fact rele- 
vant to a thesisr Bramhall is surpassed only by Hooker. .* 40 11101 
In Hooker, Eliot writes, "we find what we may call 'reasoning in 
tranquillity'; in Donne we find 'reasoning in emotion' . 1j102 
Eliot argues, furthermore, that the prose itself is noteworthy: 
"Without Hooker, the prose of the philosophery the jurist, even 
of the scientist, would not have developed so rapidly. ... , 
103 
Eliot analyzes this prose, moreover, in terms which suggest its 
relevance to the modern poet: 
The writings of both Hooker and Andrewes illustrate 
that determination to stick to essentials, that 
awareness of the needs of the time, the desire for 
clarity and precision on matters of importance, and 
the indifference to matters indifferent, which was 
the general policy of Elizabeth. These character- 
istics are illustrated in the definition of the 
Church in the second book of the 'Ecclesiastical 
polity'. 104 
Eliot's emphasis on Hooker's "clarity and precision" concerning 
matters of importance is Poundian. But setting aside the nuances 
Of his prose style, Hooker was also important theologically. 
One 
ought to show Donner Hooker, and Andrewes, Eliot writes, 
"among 
the great divines of the English Church of that period ... 
and 
remark upon the extent to which not the Church only, 
but the 
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whole of English civilisation, is indebted to those men. "105 
To a certain extent, this is the purpose of Eliot's remarks 
in "Lancelot Andrewes" (1926): 
The intellectual achievement and the prose style of Hooker and Andrewes came to complete the structure 
of the English Church as the philosophy of the 
thirteenth century crowns the Catholic Church. To 
make this statement is not to compare the 'Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' with the 'Summal. The seven- 
teenth century was not an age in which the Churches 
occupied themselves with metaphysics, and none of 
the writings of the fathers of the English Church 
belongs to the category of speculative philosophy. 
But the achievement of Hooker and Andrewes was to 
make the English Church more worthy of intellectual 
assent. 106 
Such, in any event, was their effect upon Eliot. 
Hooker's greatest influence upon Eliot's thought was in 
the shaping of his understanding of tradition and the individual 
talent, and in relating this understanding to Anglican theology. 
In a 1926 review, for instancer Eliot makes it clear that he 
finds in Hooker a mind with the historical sense: according 
to Eliot, one of the author's comments is particularly note- 
worthy: 
Dr. Norman Sykes's lecture on Hooker is ... an 
admirable piece of appreciation, and ... one wishes 
that the author might develop it into a separate 
treatise; and one of his statements about Hooker 
especially is worth pondering: -- 
Upon a general reading of the Ecclesiastical 
Polity, perhaps the most striking characteristic 
which impresses itself upon the student is the 
author's gift of historical thinking. Few have 
had 
a finer sense of the value of historical tradition 
than Hooker. To him the unity and continuity of 
history was neither a phrase nor a fallacy 
but a 
practical truth as well as an inspirationiO7 
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Hooker argued, like Cranmer, that the Church would not survive 
if it were to forsake its traditions in favour of an absolute 
scriptural authority; the effect of the radical Protestant's 
pleading against man's authority, as developed and embodied 
within Church traditions, would be to overthrow "such orders, 
laws,, and constitutions in the Church, as depending thereupon 
if they should therefore by taken away, would peradventure 
leave neither f ace nor memory of Church to continue lonq in the 
world. .. .9 "108 Moreover, man's traditional authority within 
the Church is not only necessary--though by no means sufficient-- 
for the Church's existence, but it is also a prerequisite, Hooker 
claims, for any salvation depending upon scriptural authority: 
whatsoever we believe concerning salvation by Christ, 
although the Scripture be therein the ground of our 
belief; yet the authority of man is, if we mark it, 
the key which openeth the door of entrance into the 
knowledge of the Scripture. The Scripture could not 
teach us the things that are of God, unless we did 
credit men who have taught us that the words of 
Scripture do signify those things. Some way therefore, 
notwithstanding man's infirmity, yet his authority 
may enforce assent. 109 
Yet despite his respect for tradition, Hooker could also see 
merit in the Protestant's claim to an individual relationship 
with God through a revealed and authoritative Scripture. 
Hooker was concerned not so much to decide f or one or 
the other 
of these extreme interpretations of authority, but rather 
to 
promote the Anglican claim to be the proper synthesis of 
these 
extremes: 
Two opinions theref ore., there are concerning suf 
f iciency 
of Holy Scripture, each extremely opposite unto 
the 
other, and both repugnant unto truth. 
The schools Of 
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Rome teach Scripture to be so unsufficient, as if, except traditions were added, it did not contain 
all revealed and supernatural truth, which absolutely is necessary for the children of men in this life to- know that they may in the next be saved. Others 
justly condemning this opinion qrow likewise unto 
a dangerous extremity, as if Scripture did not only 
contain all things in that kind necessary, but all things simply, and in such sort that to do any thing 
according to any other law were not only unnecessary 
but even opposite unto salvation, unlawful and sin- 
ful. 110 
In Hooker's treatment, then, the general themes of the Ref orm- 
ation serve as well in an inquiry into the relation between 
tradition and the individual talent in religion as they do 
in an inquiry into the proper definition of the Church. Hooker's 
Ecclesiastical Politv thus serves to help Eliot in articulating 
his critical conception of the relation between tradition and 
the individual talent in art. But it also serves, later, to 
bring him to his an-cjlo-catholic faith, for Hooker's definition 
of the Anglican Church was ready-made for Eliot. As Lyndall 
Gordon points out, 
Eliot felt that Anglo-CatholicismF unlike Roman 
Catholicism, would allow his mind scope. The Anglican 
Church acknowledges that the truth of the scriptures 
is only diml traced and must be verified by individual 
j udgemen. t. 111 
I 
In Anglicanism, therefore, Eliot found room both for religious 
tradition and individual religious talent; in Gordon's words 
once more, "He saw means of support and self-correction within 
the English traditions; at the same time he brought something of 
himself to the Anglican Church, a spirit more vehement, more 
dOgmatic and zealous. , 
112 Hooker's influence upon Eliot is thus 
both literary and religioust for the aspects of his work which 
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first help Eliot to articulate his literary criticism are the 
same aspects which later help him to accept and articulate 
his anglo-catholic faith. Once again, then, literary diqestion 
and assimilation produce an effect beyond that expected in the 
act of reading. 
Sir Thomas Browne--whose Religio Medici, according to 
Eliot,, though not exactly in the Elizabethan period, might 
"well be read in connection with it"--also proved an influence 
upon the early Eliot, particularlv with reference to the latter's 
conceptions of time and history. 
113 
Browne's analysis of the 
concept of time, for instance, foreshadows Bergson's treatment 
of the problem: 
to speak like a Philosopher, those continued instances 
of time which flow into a thousand years, make not to 
Him [God] one moment: what to us i-s to come, to His 
Eternity is present, His whole duration being but one 
permanentlyoint, without Succession, Parts, Flux, or 
Division. 4 
The chief distinction is that Browne places in God what Bergson 
places in the individual man. When Eliot came later to read 
Browne, then, the latter not only echoed and reinforced Eliot's 
early experience of Berqsonism, but also sugqested to Eliot how 
Bergsonism might be redeemed by adding God to the philosophical 
equation. 
Similarly, Browne's conception of time as history leaves 
its mark upon Eliot. According to Browne, time has no beginning 
or end; it is inconceivable "to retire so far back as to ap- 
prehend a beginning, to give such an infinite start forwards 
as to conceive an end, in an essence that we affirm hath neither 
2'5 
the one nor the other. , 
115 
Time, he feels, is a circle upon 
which the participants in history rise and f all like the sun: 
the lives, not only of men, but of Commonwealths 
and the whole world, run not upon an Helix that 
still enlargeth, but on a Circle, where, arriving to their Meridian, they decline in obscurity, and fall under the Horizon again. 116 
Not surprisingly, then, Browne feels that history repeats itself: 
"men are livId over aqain, the world is now as it was in Ages 
past; there was none then, but there hath been some one since 
that parallels him, and is, as it were, his revived self. jj117 
Even "Opinions do f ind, af ter certain Revolutions, men and minds 
like those that first begat them. "118 Something of Browne's 
notion of the eternal return of the persons of the past is found 
in Eliot's claim, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent, " 
that the most individual parts of a poet's work "may be those 
in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality 
most vigorously. "119 Similarly, Browne's claim that "the world 
is now as it was in Ages past" is reflected in Eliot's explana- 
n tion of the historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless 
as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal 
together. 11120 So too Eliot's concepts of a simultaneous order 
amongst the literatures of the past, and an ideal order amongst 
the existing monuments of these literatures, echo Browne's claims 
for the eternal presence--the timelessness--of the., past. Browne, 
moreover, like Eliot, conceives of the historical sense as an 
active element in the creative mind: 
We have enough to do to make up ourselves from present 
and passed times, and the whole stage of things scarce 
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serveth for our instruction. A compleat Peece of 
vertue must be made from the Centos of all ages, as all the beauties of Greece coUld--make but one handsome 
- 121 Venus. 
History, however, is neither simple nor trustworthy. And so, 
just as Eliot warns that "History has many cunning passages, 
contrived corridors / And issues, deceives with whispering 
ambitions, / Guides us by vanities" (38),, so Browne explains 
the origin of his sceptical attitude toward history in his 
knowledge of "what counterfeit shapes and deceitful vizards 
times present represent on the stage things past. ... , 
122 
In the end, however, Browne's most important influence is 
in helping to turn Eliot from a philosophical perspective on 
Bradley's Absolute to a religious perspective. Just as Browne's 
discussion of time foreshadows Bergson, so his analysis of 
difference and identity within relations foreshadows Bradley's 
philosophical emphasis. Bradley, for instance, feels that a 
relation is necessarily contradictory, for it "implies always 
two terms which are finite and which claim independence. On 
the other hand a relation is unmeaninq, unless both itself and 
the relateds are the adjectives of a whole. 11123 In short, a 
relation attempts to unite differences by means of an underlying 
identity and so asserts simultaneously difference and identity. 
Browne was aware of the same problem: 
even in things alike there is diversity; and those 
that do seem to accord do manifestly disagree. .-- 
There was never anything so like another as 
in all 
points to concur: there will ever some reserved 
difference slip in, to prevent the identity; without 
which, two several things would not be alike, 
but 
the same, which is impossible. 
124 
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In other words, "contraries,? though they destroy one another, 
are yet the life of one another.,, 
125 
Bradley's solution to the 
dilemma is to posit an Absolute which unites in itself every 
possible difference. There can be no relational appeal beyond 
the Absolute, for that ultimate reality would actually be the 
Absolute. The Absolute, then, is reality; appearance is but a 
relational differentiation within it. Browne, in fact, reaches 
the same conclusion, but refers ultimately to God, not an 
abstract Absolute, as reality: 
He [God] onely is, all others have an existence with 
dependency, and are something but by a distinction. 
And herein is Divinity conformant unto Philosophy, 
and generation not onely founded on contrarieties, but 
also creation; God, being all things, is contrary 
unto nothing, out of which were made all things, and 
so nothing became something, and Omneity informed 
Nullity into an Essence. 
Even more so than in respect of Bergsont thent Eliot's early 
experience of Browne's theological thought confirmed and re- 
inforced his Bradleyan cast of mind,, But more importantly, 
Browne made it clear to Eliot how this Bradleyan philosophical 
sensibility might be made compatible with an increasingly 
orthodox attitude towards the anglo-catholic faith; one need 
only convert a philosophical reverence of the Absolute to a 
religious reverence of God. 
In the end, then, Eliot's early reading experience of 
Donne,, Andrewes, Latimert Taylor, Cranmer, Hookerr and Browne 
produced a variety of effects which he could not 
have foreseen 
during his research for his extension lectures concerning 
Elizabethan literature. So great an impact did these writers 
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have upon his imaqination that they came to serve Eliot as 
Aquinas served Dante: "Dante's poetrly receives a boost which 
in a sense it does not merit, from the fact that the thouqht 
behind it is the thought of a man as great and lovely as Dante 
himsel f: St. Thomas. , 
127 So Eliot received a boost in his 
poetry and criticism in proportion to the impact-largely 
unconscious--of these early Anglican writers. He seems almost 
aware of this relationship in his claim that "The intellectual 
achievement and the prose style of Hooker and Andrewes came 
to complete the structure of the English Church as the philo- 
sophy of the thirteenth century crowns the Catholic Church. " 
128 
one might argue, in fact, that Eliot devoted so much study to 
the Anglican divines with the intention--in part--of creating 
just such a relationship as Dante had with Aquinas. After all, 
Dante was born into his relationship with Aquinas, whereas 
Eliot had to strive to acquire a relationship with the Anglican 
Church. But whatever his conscious intention during this early 
reading experience, Eliot's subsequent digestion and assimilation 
of sixteenth and seventeenth -century Anglican writing created a 
relationship between Eliot and these writers as real and as 
endurinq--if not as deep and as radical--as that between 
Dante 
and Aquinas . 
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Conclusion 
Given the Puritan background of the Eliot family in 
qeneral, and the Unitarian background of T. S. Eliot's own 
family in particular, it is not surprising to find a strong 
religious element in Eliot's early reading. Eliot was always 
likely to develop an acute sensitivitv to religion, if not a 
deeply religious sensibility. Even though he had lost his 
faith by the time he entered university, his mind was still 
alive to religious experiences and ideas. As Lyndall Gordon 
observes, although Eliot "had become completely indifferent 
to the Church" by the time he enrolled at Harvard, he had by 
no means become indifferent to reliqion: 
Eliot's Notebook and other manuscript poems show 
that he began to measure his life by the divine 
goal as far back as his student days, in 1910 and 
1911, and that the turning-point came not when he 
was baptized in 1927 but in 1914 when he first 
interested himself in the motives, the ordeals, 
and the achievements of saints. 1 
On the one hand, his religious sensibility led him to an early 
reading of certain religious writings, which included works by, 
and about, mystics, saints, and Anglican divines. On the other 
hando, however, such was his religious sensitivity that works 
on philosophy, anthropology, politics, and aesthetics-- appearing 
to have no more than a tangential religious reference- af f ected 
his religious development profoundly. Such, in part, was the 
influence of Babbitt, Maurrast and Hulme in aesthetics and 
POlitics, Frazer in anthropologyr and Bergson and Bradley 
in 
2 C- 7 
philosophy. 
on reading Babbitt, Maurras, and Hulme, Eliot found within 
their classical respect for discipline and authority in general 
a particular respect for spiritual discipline and authority. 
Babbitt and Maurras saw the Catholic Church as a cultural 
curator. According to Lyndall Gordon, Babbitt suggested to 
his Harvard students "that the Catholic Church might perhaps 
be the only institution left in the west that might be counted 
on to preserve the treasures of the past. ,2 Nevertheless, 
behind this pragmatic attitude toward the Church one f inds a 
genuine nostalgia for religious feeling, "that true humility- 
the inner obeisance of the spirit to something higher than 
itself --that has almost become one of the lost virtues.,, 
3 
Babbitt's humanism, Maurras' royalism, and Hulme's classicism, 
therefore, helped to lay the conceptual and emotional foundation 
upon which Eliot later placed the discipline and authority of 
his anglo-catholic faith. Similarly, Eliot realized the 
religious--as opposed to the s cepti cal- -potential of his 
anthropological studies. The Golden suggested to Eliot 
that the Christian Incarnation was the culmination of a uni- 
versal religious pattern in time--not, as Frazer implied, that 
it was merely a sophisticated derivative of ancient vegetative 
rituals. In reflecting upon the problems of anthropology 
in 
general, moreover, Eliot concluded that one must believe a 
certain point of view before one can understand it. 
He thus 
became,, in turn, a passionate convert of Bergson and 
Bradley. 
Bergson emphasized becoming; Bradley emphasized being; 
but it 
was Evelyn Underhill who brought being and becoming 
together in 
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Eliot's mind as a relation dependent upon God: 
On the one hand is his [man's] ineradicable intuition 
of a remoter unchanging Somewhat calling him: on the other there is his longing for and as clear intuition 
of an intimate, adorable Somewhat, companioning him. Man's true Real, his only adequate God-, must be great enough to embrace this sublime paradox, to take up these apparent negations into a higher synthesis. Neither the utter transcendence of extreme Absolutism, 
nor the utter immanence of the Vitalists will do. 
Both these, taken 
4 
alone, are declared by the mystics 
to be incomplete. 
From his study of Underhill and mvsticism, Eliot proceeded to 
read certain Anglican divines. Donne served him as an example 
of both the theologian indulging his personality and the poet 
indulging his theology. As such, he was the figure with whom 
the "spiritually wanton" young Eliot tended to identify himself. 
Andrewes, however, served as the antithesis of Donne, and so, 
to some extent, as the antithesis of Eliot as well. But in 
the end,, Eliot came to reqard him as a pattern for himself . 
that is, as an example of a personality properly subordinated 
to the service of God. Just as Andrewes had sacrificed his 
personality to God in the discipline and order of his impersonal 
sermons, so Eliot wished to serve the "something outside of the 
artist" to which he owed allegiance, the devotion to which he 
felt the poet "must surrender and sacrifice himself in order 
to 
earn and to obtain his unique position. " 
5 But all the while 
he was reading Donne, Andrewes, Latimerr Taylor, Cranmer, 
Hooker, 
and Browne, Eliot was digesting and assimilating--according 
to 
his religious sensibility and sensitivity--the ideas of 
his 
earlier reading. The Anglican divines, therefore, 
brought to- 
gether in Eliot's mind the past and presentr God and art, and 
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England and the Church: 
A people without history 
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a T)attern Of timeless moments. So, while the light fails 
On a winters's afternoon, in a secluded chapel History is now and England. 6 (197) 
Clearly enought then, there is a pattern of religious develop- 
ment throughout Eliot's earlv life, poetry, and thought--a 
pattern which Eliot can later attribute to the influence of the 
Holy Spirit. The immediate imnact of Babbitt, Maurras, and 
Hulme, however, was not religious; Eliot regarded them as 
philosophers, not preachers. Similarly, Eliot treated Frazer 
as an anthropologist; indeed, Frazer's religious influence 
depended upon Eliot's acceptance of his work as legitimate 
anthropology. The influence of Bergson and Bradley, of courser 
was not at first religious. Even his initial reading of the 
Anglican divines lacked a religious dimension, for Eliot was 
at first more concerned with style than content. But in addi- 
tion to the particular philosophical, anthropological, and 
theological pleasures that he sought in these particular acts 
of literary "taste and mastication, " Eliot also experienced 
the largely unconscious, and often unforeseeable, effects of 
the 11process of assimilation and digestion. ,7 That is, during 
the twenty years between reading Babbitt and making his For 
Lancelot Andrewes declaration, Eliot gradually apprehended and 
synthesized the religious elements of his early reading. In 
the end, then, the theology of the Anglican divines became as 
important to him as the experiences of the saints and mystics 
With whom he had identified as a young student at Harvard. 
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This confirmation of the reliqious pattern of development 
in Eliot's earlv life, poetry, and thought--a pattern deriving 
from his early reading, and, for Eliot himself, from the Holy 
Spirit--helps to confirm Eliot's conclusion in Four Ouartets: 
"In my beginning is my end" (177) and "In mv end is my beginning" 
(183) . Eliot not only read the authors in question as a sceptical 
young man, but also re-read most of them after his formal con- 
firmation as a member of the Church of England. Hulme's work 
came to the notice of the general reading public in 1924 with 
the publication of Speculations, but Eliot returned to Hulme often 
in the following years. 
8 Similarly, for the March 1928 issue of 
The Criterion, Eliot himself translated an early essay by Charles 
Maurras. 9 Eliot also remembered Babbitto, in "The Humanism of 
Irving Babbitt" (1928), and Bradley, in "Francis Herbert Bradley" 
(1927). 10 From "Journey of the Magi" to the completion of Four 
Quartets, moreover, Eliot quoted the same saints, mystics, and 
Anglican divines that he had first read many years before. In 
this respect, Eliot's end is very much in his beginning. To 
neglect the early influence of his first reading of these authors, 
therefore, is also to ignore the end to which this early reading 
leads. That is, one cannot fully appreciate Eliot's religious end 
in Four Quartets unless one understands its development from 
his 
religious beginning in Babbitt, Maurrast and Hulmet Frazer, Berg- 
son, Bradley, and various saints, mystics, and Anglican 
divines. 
This study of the religious dimensions of Eliot's early reading, 
and the influence of this reading upon his early lifer poetry, 
and 
thought, thus provides the key to a fuller understanding of 
Eliot's major poetry* 
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